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END OF LIFE AND AUTONOMY: THE CASE FOR 
RELATIONAL NUDGES IN END-OF-LIFE DECISION-MAKING 
LAW AND POLICY 
MEGAN S. WRIGHT 
 Autonomy is a central principle in many areas of health law.  In 
the case of end-of-life decision-making law and policy, however, 
the principle of autonomy requires revision.  On the whole, law 
conceptualizes autonomy at the end of life as an individual making 
private, personal decisions based solely on their interests and val-
ues, and independent of others.  But ordinary people understand 
autonomous decisionmaking at the end of life differently, in a way 
that acknowledges the importance of their interpersonal relation-
ships.  Social science research has documented that strengthening 
relationships with others, sharing responsibility in the decision-
making process with healthcare providers, and taking care to not 
burden loved ones become important when confronting death and 
making decisions at the end of life. 
 The divergence in how law and most people conceptualize au-
tonomy becomes particularly consequential when people do not 
have decision-making capacity when an end-of-life decision must 
be made, and have not adequately planned in advance for loss of 
capacity.  Failures of rationality explain this all too common situ-
ation: a fear and avoidance of death makes people less likely to 
plan for it, and even when they do plan, they are unable to antici-
pate every possible end-of-life scenario and their preferences for 
each scenario.  In such cases, the law provides default processes 
and standards for end-of-life decisionmaking, which constitute a 
best guess of a surrogate decision-making process that will effec-
tuate the principle of autonomy.  However, in this default decision 
scheme, relational concerns are often accorded a different weight 
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or valence than most people would prefer as evidenced in empiri-
cal studies.  For example, state statutes may direct an incapaci-
tated person’s surrogate to make end-of-life decisions in the con-
text of the patient’s religious or moral beliefs but not explicitly 
instruct surrogates to consider the patient’s relationality.  Thus, 
decisions made at the end of life may not accord with people’s val-
ues, preferences, and interests.  Paradoxically, therefore, the cur-
rent defaults in end-of-life law may impede, rather than promote, 
autonomy. 
 In order to address this unintended consequence and make con-
sistent the purpose and intended outcome of end-of-life decision-
making law and policy, which is respect for autonomy, this Article 
argues for changes to accommodate the relational nature of auton-
omy at the end of life.  Drawing on the law and behavioral eco-
nomics literature about choice architecture, I argue that relational 
“nudges” should be built into end-of-life decision-making law and 
policy.  The proposed nudges are meant to combat failures of ra-
tionality, promote a relational autonomy, and reduce negative ex-
ternalities in end-of-life decisionmaking.  These nudges would be 
designed to affect an individual’s end-of-life decisions prior to loss 
of capacity; a surrogate’s healthcare decisions in the absence of 
advance directives; and healthcare providers’ shared decisions 
with the patient or surrogate.  While this necessitates changing 
some defaults, more consequentially, the nudges at the policy level 
would also change the way information and choices are presented 
to decisionmakers, such as patients and physicians, to prime the 
decisionmaker to decide, in part, based on relationality.  These 
changes may increase the likelihood that end-of-life decisions are 
made in accordance with most persons’ stated preferences—
namely that these decisions are shared with and made in consider-
ation of others. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Autonomy is a central principle in many areas of health law.1  This is 
because of the connection between healthcare provision and the right to bod-
ily integrity.2  As the Supreme Court stated, “[n]o right is held more sacred, 
                                                          
 1.  There are multiple definitions of autonomy, but throughout this Article, I will use the def-
inition proposed by eminent bioethicists, Professors Beauchamp and Childress.  “We analyze au-
tonomous action in terms of normal choosers who act (1) intentionally, (2) with understanding, and 
(3) without controlling influences that determine their action.”  TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. 
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 104 (7th ed. 2013) (emphasis added).   
 2.  These autonomy and bodily integrity rights are private and regulate conduct between indi-
viduals, but can also be public if the state is involved.  See Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed 
Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 365 n.58 (1974); 
see also Anne Flamm & Heidi Forster, Legal Limits: When Does Autonomy in Health Care Pre-
vail?, in 3 LAW AND MEDICINE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 141, 141 (Michael Freeman & Andrew 
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or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all re-
straint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority 
of law.”3  Or, as stated by then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo of the New York 
Court of Appeals in an opinion that has been cited in several well-known end-
of-life cases,4 “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”5 
The importance of autonomy can be seen in various areas of health law.  
For example, the legal requirement that physicians and clinical researchers 
obtain voluntary, informed consent from patients and research participants 
prior to providing treatment or interventions foregrounds the importance of 
autonomy.6  Also, in public health law, there is a tension between respect for 
an individual’s autonomy and government action to promote collective wel-
fare, as in the case of mandating vaccinations to ensure population health.7  
This same tension is present in recent debates about healthcare reform in the 
United States, which include questions about the proper balance between in-
dividual choice to purchase health insurance and the federal government’s 
assessment of a penalty on persons who choose not to purchase it, highlight-
ing issues of autonomy with respect to health insurance regulation.8  And 
central to this Article, the body of law that has developed to regulate end-of-
life decisionmaking in the United States also privileges autonomy, allowing 
competent adults to refuse life-sustaining treatment.9 
                                                          
D. E. Lewis eds., 2000) (describing two doctrinal strands that privilege autonomy in healthcare 
decisionmaking: bodily integrity and self-determination).  
 3.  Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (holding that a trial court cannot 
order an examination of a plaintiff’s body without their consent); see also Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (“It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm 
of personal liberty which the government may not enter.”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 5.  Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
 6.  See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905), aff’d, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906) (“On 
the contrary, under a free government at least, the free citizen’s first and greatest right, which un-
derlies all others—the right to the inviolability of his person, in other words, his right to himself—
is the subject of universal acquiescence . . . .”); see also Capron, supra note 2, at 364–65 (discussing 
Pratt). 
 7.  See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (“There is . . .  a sphere within 
which the individual may . . . rightfully dispute the authority of . . . government . . .  to interfere with 
the exercise of [their] will.  But it is equally true that in . . . well-ordered societ[ies] . . . the rights of 
the individual . . . may . . . be subjected to such restraint . . . as the safety of the . . . public . . . de-
mand[s].”). 
 8.  See, e.g., Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Coons contends that the indi-
vidual mandate unduly burdens his right to medical autonomy by ‘forcing him to apply limited 
financial resources to obtaining a health care plan he does not desire or forcing him to save his 
income and pay a penalty’ . . .” ).  
 9.  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (“But for purposes of this 
case, we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitution-
ally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”). 
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In the case of end-of-life decision-making law, however, the principle 
of autonomy requires revision.10  On the whole, law conceptualizes autonomy 
at the end of life in terms of an individual making private, personal decisions 
based solely on their interests and values, and independent of others.11  In-
deed, adjudicators and legislators attempt to protect persons making end-of-
life decisions from the influence of others, fearing that others’ interests will 
compromise individual autonomy.12 
But ordinary people understand autonomous decisionmaking at the end 
of life differently, in a way that acknowledges the importance of their inter-
personal relationships.  Indeed, empirical research demonstrates that while 
people want to have control over their end-of-life decisions, which accords 
with the traditional legal conceptualization of autonomy, they also value oth-
ers’ input and consider others’ interests.13  Because of these preferences, 
when end-of-life decisions are made voluntarily in the context of their rela-
tionships, people are exercising their autonomy in a relational manner. 
This mismatch in how autonomy is conceptualized occurred, in part, 
because the philosophical notion of autonomy that influenced the drafters of 
the United States Constitution and was relied upon in common law decisions, 
is highly individualistic.14  Indeed, alternative conceptualizations of auton-
omy that more fully admit the significant role of relationships is a much more 
recent development in philosophical scholarship.15  Furthermore, end-of-life 
decision-making law was largely settled prior to the time when researchers 
began asking people about their values, preferences, and interests at the end 
of life.16  Social science research has since documented that strengthening 
relationships with others, sharing responsibility in the decision-making pro-
cess with healthcare providers, and taking care to not burden loved ones be-
come important when confronting death and making decisions at the end of 
life.17 
                                                          
 10.  This principle may require revision in other areas of health law, but the focus in this Article 
is on end of life.  See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Rights Talk and Patient Subjectivity: The Role of Auton-
omy, Equality, and Participation Norms, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1525, 1527–28 (2010) (describ-
ing how patient-centered medicine needs an updated account of autonomy). 
 11.  See infra Part I. 
 12.  See infra Part I. 
 13.  See infra Part II. 
 14.  See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. 
REV. 1705, 1732–35, 1737 (1992) (describing the history of autonomy in U.S. law, with a special 
emphasis on mental health law). 
 15.  See, e.g., RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, 
AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). 
 16.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 17.  See infra Part II.A. 
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The divergence in how law and most people conceptualize autonomy 
becomes particularly consequential when people do not have decision-mak-
ing capacity when an end-of-life decision must be made, and have not ade-
quately planned in advance for loss of capacity.  Failures of rationality ex-
plain this all too common situation: a fear and avoidance of death makes 
people less likely to plan for it, and even when they do plan, they are unable 
to anticipate every possible end-of-life scenario and their preferences for each 
scenario.  In such cases, the law provides default processes and standards for 
end-of-life decisionmaking, which constitute a best guess of a surrogate de-
cision-making process that will effectuate the principle of autonomy.  How-
ever, in this default decision scheme, relational concerns are accorded a dif-
ferent weight and valence than most people would prefer, based on evidence 
from empirical studies of end-of-life preferences.  For example, state statutes 
may direct an incapacitated person’s surrogate to make end-of-life decisions 
in the context of the patient’s religious or moral beliefs but not explicitly 
instruct surrogates to consider the patient’s relationality.18  Thus, decisions 
made at the end of life may not accord with people’s values, preferences, and 
interests.  Paradoxically, therefore, the current defaults in end-of-life law may 
impede, rather than promote, autonomy. 
In order to address this inadvertent consequence and make consistent 
the purpose and intended outcome of end-of-life decision-making law and 
policy, which is respect for autonomy, this Article argues for changes to ac-
commodate the relational nature of autonomy at the end of life.  Such changes 
would account for the effects that end-of-life decisions have on third par-
ties—namely surviving family members and healthcare providers—and thus 
may also reduce negative externalities, such as witnessing or causing pro-
longed physical suffering at the end of another’s life, in this decision-making 
domain. 
Drawing on law and behavioral economics literature about choice archi-
tecture, I argue that relational “nudges” should be built into end-of-life deci-
sion-making law and policy.  The proposed nudges are meant to combat fail-
ures of rationality in end-of-life decisionmaking, and promote a relational 
autonomy.  These nudges would be designed to affect an individual’s end-
of-life decisions prior to loss of capacity; a surrogate’s healthcare decisions 
in the absence of advance directives; and healthcare providers’ shared deci-
sions with the patient or surrogate.  While this necessitates changing some 
defaults, more consequentially, the nudges at the policy level would change 
the way information and choices are presented to decisionmakers, such as 
                                                          
 18.  “Relationality,” in this Article, will be used according to a dictionary definition of “rela-
tional,” because relationality is the condition of being relational.  “Relational” is defined as “of or 
relating to kinship” and “characterized or constituted by relations.”  Relational, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relational (last visited May. 7, 2018). 
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patients and physicians, to prime the decisionmaker to decide, in part, based 
on relationality.  This may increase the likelihood that end-of-life decisions 
are made in accordance with most persons’ stated preferences—namely that 
these decisions are shared with and made in consideration of others.  The 
nudges are meant to influence rather than mandate, which also allows for 
autonomous decisionmaking for people who prefer not to consider or involve 
others. 
Given that autonomy is of central importance in health law, this recon-
ceptualization of autonomy has implications in many other contexts.  Indeed, 
there is a parallel in the disability law context where some advocates have 
argued that autonomy should be understood in a way that respects the capa-
bilities of persons with disabilities and acknowledges the reality of interde-
pendencies with others.19  This Article is the first in a series that will explore 
and reconceptualize the principle of autonomy in health law.  While a rela-
tional conceptualization of autonomy in the end-of-life context may not be 
unique, it is especially salient and is therefore a good place to begin this 
scholarly agenda. 
This Article is organized as follows.  Part I briefly reviews existing law 
to demonstrate how autonomy is conceptualized in the end-of-life decision-
making context, focusing on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment in the case of competent and incompetent adults, medical futility, 
and physician aid in dying.20  Part II surveys what people report wanting and 
valuing at the end of their lives and describes relational autonomy.  Part III 
explains why people often fail to make end-of-life decisions that accord with 
their values and preferences.  Part III also advances a normative argument 
that end-of-life decision-making law and policy should change to promote  
relational autonomy, argues for specific relational nudges to accomplish this 
goal, and attends to potential objections, demonstrating how concerns can be 
adequately addressed.  The Article concludes by noting some implications of 
the reconceptualization of autonomy as relational for other areas of health 
law. 
I.  AUTONOMY AND END-OF-LIFE DECISION-MAKING LAW AND POLICY 
This Part will briefly review the law of end-of-life decisionmaking, in-
cluding a summary of law on end-of-life decisions for competent adults, de-
                                                          
 19.  See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal, & Amy T. Campbell, Supported Decision-
Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN STATE L. REV. 1111 (2013). 
 20.  End-of-life decisionmaking in the case of children and infants is outside the scope of this 
paper given that autonomy is not the underlying principle in the decision-making process for minors. 
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cisions by surrogates for incompetent adults, medical futility cases, and phy-
sician aid in dying.21  This review will demonstrate how, in each part of the 
law, autonomy is the primary principle (beneficence is a secondary value), 
and it is conceptualized and applied in a way that views persons in isolation 
from their relations to others, that is, these conceptualizations are highly in-
dividualistic. 
A.  Establishing the Right for Competent Adults to Refuse Life-
Sustaining Treatment 
The “right to die” was first established and defined in state courts, and 
in the context of making end-of-life decisions for persons who were not com-
petent.  In the widely influential case In re Quinlan,22 a New Jersey court 
grappled with state law about refusing life-sustaining treatment.23  The court 
characterized the case as, in part, “involving questions related to the . . . im-
pact of such durationally indeterminate and artificial life prolongation on the 
rights of the incompetent, her family and society in general.”24  The court 
found that the “vegetative” Karen Quinlan’s state and federal constitutional 
rights to privacy encompassed the right to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment.25  Although Karen Quinlan’s father, her legal guardian, asserted 
both her privacy rights and his privacy rights, the court noted, when it came 
to discontinuing life-sustaining treatment, there was “no parental constitu-
tional right.”26  In this case, the New Jersey court limited consideration of 
anyone’s interests other than the individual for whom an end-of-life decision 
must be made.  Indeed, throughout the opinion, the court often discussed the 
facts and law using phrases such as individual “right of choice” and “individ-
ual’s right to privacy,” promoting a highly individualistic conceptualization 
of choice in this domain.27 
A year after In re Quinlan was decided, in another influential end-of-
life decision-making case, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz,28 the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized the right of an 
adult to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and outlined potential limits 
                                                          
 21.  For a brief review on end-of-life decision-making law, see Lois Shepherd, The End of End-
of-Life Law, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1693, 1697–1704 (2014).  For a comprehensive treatise on end-of-life 
decision-making law, see generally ALAN MEISEL ET AL., THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-
OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING (3d ed. 2017). 
 22.  355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 23.  Id. at 651.  
 24.  Id. at 652. 
 25.  Id. at 663–64. 
 26.  Id. at 664. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  370 N.E. 2d 417 (Mass. 1977). 
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on this right.29  The court first identified the source of the right, beginning 
with the evolution of the informed consent doctrine, which is based on the 
right to “bodily integrity,” in the common law of Massachusetts and other 
states.30  The court then turned to the Federal Constitution: 
Of even broader import, but arising from the same regard for hu-
man dignity and self-determination, is the unwritten constitutional 
right of privacy found in the penumbra of specific guaranties of the 
Bill of Rights.  As this constitutional guaranty reaches out to pro-
tect the freedom of a woman to terminate pregnancy under certain 
conditions, so it encompasses the right of a patient to preserve his 
or her right to privacy against unwanted infringements of bodily 
integrity in appropriate circumstances.31 
The court referred to the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment in terms 
like “dignity,” “self-determination,” and “bodily integrity,” all of which refer 
to a self, independent of its relation to others.32 
However, the court described state interests that must be balanced 
against a person’s right to refuse life-sustaining medical care including: the 
interest in preserving life; “protection of the interests of innocent third par-
ties”; preventing suicide; and maintaining the integrity of the medical profes-
sion.33  Two of these interests define the scope of the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment by presenting the decision in the context of relationality.  
First, the concern about the effect of a person’s decision on third parties rec-
ognizes that one person’s decision impacts others in their network of rela-
tionships.  Second, the concern about the ethical integrity of the medical pro-
fession recognizes that patients exist in relation to a system of healthcare 
provision, and in particular, in relation to their physicians and other treating 
clinicians.  As some scholars note, however, these interests have never been 
able to trump a competent patient’s choice to hasten their death.34 
The Supreme Court of the United States eventually weighed in on the 
question of whether competent adults have a right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment, constitutionalizing this common law right in Cruzan v. Director, 
                                                          
 29.  Id. at 425–27. 
 30.  Id. at 424. 
 31.  Id. (citations omitted) (first citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); and 
then citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 425–27. 
 34.  BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 327 (7th ed. 
2013). 
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Missouri Department of Health.35  The Supreme Court stated that the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause is the source of this right.36  Refusing 
unwanted medical treatment—even if such treatment is necessary to preserve 
life—is a constitutionally protected liberty interest, as Justice O’Connor 
wrote in her concurring opinion in this case: 
Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures against her 
will burdens the patient’s liberty, dignity, and freedom to deter-
mine the course of her own treatment.  Accordingly, the liberty 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects 
anything, an individual’s deeply personal decision to reject medi-
cal treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water.37 
Given that the case also concerned the evidentiary requirements for sur-
rogates to make such a decision on behalf of incapacitated adults, the Court 
discussed surrogate decisionmaking.38  In this portion of the opinion, the 
Court noted the need for the state to protect vulnerable patients from their 
family members: 
Not all incompetent patients will have loved ones available to serve 
as surrogate decisionmakers.  And even where family members are 
present, “[t]here will, of course, be some unfortunate situations in 
which family members will not act to protect a patient.”  A State is 
entitled to guard against potential abuses in such situations.39 
The Court further wrote that there is not a constitutional right to have 
surrogates refuse life-sustaining treatment on behalf of an incompetent pa-
tient.40  Much of the reasoning focused on the possibility that family members 
would assess the quality of an incompetent patient’s life as lower than the 
patient would if they regained capacity.  The state, then, is permitted to have 
a high evidentiary bar for surrogate decisions to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment.  The Court explained, 
Close family members may have a strong feeling—a feeling not at 
all ignoble or unworthy, but not entirely disinterested, either—that 
they do not wish to witness the continuation of life of a loved one 
which they regard as hopeless, meaningless, and even degrading.  
                                                          
 35.  497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 36.  Id. at 279.  The constitutional right only applies to state action, however, and so this right 
is only relevant when people are receiving treatment in state facilities.  Private facilities respect the 
right to refuse medical treatment based on the common law doctrine of informed consent and be-
cause they do not wish to risk liability.  See DAVID ORENTLICHER ET AL., BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH LAW 283 (3d ed. 2013).   
 37.  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 38.  Id. at 273–75 (majority opinion). 
 39.  Id. at 281 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (citing and quoting In re Jobes, 529 
A.2d 434, 447 (N.J. 1987)). 
 40.  Id. 
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But there is no automatic assurance that the view of close family 
members will necessarily be the same as the patient’s would have 
been had she been confronted with the prospect of her situation 
while competent.41 
The Cruzan case exemplifies the conceptualization of autonomous de-
cisionmaking at the end of life as isolated decisionmaking, grounded in indi-
vidual liberty, privacy, self-determination, and dignity. 
In sum, both state and federal case law privilege autonomy in end-of-
life decisionmaking.  Autonomy as conceived by the courts is personal, pri-
vate decisionmaking, independent from consideration of anyone else’s inter-
ests.42  Indeed, while some courts have noted that relational considerations 
do have a place in defining the limits of these rights, courts are also suspi-
cious of the motives of third parties and want to protect people from others’ 
potentially conflicting interests.43 
B.  Surrogate Decisions about Refusing Life-Sustaining Treatment 
The law of end-of-life surrogate decisionmaking differs somewhat de-
pending upon whether the incompetent person is an adult, minor, or infant.  
This Section will review only the law of end-of-life surrogate decisionmak-
ing for adults.44  While competent adults can refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment, in many cases in which a decision must be made about whether to 
begin or continue such treatment, the person no longer has decisional capac-
ity.  In such cases, surrogates (often family members) make a decision on 
behalf of the patient. 
The law of surrogate decisionmaking originated when courts were con-
fronted with questions about how to make healthcare decisions on behalf of 
an incapacitated patient, and indeed, the cases described above that estab-
lished the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment involved patients 
in the vegetative state or with lifelong intellectual disabilities.45  Thus, the 
conceptualization of autonomy described in the previous Section is the same 
as the conceptualization of autonomy in surrogate decision-making law.  The 
                                                          
 41.  Id. at 286. 
 42.  See Bruce Jennings, Solidarity Near the End of Life: The Promise of Relational Decision-
Making in the Care of the Dying, in ETHICS AT THE END OF LIFE: NEW ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 
218, 219, 224–27 (John K. Davis ed., 2017) (describing the individualistic conceptualization of 
autonomy in end-of-life decision-making law). 
 43.  See supra text accompanying note 40. 
 44.  This paper will not delve into surrogate decisionmaking for adults who have never had 
competence. 
 45.  See supra Part I.A. 
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law of surrogate decisionmaking differs by state, with variations on eviden-
tiary standards and procedural processes.46  A review of all state laws is be-
yond the scope of this Article.47  Instead, this Section will focus on model 
laws and highlight a few state laws when illustrating broader points. 
Surrogate decisionmaking can be relatively straightforward when it is 
the case that people have planned for their eventual incapacity.48  This plan-
ning may take the form of completing a written advance directive with in-
structions about what medical treatments a person wants at the end of life.49  
In theory, these directives are then followed upon incapacity, and thus auton-
omous decisionmaking survives the patient’s loss of capacity.  People may 
also have executed a healthcare power of attorney, in which case they have 
appointed an agent to make decisions on their behalf; the agent is often a 
family member or close friend.50 
Many people do not plan for incapacity,51 however, and so there is a 
growing movement in health care for physicians to assist with their patient’s 
end-of-life planning by completing Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining 
Treatment (“POLST”) for their elderly or seriously ill patients.52  After hav-
ing a conversation with their patient (or their patient’s legally authorized sur-
rogate) about what kinds of treatment they may or may not want, the physi-
cian documents these preferences as a medical order to be relied upon in an 
emergency situation.53  Given that the POLST is a medical order made in 
consultation with a capacitated patient or their legally authorized surrogate, 
it is unlikely that this order will be revised (although it can be), and again, as 
                                                          
 46.  ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 36, at 320.  
 47.  For a comprehensive summary of state law regarding surrogate decisionmaking, see gen-
erally MEISEL ET AL., supra note 21. 
 48.  See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING 
INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE 122 (2015) [hereinafter IOM] (describing vari-
ous types of advance directives). 
 49.  Federal law attempted to promote advance directives by directing healthcare facilities to 
inform patients upon admission about their right to make medical decisions, inquire whether patients 
have an advance directive, and then document the patients’ responses.  Patient Self-Determination 
Act of 1990 (“PSDA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A) (2012).  Not only has the PSDA not increased 
the use of advance directives, but healthcare facilities often do not comply with the law’s documen-
tation requirements.  ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 36, at 336 (summarizing scholarly literature 
on the success of the PSDA). 
 50.  Jiska Cohen-Mansfield et al., The Decision to Execute a Durable Power of Attorney for 
Health Care and Preferences Regarding the Utilization of Life-Sustaining Treatments in Nursing 
Home Residents, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 289, 290 (1991). 
 51.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 189; IOM, supra note 48, at 125. 
 52.  There is variability in whether providers follow advance directives, which is another reason 
why there is a push to have a patient’s end-of-life preferences put in the form of a physician’s order, 
which will be followed.  FURROW ET AL., supra note 34, at 359–64 (describing the POLST para-
digm)  
 53.  IOM, supra note 48, at 173 (defining the POLST paradigm as an approach to advance care 
planning). 
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in the case of writing an advance directive, individual autonomy survives in-
capacity.54 
In the vast majority of cases in which there are no verbal or written in-
structions and no healthcare agent, surrogate decisionmakers may try to make 
what courts have termed a “substituted judgment”55; that is, to do what the 
patient would do if the patient had capacity, which is an attempt to preserve 
patient autonomy.  As the Supreme Court of New Jersey wrote in In re 
Conroy,56 when discussing the substituted judgment standard: “The question 
is not what a reasonable or average person would have chosen to do under 
the circumstances but what the particular patient would have done if able to 
choose for himself.”57 
A substituted judgment decision-making standard “commends itself 
simply because of its straightforward respect for the integrity and autonomy 
of the individual.”58  A substituted judgment “can be done through a thought-
ful analysis of the patient’s values during life or through review of formal 
statements made by the patient when the patient had capacity.”59 
If making a substituted judgment is not possible, then surrogate deci-
sionmakers will make a decision according to what is in the incapacitated 
patient’s best interest.  In order to discontinue medical treatment under the 
best interests test as described in In re Conroy, 
the net burdens of the patient’s life with the treatment should 
clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives 
from life.  Further, the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of 
the patient’s life with the treatment should be such that the effect 
of administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane.60 
The law also recognizes that incapacitated persons will sometimes have 
no family or friends who can act as surrogate decisionmakers, or that some-
times family members may not be the best surrogates.  In these cases, courts 
                                                          
 54.  Id. at 173–76.  A POLST may not actually be autonomy-promoting, however, if a particular 
patient prefers that their family members have flexibility over their end-of-life decisions, and the 
family has not been present for discussion about, and completion of, the POLST.  See also Stanley 
A. Terman, It Isn’t Easy Being Pink: Potential Problems with POLST Paradigm Forms, 36 
HAMLINE L. REV. 177, 178–79 (2013) (detailing potential problems with POLST forms). 
 55.  See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 
(Mass. 1977). 
 56.  486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
 57.  Id. at 1229.  
 58.  See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431. 
 59.  FURROW ET AL., supra note 34, at 343.   
 60.  In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232. 
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can appoint a guardian to make decisions on behalf of the incapacitated per-
son,61 or as in the case of disputes between family members about whether to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment for an incompetent 
patient, the court can itself act as a decisionmaker or guardian.62 
While these standards for surrogate decisionmaking evolved through 
case law, states have also codified the procedure for surrogate healthcare de-
cisionmaking in statutes.  The Uniform Health-Care Decision Act,63 model 
legislation that has been adopted in some states, directs healthcare agents to 
follow the principal’s instructions, or if instructions are unknown, to make a 
substituted judgment.64  If this is not possible, then the Act directs the agent 
to make a decision in the principal’s best interest.65  If the patient has not 
appointed a healthcare agent, then according to the Uniform Health-Care De-
cision Act, a surrogate decisionmaker will be chosen from the patient’s fam-
ily or social network.66  The order of priority for surrogate decisionmakers is 
the patient’s spouse, followed by their adult children, their parents, and fi-
nally, their adult siblings.67  Should there not be any eligible surrogate deci-
sionmakers from the patient’s family, “an adult who has exhibited special 
care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal 
values, and who is reasonably available may act as surrogate.”68  Surrogate 
decisionmakers also make healthcare decisions based on the patient’s instruc-
tions, and in the absence of such instructions, make a substituted judgment 
on the basis of the patient’s values.69  If there are no instructions and the 
patient’s values are not known, then a surrogate will make decisions in the 
patient’s best interests.70 
Questions still arise, however, about the degree to which others’ inter-
ests should be considered when surrogates make end-of-life decisions on be-
half of incompetent patients.  In the well-known case of Theresa Schiavo, her 
husband and parents disagreed about whether she should continue to receive 
                                                          
 61.  See generally Andrew B. Cohen et al., Guardianship and End-of-Life Decision Making, 
175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1687 (describing end-of-life decision-making law in the context of 
guardianship). 
 62.  In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“In this 
context, the trial court essentially serves as the ward’s guardian.”).  
 63.  UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993).  This legislation ap-
plies to all healthcare decisions, not just end-of-life decisions. 
 64.  Id. § 2(e).  
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. § 5(b).  
 67.  Id.   
 68.  Id. § 5(c).   
 69.  Id. § 5(f).  
 70.  Id. 
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artificial nutrition and hydration in her permanent vegetative state.71  One 
court faced with the issue commented: 
 But in the end, this case is not about the aspirations that loving 
parents have for their children.  It is about Theresa Schiavo’s right 
to make her own decision, independent of her parents and inde-
pendent of her husband.  In circumstances such as these, when fam-
ilies cannot agree, the law has opened the doors of the circuit courts 
to permit trial judges to serve as surrogates or proxies to make de-
cisions about life-prolonging procedures.  It is the trial judge’s duty 
not to make the decision that the judge would make for himself or 
herself or for a loved one.  Instead, the trial judge must make a 
decision that the clear and convincing evidence shows the ward 
would have made for herself.  It is a thankless task, and one to be 
undertaken with care, objectivity, and a cautious legal standard de-
signed to promote the value of life.  But it is also a necessary func-
tion if all people are to be entitled to a personalized decision about 
life-prolonging procedures independent of the subjective and con-
flicting assessments of their friends and relatives.  It may be unfor-
tunate that when families cannot agree, the best forum we can offer 
for this private, personal decision is a public courtroom and the 
best decision-maker we can provide is a judge with no prior 
knowledge of the ward, but the law currently provides no better 
solution that adequately protects the interests of promoting the 
value of life.72 
The court noted neither parents nor judges have the right to make surro-
gate decisions based on their own values, but instead, surrogate decisions 
should be based on what the incompetent person would have chosen.73  
Words such as “independent,” “personal,” and “private” are used in this opin-
ion, which again emphasize an understanding of autonomy that is highly in-
dividualistic.74  Furthermore, the court cautioned that families may even have 
preferences that conflict with the incompetent person, and care must there-
fore be taken to ensure that end-of-life decisions are independent of others’ 
preferences.75  This recalls the language and concerns of the Cruzan court.76 
As can be seen from this brief review of surrogate healthcare decision-
making law, which covers medical decisions that must be made at the end of 
                                                          
 71.  In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 183–85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 72.  Id. at 186–87 (citations omitted) (citing In re Guardianship of Browning, 560 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 
1990); FLA. STAT. § 765.401(3) (2000). 
 73.  Id. at 187. 
 74.  See id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  See supra text accompanying notes 35–41. 
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life, the law always privileges autonomy followed by beneficence.  The law 
prefers that people make decisions themselves or through “an individual in-
struction,”77 which is viewed by lawmakers and judges as fairly straightfor-
ward respect for autonomous decisionmaking.  However, the law recognizes 
that such decisionmaking will not always be possible, and so, privileges au-
tonomy through a notion of substituted judgment.78  State statutes do not di-
rect substituted judgments to consider the individual’s relations with others 
as part of the examination of their values, beliefs, and preferences; this si-
lence again reveals how law conceptualizes autonomy as individualistic in 
nature.79  Some courts conceive substituted judgments in a way that excludes 
consideration of any interests besides the incompetent individual, as in the 
Schiavo case, but if there is evidence that the incompetent individual would 
have made a particular end-of-life decision based on relational interests or in 
consultation with others, this may become part of the substituted judgment.80  
On the whole, however, in end-of-life surrogate decision-making law, there 
is a presumption that preservation of an individual’s autonomy upon incapac-
ity must mean examining their preferences for a particular choice in isolation 
from how such preferences may be formed in consideration of their relation-
ships with others.81 
                                                          
 77.  UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 1(l) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993). 
 78.  See supra text accompanying notes 55–59. 
 79.  See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(4) (McKinney 2015); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 5461(d)(1)(vi) (Supp. 2017). 
 80.  “The law does not generally promote respect for autonomy as including respect for choices 
that benefit others’ interests over the patient’s interests, even if a competent patient could freely 
make such decisions.”  Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1699.  But, if a particular person valued making 
decisions in consideration of their relationships when they were competent, it follows that a 
healthcare decision made on their behalf could also consider such relationships.  Id. 
Indeed, the actual process of making a substituted judgment may involve consideration of the 
individual’s family, the impact the decision will have on them, and how the individual viewed their 
family relationships and responsibilities.  For example, in Conservatorship of Wendland, during the 
California court proceedings about a conservator’s request to have artificial nutrition and hydration 
withheld from their conservatee, the court heard testimony from family members about Wendland’s 
desire to not burden his children with a prolonged death.  28 P.3d 151, 157 (Cal. 2001).  The family 
offered evidence Wendland had stated: “I would never want to live like that, and I wouldn’t want 
my children to see me like that and look at the hurt you’re going through as an adult seeing your 
father like that.”  Id.  In this instance, Wendland’s interest in his family relationships was intertwined 
with the analysis of his autonomy interests in end-of-life decisionmaking.  Id. at 168. 
Similarly, in In re Westchester County Medical Center, ex rel. O’Connor, the New York court 
heard testimony from an incompetent patient’s family that the patient “desire[d] to remain inde-
pendent and avoid burdening her children.”  531 N.E.2d 607, 624 (N.Y. 1988) (Simons, J., dissent-
ing).  Again, the court connected the analysis of what a patient wanted in regard to medical treatment 
at the end of life with what they wanted for their family. 
In both Conservatorship of Wendland and O’Connor, the courts ultimately refused to allow 
for the termination of life-sustaining medical treatment because the evidence of the patients’ wishes 
did not meet the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard.  Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 
P.3d at 175; O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 615. 
 81.  Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1699–1700. 
 
1078 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:1062 
 
C.  Medical Futility Disputes and Discontinuing Life-Sustaining 
Treatment 
Sometimes physicians determine that providing or continuing to provide 
a patient with an intervention meant to prolong or sustain life is “futile.”  A 
physician may think that the requested treatment is scientifically or medically 
futile, in which case the treatment will not have the effect that the patient or 
surrogate decisionmaker desires.82  Or the physician may think that the re-
quested treatment is ethically futile as it “will not serve the underlying inter-
ests of the patient”83 and may harm the patient.84  When patients or their sur-
rogate decisionmakers disagree with this assessment and insist on the medical 
intervention, this is known as a medical futility dispute.85  The question be-
comes who is the ultimate decisionmaker: the physician (and hospital ethics 
committee) or the patient and their representatives.86  This directly raises 
questions about the extent to which an individual’s autonomy in healthcare 
decisionmaking is respected. 
When the disagreement between the physician and the patient or their 
surrogate decisionmaker cannot be resolved, state statutes or specific hospital 
policies may provide a process for reaching a decision.87  For example, Texas 
has a futility statute as part of the state’s Advance Directives Act that outlines 
a detailed procedure to follow when providers refuse to honor a patient’s ad-
vance directive or treatment decision because the provider believes that to do 
so would be futile.88  Court cases arising under the Texas futility statute note 
that providers are the appropriate decisionmaker about whether a treatment 
is futile, rather than the patient or their family.89  Hospitals also often have 
                                                          
 82.  FURROW ET AL., supra note 34, at 444. 
 83.  Id. at 445.  Some research has shown that clinicians feel distress when asked to provide 
futile care, and that this distress likely comes from thinking patients or their families do not trust 
them or from feeling like they are violating a taboo against abusing a dead or dying body.  J. Randall 
Curtis & Robert A. Burt, Why Are Critical Care Clinicians so Powerfully Distressed by Family 
Demands for Futile Care?, 18 J. CRITICAL CARE 22, 23 (2003).   
 84.  IOM, supra note 48, at 288 (describing physician assessments of futile care as follows: 
“the burden on the patient greatly outweighed the benefits, the treatment could never achieve the 
patient’s goals, death was imminent, and the patient would never be able to survive outside the 
critical care unit”); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 169–70 (describing seven 
definitions of futility and arguing that a futility assessment is both a scientific and a value judgment). 
 85.  James L. Bernat, Medical Futility: Definition, Determination, and Disputes in Critical 
Care, 2 NEUROCRITICAL CARE 198, 201 (2005). 
 86.  If a person has been declared dead, however, families have no legal basis to insist on con-
tinued mechanical ventilation unless they can dispute the definition of death used.  ORENTLICHER 
ET AL., supra note 36, at 392–93.  
 87.  Only a limited number of futility cases make it to court.  Id. at 385–87 (summarizing the 
few futility cases). 
 88.  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.046, .052, .053 (West 2017). 
 89.  See, e.g., Nikolouzos v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. App. 2005) 
(Fowler, J., concurring) (“Section 166.046 permits the withdrawal of life-sustaining care for patients 
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written policies about how to handle conflict between healthcare providers 
and their patients in cases in which providers think a requested intervention 
would be futile.90   
Law and policy attempt to accommodate all actors’ views by encourag-
ing shared decisionmaking, but often weigh a provider’s professional judg-
ment more heavily.  If consensus cannot be reached, the provider’s judgment 
ultimately trumps the patient’s autonomy.  Indeed, the principle of medical 
futility has come to be seen as an exception to the principle of patient auton-
omy in the realm of healthcare decisionmaking.91 
D.  Physician Aid in Dying 
Physician aid in dying (“physician AID”),92 in which a mentally com-
petent, terminally ill adult voluntarily hastens death by ingesting a lethal drug 
prescribed by a physician, is, at the time of this writing, legal, with strict 
eligibility requirements, in seven U.S. jurisdictions: Oregon, Washington, 
Vermont, Montana, California, Colorado, and the District of Columbia.93 
Oregon was the first state to permit physician AID.  In 1994, the citizen-
initiated Death with Dignity Act94 passed and then survived challenges at 
both the state and federal levels.95  Washington legalized physician AID, also 
via voter initiative, in 2008.96  In 2009, the Supreme Court of Montana held 
                                                          
who are not brain dead if the hospital’s ethics committee has determined that the care is inappropri-
ate.”).  
 90.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 170.  Some hospitals emphasize that providers 
should communicate clearly, honestly, and respectfully with patients and their families.  Such poli-
cies assert that, whenever possible, conflict should be avoided, but if it cannot, the policies outline 
procedures to resolve the conflict.  See, e.g., FURROW ET AL., supra note 34, at 440–44 (providing 
examples of hospital futility policies); see also NANCY BERLINGER ET AL., THE HASTINGS CENTER 
GUIDELINES FOR DECISIONS ON LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND CARE NEAR THE END OF LIFE 
57 (2d ed. 2013) (advising clinicians to avoid using the term “futile” and instead emphasizing how 
the requested intervention will not meet treatment goals). 
 91.  Curtis & Burt, supra note 83, at 22; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 
170 (“Respect for the autonomy of patients or authorized surrogates is not a trump that allows them 
alone to determine whether a treatment is futile.”).  But see Nancy S. Jecker, Medical Futility and 
Respect for Patient Autonomy, in ETHICS AT THE END OF LIFE: NEW ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 138, 
149 (John K. Davis ed., 2017) (arguing that respect for autonomy does not mean that patients or 
surrogates receive care they demand because, “[p]roperly understood, autonomy requires that com-
petent adults be allowed to choose from among medically appropriate options, or reject all options”). 
 92.  There are many terms used in the literature to reference this end-of-life decision.  Advo-
cates tend to call it “aid in dying” or “death with dignity.”  Opponents tend to call it “assisted sui-
cide.”  See FURROW ET AL., supra note 34, at 449–50 (discussing the controversy over terminology). 
 93.  The Supreme Court of New Mexico recently failed to find a right to physician AID under 
its state constitution.  Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836, 857 (N.M. 2016).   
 94.  OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2015). 
 95.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006) (holding that Oregon’s Death with Dignity 
Act did not violate the federal Controlled Substances Act). 
 96.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN., §§ 70.245.010–.903 (West 2011). 
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that physician-assisted suicide did not constitute homicide under Montana’s 
criminal law.97  Vermont’s legislature passed the Patient Choice and Control 
at End of Life Act in 2013.98  The California legislature passed the End of 
Life Option Act in 2015,99 which assured that a significant proportion of the 
United States population would have access to this end-of-life option.  Fi-
nally, residents in Colorado and the District of Columbia voted in the fall of 
2016 to legalize physician AID.100 
The words used to name the legislation permitting physician AID 
demonstrate the central importance of autonomy in this body of law: “dig-
nity,”101 “choice,” “control,” and “options.”102  Further, the rationale for pass-
ing such laws also demonstrates the underlying motivation of preserving au-
tonomous choice to end one’s life on one’s own terms.  As California 
Governor Jerry Brown stated upon signing the law, 
In the end, I was left to reflect on what I would want in the face of 
my own death.  I do not know what I would do if I were dying in 
prolonged and excruciating pain.  I am certain, however, that it 
would be a comfort to be able to consider the options afforded by 
this bill.  And I wouldn’t deny that right to others.103 
There is no federal right to physician AID.  When advocates for the 
practice litigated the question of whether, like the right to hasten death by 
refusing life-sustaining treatment, physician AID is a constitutional right, the 
Supreme Court held that there is no fundamental constitutional right under 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to access this method of dy-
ing.104  In Washington v. Gluckberg,105 the Court argued, “That many of the 
                                                          
 97.  Baxter v. Montana, 224 P.3d 1211, 1222 (Mont. 2009). 
 98.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–5293 (Supp. 2016). 
 99.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443–444.12 (West 2016) (some parts of the law have 
been repealed, but the provisions discussed in this paper at the time of writing remain good law). 
 100.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-48-101–123 (West 2017); D.C. CODE §§ 7-661.01–.17 
(2001); see also Thaddeus Mason Pope, DC Death with Dignity Survives Federal Congress Repeal, 
MEDICAL FUTILITY BLOG (Mar. 23, 2018), http://medicalfutility.blogspot.com (describing the fed-
eral congressional efforts to repeal the D.C. Death with Dignity Act). 
 101.  “Dignity” is an oft-used but rarely defined word.  It can encompass autonomy and control 
in decisionmaking, however.  Annette F. Street & David W. Kissane, Constructions of Dignity in 
End-of-Life Care, 17 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 93 (2001). 
 102.  See supra text accompanying notes 94–99. 
 103.  Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor, Cal., to Members of the Cal. State Assembly  
(Oct. 5, 2015), heartwiredforchange.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/04/ABX2_15_Signing_Message.pdf; see also Patrick McGreevy, After Struggling, 
Jerry Brown Makes Assisted Suicide Legal in California, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015, 5:50 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-gov-brown-end-of-life-bill-20151005-story.html. 
 104.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 709 (1997).  In another case decided in the same 
term, the Supreme Court held that a state ban on physician-assisted suicide did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997). 
 105.  521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal 
autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all im-
portant, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected . . . .”106  The Court 
acknowledged, however, that end-of-life laws and policies were changing to 
ensure “dignity and independence” for a population likely to die in institu-
tions after suffering from chronic conditions given technological and medical 
advancements that can prolong life.107  The language in this refusal to find a 
right to physician AID underscores how the Supreme Court conceptualizes 
autonomy in this end-of-life option: autonomy is “personal” decisionmak-
ing,108 which is meant to ensure independence.109 
In sum, proponents of physician AID laws describe them in terms of an 
individual’s right to choose to die, and the conceptualization of autonomy in 
the law is mostly abstracted from social relationships.110  It is one’s relation 
to others, however, that the Supreme Court and opponents of physician AID 
fear will compromise autonomy for some “vulnerable” persons with respect 
to this end-of-life option.111 
II.  END-OF-LIFE DECISION-MAKING PREFERENCES AND RELATIONAL 
AUTONOMY 
The previous Part demonstrated how end-of-life decision-making law 
and policy conceives of autonomy as personal, private, and independent de-
cisionmaking.  This Part will demonstrate, however, that in the end-of-life 
decision-making context, ordinary people conceive of autonomous deci-
sionmaking much differently.  While many people want to make decisions 
                                                          
 106.  Id. at 727 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–35 (1973)). 
 107.  Id. at 716 (“Because of advances in medicine and technology, Americans today are in-
creasingly likely to die in institutions, from chronic illnesses.  Public concern and democratic action 
are therefore sharply focused on how best to protect dignity and independence at the end of life, 
with the result that there have been many significant changes in state laws and in the attitudes these 
laws reflect.” (citation omitted) (citing PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO 
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 16–18 (1983))).  
 108.  Id. at 727.  Indeed, those petitioning the Court for a constitutional right to physician AID 
argued that the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence is about “self-sovereignty” and “per-
sonal autonomy,” which again abstracts individuals from their social relationships.  Id. at 723–24 
(quoting Brief for Respondents at 10, 12, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96–110)). 
 109.  Id. at 716. 
 110.  An important exception is contained in the form of the requests for physician AID in some 
states wherein a patient is asked whether they have family members who have been informed about 
the decision to use physician AID.  See infra Part III. 
 111.  See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731–32 (“The risk of harm is greatest for the many individuals 
in our society whose autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty, lack of access 
to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a stigmatized social group.” (quoting NEW 
YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE 
AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 120 (1994))); infra text accompanying note 273. 
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on the basis of their values and preferences, which aligns with the legal un-
derstanding of autonomous decisionmaking, their preferred decision-making 
process is often in consultation or even collaboration with family members 
and physicians, and they may also decide on the basis of others’ interests.  
That is, people understand autonomy as relational and interdependent, in con-
trast to the legal conceptualization of autonomy as individual and independ-
ent. 
This Part will begin with a review of empirical literature on what people 
in the United States want at the end of life and how they make end-of-life 
decisions, and will analyze the role and understanding of autonomy in such 
preferences and actions.  Next, this Part will describe physician use of shared 
decision-making models, which are an attempt to respond to patient prefer-
ences.  Given that it is reasonable to expect that preferences differ within a 
society, this Part will also note end-of-life decision-making preferences for 
different racial and ethnic groups.  This Part will conclude with a discussion 
of the concept of relational autonomy. 
A.  Patient and Family End-of-Life Decision-Making Preferences 
1.  Values, Preferences, and Interests at the End of Life 
It has only been in the last twenty years that scholars have devoted their 
attention to asking people what they want at the end of life.  This timeline 
matters because U.S. end-of-life decision-making law, including the defini-
tion of autonomy and beneficence within this body of law, was largely settled 
prior to knowing people’s preferences.112  So what is it that people want and 
value at the end of life? 
The foundational study of American end-of-life values and preferences, 
published nearly two decades ago, demonstrates that people confronting 
death primarily value caring relationships with family, friends, and physi-
cians.113  In this study, Steinhauser and colleagues surveyed Veterans Affairs 
                                                          
 112.  The law of refusing life-sustaining treatment was decided at the state level beginning in the 
1970s and was constitutionalized in 1990.  See  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 
(1990); In Re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).  Surrogate decision-making laws date prior to this 
time period as well.  See, e.g., UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993).  
Physician aid in dying laws were first passed in 1994.  See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2015).  
Perhaps the only area of end-of-life decision-making law that remains unsettled is medical futility 
law.  See supra Part I.  Even if preferences were known, however, they may not have been incorpo-
rated into the common law.  See Lois Shepherd & Mark A. Hall, Patient-Centered Health Law and 
Ethics, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2010) (describing how “the patient is often absent 
as an active participant in the shaping of law”).  But at least knowing preferences can influence 
biomedical ethics policy formation. 
 113.  Karen E. Steinhauser et al., Factors Considered Important at the End of Life by Patients, 
Family, Physicians, and Other Care Providers, 284 JAMA 2476, 2476 (2000). 
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patients with advanced disease, people who had recently lost a family mem-
ber to disease, and physicians and others involved in end-of-life care, such as 
chaplains, and found broad consensus amongst all survey respondents about 
what matters at the end of life.114  In particular, the study revealed that all 
participants wanted to be able to say goodbye to loved ones who were pre-
pared for the impending death, be around friends, not die alone, and be known 
and well cared for well by healthcare professionals with whom one could 
discuss their fears.115  These concerns encompass relationships with fam-
ily,116 friends, and healthcare providers.117  Patient respondents differed from 
physician respondents in terms of some of the things they thought mattered 
at the end of life, however.118  Among the factors patients considered im-
portant, but physicians did not, were “not being a burden to family or society 
[and] being able to help others.”119  It thus appears that physicians may un-
derestimate the importance of some relational dimensions of life to dying 
patients. 
                                                          
 114.   Id.  This article has been cited almost 2,000 times since its publication.  Search of Factors 
Considered Important at the End of Life by Patients, Family, Physicians, and Other Care Providers, 
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com. 
 115.  Steinhauser et al., supra note 113, at 2478–79.  All respondents also thought adequate pain 
relief, preparation for death (e.g., getting financial affairs in order and deciding on medical treatment 
preferences in advance), and maintaining dignity to the end were important factors.  Id.  Importantly, 
however, the authors note that dying is still highly personal and that end-of-life care providers 
should determine what is important to individuals they care for.  Id. at 2482. 
 116.  This Article uses a broad definition of family, similar to that used by bioethics and medical 
associations.  A leading bioethics organization wrote the following about “family”: 
“Family” . . . may include close friends or an intimate partner whose relationship to the 
person may or may not be recognized by the law.  It may include a relative, friend, or 
paid caregiver who serves as the patient’s designated care partner by accompanying the 
patient to treatment and helping the patient to coordinate care.  It may include the pa-
tient’s appointed health proxy or surrogate decision-maker.  The family may include in-
dividuals who love the sick person deeply and individuals who detest this person, or in-
dividuals immobilized by the circumstances of their emotions.  It may include someone 
who does not want the sick person to die, and someone who wishes this person dead 
sooner rather than later.   
BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 26.  Similarly, the IOM writes that family includes “spouses, 
blood relatives, in-laws, step-relatives, fiancés, significant others, friends, caring neighbors, col-
leagues, fellow parishioners or congregants, and other people . . . ‘for whom it matters.’”  IOM, 
supra note 48, at 45–46. 
 117.  Steinhauser et al., supra note 113, at 2478–79. 
 118.  Id. at 2479. 
 119.  Id.  Patients’ concerns about being a burden are well-grounded in reality.  The empirical 
literature demonstrates that medical care at the end of life is often financially burdensome, both as 
a proportion of Medicare or Medicaid spending and on families who pay out of pocket for medical 
care.  See IOM, supra note 48, at 289, 300–01 (summarizing statistics on spending on medical care 
at the end of life).  Indeed, the cost of medical care at the end of life is patients’ highest concern, 
especially as it relates to burdening their families.  Id. at 350 (surveying research on patient concerns 
about medical care at the end of life).  As one person who submitted testimony to the IOM stated, 
“the emotional cost is great, the financial cost is astronomical.”  Id. at 451. 
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Studies of non-veteran populations had similar findings regarding the 
importance of relationality.  A recent review of empirical literature demon-
strates that many psychosocial and relational factors are important to people 
at the end of life.120  Significantly, many dying patients report that relation-
ships matter to them at the end of life; that being with family and friends and 
strengthening these relationships is important; and that having good relation-
ships with healthcare professionals who treat them with dignity and support 
them and their families with all of their end-of-life needs (including non-
medical needs) is also a key concern.121  For patients without close family, it 
is especially crucial to them that their healthcare providers care about them 
and treat them compassionately.122  While some patients prefer privacy at the 
end of life, others find that being around patients who are similarly situated 
is helpful and value their interactions with these patients.123  Thus, at the end 
of life, people care both about mending and maintaining existing relation-
ships and also developing new, supportive relationships, highlighting the sig-
nificant role of relationality in this context.  
2.  Preferences Regarding End-of-Life Decisionmaking 
While the previous Section demonstrates that relationships matter to 
people at the end of life, it is still necessary to determine people’s perspec-
tives on autonomy—the fundamental principle in end-of-life decision-mak-
ing law and policy—and whether people want others involved in their 
healthcare decision-making processes at the end of life.  One study, relying 
on focus groups of bereaved family members across the country, sheds some 
                                                          
Surrogate decisionmaking is also emotionally burdensome to families who feel like they do 
not have adequate information about what their loved one would decide in a particular situation.  
The majority of people do not want their family to be burdened or stressed by making medical 
decisions on their behalf.  See id. at 350; BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 54. 
Finally, actually providing care at the end of life is difficult and exhausting for informal, un-
trained family caregivers.  See IOM, supra note 48, at 312–13.  Indeed, research has demonstrated 
that the majority of people, should they be completely dependent on another for care, would choose 
to refuse life-sustaining treatment.  Id. at 348.  Furthermore, about a third of people report that they 
believe there should be a right to suicide if they are a burden on others, although this differs by race.  
Id. at 347–48 (describing results from a nationally representative survey about end-of-life prefer-
ences).  
 120.  Anecdotes from clinicians support this as well.  See, e.g., Lydia S. Dugdale, Conclusion: 
Toward a New Ethical Framework for the Art of Dying Well, in DYING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: TOWARD A NEW ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ART OF DYING WELL 173, 183–87 
(Lydia S. Dugdale ed., 2015).  Other factors important at the end of life included “being mentally 
aware, having funeral arrangements planned, feeling that one’s life was complete . . . coming to 
peace with God, and praying.”  Steinhauser et al., supra note 114, at 2479.  
 121.  Tuva Sandsdalen et al., Patients’ Preferences in Palliative Care: A Systematic Mixed Stud-
ies Review, 29 PALLIATIVE MED. 399, 411, 413 (2015).  
 122.  Id. at 413–15.  
 123.  Id. at 414.   
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light on this.  This study revealed that the most significant concerns for those 
receiving medical care at the end of life include not only physical comfort 
and pain relief, but also controlling everyday decisions, sharing in the medi-
cal decisionmaking with healthcare providers (rather than feeling abandoned 
to make such decisions alone), and ensuring that family members are sup-
ported in their caregiving efforts and when they are grieving.124  This study 
demonstrates that dying patients want to be in charge of their healthcare de-
cisions, and they prefer to decide in collaboration with clinicians and in con-
sideration of their families. 
More recent studies make clear that patients value their autonomy when 
making decisions at the end of life, but that this autonomy is exercised in a 
relational manner in which families and physicians are invited to participate 
in decisionmaking.  A systematic review of studies examining the values of 
people receiving palliative care in a final stage of illness provides insight into 
what matters to patients in their end-of-life decisionmaking.125  Patients want 
their families involved in end-of-life decisionmaking to some degree, which 
may, in some cases, mean informing families about the illness and healthcare 
decisions or, in other cases, desiring family input or assistance in making 
decisions.126  To further their autonomy and ensure their values are respected 
and considered when making decisions, patients also generally desire clear 
information from healthcare staff about their illness, and to make decisions 
about their medical care in consultation with the treatment team.127 
The previously described empirical studies are based on responses to 
survey or interview questions.128  However, social scientists have also studied 
medical decisionmaking in action, and their findings make clear that the 
practice of autonomy in end-of-life decisionmaking accords with discourse 
about autonomy in end-of-life decisionmaking.  For example, a qualitative 
study of in-patient hospice patients illustrates actively dying, capacitated per-
sons making end-of-life decisions in consultation with, and in consideration 
of, family members.129  In this study, the authors found that the primary rea-
son that dying individuals were using in-patient hospice was to reduce the 
                                                          
 124.  Joan M. Teno et al., Patient-Focused, Family-Centered End-of-Life Medical Care: Views 
of the Guidelines and Bereaved Family Members, 22 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 738, 745, 749 
(2001).  In this study, the authors argue for a “patient-focused, family-centered [end-of-life] medical 
care” that is “focused on the patient, but . . . also acknowledges the important role of family mem-
bers,” and attempts to promote quality of life for both groups.  Id. at 745 (emphasis omitted). 
 125.  Sandsdalen et al., supra note 121.  
 126.  Id. at 414. 
 127.  Id.  There is variation in preferences, however, in that some patients wanted to defer deci-
sionmaking to others.  Id.  Those who do want to participate in medical decisionmaking expressed 
a desire to have access to healthcare personnel for help and coordinated care.  Id. 
 128.  See id. at 403–10 (listing and describing the nature of the studies used). 
 129.  Alex Broom & Emma Kirby, The End of Life and The Family: Hospice Patients’ Views on 
Dying as Relational, 35 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 499 (2013). 
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burden and stress on their families from providing care or witnessing the 
physiological decline of their loved one.130  As one study participant stated, 
“I would prefer to be at home.  Um, but then again, by the same token, if 
hubby doesn’t think he can cope, which, it may come to that point, where he 
can’t cope, with the whole physical thing, the mental thing of me being at 
home, then I will willingly come in [again].”131  Notably, this participant has 
different preferences from her family members, but willingly chooses to pri-
oritize their preferences, exercising autonomy in a relational way.  The pa-
tients in this study also show how being in hospice provides an opportunity 
to say goodbye to loved ones and improve relationships at the end-of-life.132  
Every single patient in the study, regardless of whether they had close rela-
tionships with their family members, “expressed considerable concern re-
garding their family’s capacity to cope and the broader impact of their dying 
process on families and relationships.”133 
It thus appears that persons making decisions in the end-of-life context 
do not view autonomous decisionmaking as inconsistent with the participa-
tion or consideration of others. 
3.  Surrogate Decisionmaking 
Given that some people will ultimately be unable to make medical de-
cisions for themselves at the end of life, it is necessary to analyze patient 
autonomy with respect to the many empirical studies about surrogate deci-
sionmaking.  One body of literature demonstrates that there is discordance 
between what medical decisions an individual would make at the end of life, 
and what their surrogate would decide for the individual, even when trying 
to decide based on the individual’s values.134  This discrepancy has led many 
to advocate for people to complete advance directives that specify their 
wishes at the end of life in order to preserve autonomy upon incapacity,135 
                                                          
 130.  Id. at 503–06. 
 131.  Id. at 503 (alteration in original). 
 132.  Id. at 504. 
 133.  Id. at 505. 
 134.  See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn, Improving Healthcare Decisions Through a Shared Preferences 
and Values Approach to Surrogate Selection, in NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 297, 298–300 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter NUDGING 
HEALTH] (summarizing studies on surrogate decisionmaking); Stephen C. Hines et al., Improving 
Advance Care Planning by Accommodating Family Preferences, 4 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 481, 482, 
485–87 (2001) (finding discordance between individual preferences and surrogate decisions). 
 135.  Nikki Ayers Hawkins et al., Micromanaging Death: Process Preferences, Values, and 
Goals in End-of-Life Medical Decision Making, 45 GERONTOLOGIST 107, 107, 113–14 (2005).  
Many have critiqued the emphasis on autonomy in advance directives given that people value more 
than just autonomy in healthcare decisionmaking, including family relationships.  IOM, supra note 
48, at 125; Theresa S. Drought & Barbara A. Koenig, “Choice” in End-of-Life Decision Making: 
Researching Fact or Fiction?, 42 GERONTOLOGIST 114, 118 (2002) (“It is the relationship that 
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but few people complete such directives.136  The reasons for this are numer-
ous, but include a desire to avoid discussing death,137 a preference to provide 
verbal rather than written instructions, and a preference to delegate decision-
making responsibility and flexibility.138  Surrogates may prefer more precise 
instructions, however,139 because making a decision often causes them im-
mense stress,140 which can be somewhat alleviated if surrogates think they 
are making the decision the patient would have made.141 
Surrogates’ preferences for precise instructions show that they respect 
the autonomy of the person for whom they are deciding, and they understand 
respecting this autonomy to be deciding as the patient would decide.  In cases 
in which surrogates are uncertain of the patient’s preferences, surrogates may 
be comforted to know that most patients want others to share in the decision-
making process.  Assuming the surrogate is a family member, a competent 
patient would likely make the decision at least in part based on the surrogate’s 
input.  Furthermore, even if a surrogate decides differently than a competent 
patient would decide, patients still believe surrogates respect their autonomy 
as long as the surrogate has decided conscientiously in light of the patient’s 
values.142  Therefore, absence of specific information about patient prefer-
ences about the particular end-of-life decision as well as discordance between 
patient and surrogate choices may be less critical to respecting autonomy than 
surrogates (and the law) presume. 
                                                          
matters, yet the relational values patients hold and want preserved through their advance directive 
(and symbolically charged appointments of surrogates) cannot be accounted for by the autonomy 
paradigm.”). 
 136.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 189 (describing multiple problems with ad-
vance directives, including that persons do not complete them); IOM, supra note 48, at 125. 
 137.  See IOM, supra note 48, at 117, 350–51; Linda Briggs, Shifting the Focus of Advance Care 
Planning: Using an In-Depth Interview to Build and Strengthen Relationships, 7 J. PALLIATIVE 
MED. 341, 347 (2004). 
 138.  Hawkins et al., supra note 135, at 113; Hines et al., supra note 134, at 487; see also Joseph 
J. Fins et al., Contracts, Covenants and Advance Care Planning: An Empirical Study of the Moral 
Obligations of Patient and Proxy, 29 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 55, 56, 64–65 (2005) (describing 
how proxies can deviate from patient instructions without feeling like they are violating the patient’s 
autonomy because discretion in making clinical choices is often necessary, and through their ap-
pointment as proxies, they have procedural moral authority to deviate from the substance of deci-
sions). 
 139.  Hines et al., supra note 134, at 487.  But patients want their families to have more flexibility 
in decisionmaking.  Id. 
 140.  IOM, supra note 48, at 129, 137–39 (summarizing research that shows many surrogate 
decisionmakers experience “negative psychological impact”); Briggs, supra note 137, at 347. 
 141.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 191 (summarizing research findings on sur-
rogate decisionmaking). 
 142.  Michael Cholbi, Grief and End-of-Life Surrogate Decision-Making, in ETHICS AT THE END 
OF LIFE: NEW ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 201, 214–15 (John K. Davis ed., 2017) (arguing that choos-
ing someone to make decisions bestows an honor on the chosen surrogate). 
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4.  Physician-Patient Relationships and Shared Decisionmaking 
As discussed previously, patients prefer to make end-of-life decisions 
with their healthcare providers, although this does not always happen in prac-
tice.  Indeed, many empirical studies have found that patients desire better 
communication, the foundation of the physician-patient relationship, with 
their healthcare providers when it comes to decisionmaking at the end of 
life.143  Physicians are often uncomfortable having such conversations or do 
not have the time to discuss these matters.144  The literature also demonstrates 
that patients have non-medical concerns at the end of life, but physicians 
rarely address them, instead focusing solely on medical issues such as treat-
ment, even when patients raise issues such as autonomy, maintaining control, 
and concerns for family members and relationships.145  However, having con-
versations about end-of-life decisions is associated with greater patient well-
being and family adjustment after patient deaths; such conversations are not 
associated with patient distress.146 
Given these consistent patient preferences about their relationship with 
their doctors, it is useful to review a medical decision-making model that 
attempts to improve physician-patient communication and accommodate pa-
tient values and concerns in the decision-making process.  This process is 
known as shared decisionmaking, which is viewed “as a compromise in the 
longstanding debate about the relative role of patient autonomy and provider 
beneficence in medical decision-making.”147  According to the Institute of 
                                                          
 143.  See IOM, supra note 48, at 351 (reviewing literature showing that most people want, but 
do not receive, good communication with clinicians at the end of life). 
 144.  Rachelle E. Bernacki & Susan D. Block, Communication About Serious Illness Care 
Goals: A Review and Synthesis of Best Practices, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1994, 1996, 1998 
(2014) (reviewing scholarly literature about physicians’ role in end-of-life decisionmaking); see 
also IOM, supra note 48, at 117, 159–62 (describing how patients and families are often emotional 
when discussing poor prognoses, and physicians are uncomfortable performing emotional labor).  
The perception of time constraints is likely accurate given that these conversations may not always 
be reimbursed, or reimbursed at a high rate.  Even though there have been recent changes to Medi-
care reimbursement for such conversations, there remains a cultural fear of having the government 
pressure people to hasten their death in order to save money.  Jonel Aleccia, Doctors Bill Medicare 
for End-of-Life Advice as “Death Panel” Fears Reemerge, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 15, 2017), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/doctors-bill-medicare-end-life-advice-death-panel-fears-
reemerge/; see also IOM, supra note 48, at 367–69 (arguing that the fear about “death panels” mis-
understands the role and importance of discussions about end-of-life decisions). 
 145.  Bernacki & Block, supra note 144, at 1998 (reviewing scholarly literature focusing on end-
of-life discussions). 
 146.  Id. at 1996. 
 147.  IOM, supra note 48, at 166 (quoting Meredith Stark & Joseph J. Fins, What’s Not Being 
Shared in Shared Decision-Making?, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 13 (2013)).   
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Medicine (“IOM”), shared decisionmaking is the “standard for [patient-cen-
tered] good care.”148  The goal of shared decisionmaking is, in part, to ensure 
that the patient’s medical care conforms to their values and preferences,149 
and to allow for the possibility that some patients will prefer to defer to their 
physician’s judgment and authority.150 
Shared decisionmaking has been described as follows: 
Most simply put, the physician’s role is to use his or her training, 
knowledge, and experience to provide the patient with facts about 
the diagnosis and about the prognoses without treatment and with 
alternative treatments.  The patient’s role in this division of labor 
is to provide the values—his or her own conception of the good—
with which to evaluate these alternatives, and to select the one that 
is best for himself or herself.151 
In ideal shared decisionmaking, all parties understand the important fac-
tors underlying the decision, and together make the decision about how best 
to proceed.152  Clinician-scholars emphasize that shared decisionmaking—
which is meant to respect patients’ autonomy—does not mean abandoning 
patients, but instead, “support[s] autonomy by building good relationships, 
respecting both individual competence and interdependence on others.”153  
                                                          
 148.  Id.  This is especially so in the context of chronic illness in which “an ongoing partnership 
needs to be developed between the clinical team, the patient and the family.”  Tim Rapley, Distrib-
uted Decision Making: The Anatomy of Decisions-in-Action, 30 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 429, 433 
(2008).   
 149.  IOM, supra note 48, at 166–67. 
 150.  Lisa M. Lines et al., Patient-Centered, Person-Centered, and Person-Directed Care: They 
Are Not the Same, 53 MED. CARE 561, 561 (2015).  Notably, leading bioethicists argue that “no 
fundamental inconsistency exists between autonomy and authority if individuals exercise their au-
tonomy in choosing to accept an institution, tradition, or community that they view as a legitimate 
source of direction.”  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 105 (discussing the case of reli-
gious and medical authority). 
 151.  Dan W. Brock, The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between Physicians and Patients, 1 
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 28, 28 (1991).  The Institute of Medicine defines shared decisionmaking 
as a process that includes physicians: 
eliciting and understanding the patient’s perspective; understanding the patient’s psycho-
social and emotional context; developing a shared understanding of the clinical problem 
and its appropriate treatment, given the patient’s goals, preferences, and values; and em-
powering patients, which is achieved through active involvement of patients in decision 
making. 
IOM, supra note 48, at 166–67. 
 152.  Michael J. Barry & Susan Edgman-Levitan, Shared Decision Making—The Pinnacle of 
Patient-Centered Care, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 780, 781 (2012).   
 153.  Glyn Elwyn et al., Shared Decision Making: A Model for Clinical Practice, 27 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 1361, 1361 (2012).  Patients want their physicians to aid in making end-of-life 
decisions because they may feel abandoned if left alone with the choice.  Drought & Koenig, supra 
note 135, at 122 (“A few patients expressed the feeling that offering choice reflected incompetence 
or indifference on the provider’s part.”). 
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Clinician-scholars also note that patients “are not entirely free, self-govern-
ing agents but that [their] decisions will always relate to interpersonal rela-
tionships and mutual dependencies.”154  The IOM notes, however, that it is 
difficult to shift from a culture of physician paternalism, and so shared deci-
sionmaking may not occur in practice, despite the vast majority of patients’ 
and surrogates’ desires to the contrary.155  The IOM reports that rather than 
physicians engaging with patients and families in decisionmaking, “[p]eople 
feel that explanations are rushed, issues are not explained, choices are not 
understood, and clinicians do not listen” and, that “[g]ood communication, 
by contrast, is greatly appreciated.”156 
Contemporary guidance about shared decisionmaking also includes a 
heavy focus on involving family in the medical decision-making process,157 
given that “important health decisions are usually not made in isolation . . . 
[but] are usually made in the context of social networks with friends, family, 
other social contacts, and health care professionals.”158  While family in-
volvement may be important in a variety of healthcare decision-making con-
texts, it is crucial for end-of-life planning and decisions.159  There are two 
reasons for the importance of family involvement at the end of life.  First, 
having family involved in end-of-life decisionmaking reflects patients’ pref-
erences for such involvement, as described above.  Second, given that most 
                                                          
 154.  Elwyn et al., supra note 153, at 1361–62.  
 155.  IOM, supra note 48, at 351; see also Barry & Edgman-Levitan, supra note 152, at 781 
(describing how physicians are not ceding paternalistic control over decisionmaking, although pa-
tients desire to be actively involved in decisionmaking and often do become involved when given 
the opportunity); Hines et al., supra note 134, at 487 (describing how surrogates desire shared de-
cisionmaking with physicians); Laura C. Hanson et al., What is Wrong with End-of-Life Care? 
Opinions of Bereaved Family Members, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC. 1339, 1343 (1997) (“Because 
current practices emphasize individual autonomy rights, physicians may overlook family or pur-
posely exclude them from key clinical discussions.”). 
“Paternalism” in this context can be defined as “the intentional overriding of one person’s 
preferences or actions by another person, where the person who overrides justifies this action by 
appeal to the goal of benefitting or of preventing or mitigating harm to the person whose preferences 
or actions are overridden.”  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 215 (emphasis omitted).   
 156.  IOM, supra note 48, at 351.   
 157.  Barry & Edgman-Levitan, supra note 152, at 780–81 (“[S]hared decision making . . . in-
volves, at minimum, a clinician and the patient, although other members of the health care team or 
friends and family members may be invited to participate.”).  However, this is a relatively recent 
development, given that bioethicists and clinicians previously ignored the role of the patient’s fam-
ily.  See HILDE LINDEMANN NELSON & JAMES LINDEMANN NELSON, THE PATIENT IN THE FAMILY: 
AN ETHICS OF MEDICINE AND FAMILIES 84 (1995). 
 158.  Ronald M. Epstein & Richard L. Street, Shared Mind: Communication, Decision Making, 
and Autonomy in Serious Illness, 9 ANNALS FAM. MED. 454, 456 (2011) (citing Beth A. Lown et 
al., Mutual Influence in Shared Decision Making: A Collaborative Study of Patients and Physicians, 
12 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 160, 160–74 (2009). 
 159.  IOM, supra note 48, at 167; see also Jennings, supra note 42, at 228 (noting the shift to-
wards prioritizing relational decisionmaking at the end-of-life with “consensus building among pro-
viders, surrogates, and family members, and the dying person, if capacity has not been lost”). 
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people do not have advance directives, the family may ultimately end up be-
ing surrogate decisionmakers with no written instructions, and so, the family 
needs to be involved earlier in the decision-making process.  Earlier involve-
ment may assist the family in gathering information necessary to know how 
to make a decision that best accords with the patient’s values based on the 
options available given the specific illness.160 
A patient’s preference for the clinical model of shared decisionmaking 
demonstrates that everyday decision makers such as patients and their fami-
lies understand the involvement of multiple parties in a decision to be com-
patible with autonomous choice in the context of health care and end-of-life 
decisionmaking. 
In sum, when making an end-of-life decision, relationships matter in 
two ways.  First, an individual may take into account others’ views and in-
terests.  Second, an individual may actually involve others, such as their phy-
sician or family members, in the decision-making process.161 
5.  Are End-of-Life Decision-Making Preferences and Values 
Universal? 
In the United States, people subject to end-of-life law and policy are not 
a homogeneous group.  The United States is a racially, ethnically, and cultur-
ally diverse nation.162  Thus, prior to making normative and prescriptive ar-
guments that impact everyone, it is sensible to examine whether there are 
distinct end-of-life values and preferences by race, ethnicity, and culture. 
With respect to end-of-life decisionmaking, bereaved African American 
family members report a desire for physicians to honestly, openly, compas-
sionately, and respectfully communicate with them about what is happening 
at the end of their loved one’s life, and to inquire about the family’s wishes 
about end-of-life care.163  These findings about African American end-of-life 
                                                          
 160.  Larry W. Foster & Linda J. McLellan, Translating Psychosocial Insight into Ethical Dis-
cussions Supportive of Families in End-of-Life Decision-Making, 35 SOC. WORK IN HEALTH CARE 
37, 38–39 (2002); Lee H. Igel & Barron H. Lerner, Moving Past Individual and “Pure” Autonomy: 
The Rise of Family-Centered Patient Care, 18 AM. MED. ASS’N. J. ETHICS 56, 58 (2016); see also 
Hines et al., supra note 134, at 487 (recommending that physicians obtain prior patient consent 
before physicians directly talk with surrogates). 
 161.  Indeed, leading guidance for clinicians on end-of-life decisionmaking advises that clini-
cians respect patient self-determination, but also notes,  
[r]espect for persons also recognizes that individuals are social beings who may consider 
the interests of others when making decisions and who may choose to make decisions in 
consultation or collaboration with loved ones or with other trusted individuals. 
BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 14.   
 162.  See IOM, supra note 48, at 38 (advising physicians to expect to care for a diverse popula-
tion). 
 163.  Carolyn Jenkins et al., End-of-Life Care and African Americans: Voices from the Commu-
nity, 8 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 585, 587–88 (2005). 
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preferences are similar to the findings of studies that survey the preferences 
of broader populations.164  Indeed, scholars have noted a similarity amongst 
racial groups with respect to desires for better communication with physi-
cians.165  And again, similar to what matters at the end of life for the general 
population, African Americans report a desire not to burden their families.166 
A more recent article addressing end-of-life preferences and ethnicity 
suggests that non-Western, “collectivis[t]” cultures may value beneficence 
more than autonomy, whereas autonomy is the primary value emphasized in 
“individualis[t],” Western law and medicine with respect to patient deci-
sionmaking.167  Many persons in the United States come from collectivist 
cultures, and thus, cultural differences (as distinct from racial differences) are 
also necessary to consider in end-of-life decisionmaking.  Searight and Gaf-
ford note: “These non-Western cultures believe that communities and fami-
lies, not individuals alone, are affected by life-threatening illnesses and the 
accompanying medical decisions.”168  With respect to this point, Searight and 
Gafford perhaps overplay cultural differences, given the above described em-
pirical research of the United States general population, consisting of both 
individualistic and collectivist subgroups, that illustrates the importance of 
relationships at the end of life and documents concern for grieving family 
members.169 
However, Searight and Gafford do correctly point out that in some cul-
tures, family members are viewed as the appropriate decisionmakers rather 
than the patient; in other cultures, however, physicians are viewed as the most 
appropriate decisionmaker, and families and patients defer to the physi-
cian.170  Research has demonstrated that Mexican Americans and Asian 
                                                          
 164.  See, e.g., IOM, supra note 48, at 351 (reviewing literature showing that most people want, 
but do not receive, good communication with clinicians at the end of life); Steinhauser et al., supra 
note 113, at 2481–82 (describing respondents’ desire for “strong relationships” between patients 
and physicians). 
 165.  Jenkins et al., supra note 163, at 589. 
 166.  Id. at 587. 
 167.  H. Russell Searight & Jennifer Gafford, Cultural Diversity at the End of Life: Issues and 
Guidelines for Family Physicians, 71 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 515, 516 (2005).   
 168.  Id.  
 169.  See Jung Kwak & William E. Haley, Current Research Findings on End-of-Life Decision 
Making Among Racially or Ethnically Diverse Groups, 45 GERONTOLOGIST 634, 639 (2005) (“The 
importance of involvement of family members in the decision-making process was found across all 
racial or ethnic groups, although preferences for how family members were involved in the process 
differed.”).  Other studies have shown that there is variability within a particular subgroup as to 
whether members think patients, patients’ families, or physicians should be making end-of-life de-
cisions.  Jenkins et al., supra note 163, at 589 (describing the results of focus groups with African 
Americans). 
 170.  Searight & Gafford, supra note 167, at 518–19; see also H. Eugene Hern, Jr. et al., The 
Difference that Culture Can Make in End-of-Life Decisionmaking, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE 
ETHICS 27, 30–31 (1998) (describing end-of-life decisionmaking in the case of Chinese immi-
grants); IOM, supra note 48, at 150 (“In many cultures, collective family decision making—and 
 
2018] END OF LIFE AND AUTONOMY 1093 
 
Americans are more likely than other racial and ethnic groups to informally 
involve family in end-of-life decisionmaking.171 
To accommodate variability in patient preferences while still privileging 
autonomy, many scholars argue that physicians should follow the American 
model of informed consent in medical decisionmaking, but respect a patient’s 
preference for their family or physician to make or participate in making their 
end-of-life decisions; respecting such preferences is both respecting auton-
omy and exercising cultural competence.172  Other scholars have cautioned, 
however, that culture should not be used as a proxy for an individual patient’s 
preferences, and physicians should ask each patient how they would like to 
make decisions.173 
In conclusion, the findings on the significance of interpersonal connec-
tions to persons at the end of life, the desire for good, respectful communica-
tion with healthcare providers, and the desire to involve families in deci-
sionmaking to some extent seem to be shared widely across the U.S. 
population, regardless of cultural background. 
B.  Relational Autonomy and End-of-Life Decisionmaking 
The above cited studies of attitudes, beliefs, and values describe ideal 
decisionmaking at the end of life.  Many people want to maintain autonomy, 
but they understand the exercise of autonomy to be relational in two distinct 
dimensions: deciding with others and deciding, in part, based on others’ in-
terests.  For example, patients want physicians to respect their values and not 
be overly paternalistic, but they also want physicians to assist with their de-
cisionmaking.  People also want to retain control over decisions, but many 
want their family involved in the decision-making process or at least consider 
their families when making these decisions. 
Conceiving the nature of autonomy as relational makes sense:   
As many [scholars] have pointed out, our self is constituted to an 
important degree by relations with and responsibilities towards our 
                                                          
even sometimes the paternalistic decisions of the family patriarch—is considered as important or 
more so than patient autonomy.”). 
 171.  Kwak & Haley, supra note 169, at 639 (“For most Asian and Hispanic Americans, the 
family’s role is meant to remove the burden of making treatment decisions from the patient.”).  
Mexican Americans, Korean Americans, and Native Americans are also more likely to prefer that 
poor diagnoses and prognoses not be disclosed to patients.  Id. at 638–39. 
 172.  Searight & Gafford, supra note 167, at 521; see also Hern et al., supra note 170, at 36 
(“Choosing not to participate is still an exercise of autonomy.”); Kwak & Haley, supra note 169, at 
640 (“Policy makers need to find ways to allow flexibility to support values and norms of various 
racial or ethnic groups in order to respect and protect rights of patients and their families.”). 
 173.  Hern et al., supra note 170, at 30; see also IOM, supra note 48, at 348 (“[C]linicians cannot 
make assumptions about patients’ beliefs and preferences based on race, ethnicity, religion, or cul-
ture.”). 
 
1094 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:1062 
 
intimates, and these relations and the welfare of our loved ones 
may be more significant than the interests of any individual self in 
isolation.174 
Coupled with the reality that most “[p]eople never make decisions with-
out the participation of others,”175 feminist philosophers, bioethicists, and 
critical disability scholars have thus advanced the concept of “relational au-
tonomy.”176  Importantly, relational autonomy is autonomy, just conceptual-
ized in a way that accords with social reality.177 
Some philosophers have therefore argued that making medical decisions 
with family in mind is not necessarily counter to exercising autonomy at the 
end of life, and that such decisions may actually promote agency.178  There-
fore, if physicians, other actors, or the law try to prevent family involvement 
on the grounds of protecting an individual’s autonomy, they may actually be 
undermining autonomy.179 
The concept of relational autonomy has extended over time to include 
relationships not only with family members contributing to the constitution 
of self, but also relationships with members of one’s larger community.  This 
version of autonomy is “set in a context of community relations.”180  Some 
                                                          
 174.  Anita Ho, Relational Autonomy or Undue Pressure? Family’s Role in Medical Decision-
Making, 22 SCANDINAVIAN J. CARING SCI. 128, 131 (2008). 
 175.  Autumn Alcott Ridenour & Lisa Sowle Cahill, The Role of Community, in DYING IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: TOWARD A NEW ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ART OF DYING WELL 
107, 122 (Lydia S. Dugdale ed., 2015); see also Rapley, supra note 148, at 434 (“[D]ecisions can 
and are ‘thought about’ in and through interactions. . . .  [I]t is a routine feature of everyday life that 
we talk to, listen to and ask advice from others.  In this way, our decision making is deeply embed-
ded in, shapes and is shaped by, interactions with others.”).  
 176.  See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 106 (“In our view, relational con-
ceptions of autonomy are defensible as long as they do not neglect or obscure the principal features 
of autonomy . . . .”); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, 
AUTONOMY, AND LAW 3 (2011) (“Autonomy . . . comes into being (or is harmed) through relation-
ships . . . .”); MACKENZIE & STOLJAR, supra note 15, at 4; Harold Braswell, Can There Be a Disa-
bility Studies Theory of “End-of-Life Autonomy”?, 31 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2011).  
 177.  Some clinicians do not recognize the involvement of family in healthcare decisionmaking 
as compatible with autonomy, and refer to such involvement as “post-autonomy” clinical practice.  
Igel & Lerner, supra note 160, at 56–57.  
 178.  Ho, supra note 174, at 129.  Indeed, Ho asserts, “[f]or those whose family is at the centre 
of their existence, consideration of their advice, needs and mutual interests is part of their autono-
mous agency.”  Id. at 132. 
 179.  Id. at 133.  “[I]n the absence of abuse and neglect, respect for autonomous agency requires 
clinicians to abide by patients’ expressed wishes.”  Id. at 129.  Acknowledging the reality of rela-
tional autonomy, the Hastings Center advises clinicians:  
[p]romoting autonomy and respecting relationships are compatible goals.  Autonomy 
means “self-rule,” not “self-isolation.”  Respecting a patient as a person means respecting 
this person’s relationships and supporting a patient’s ability to draw on these relation-
ships in making decisions and approaching the end of life.   
BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 14–15. 
 180.  Ridenour & Cahill, supra note 175, at 107. 
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have argued that communities, particularly religious communities, have a 
significant role to play in providing support when a member is dying, includ-
ing economic support and provision of care.181  These scholars also note, 
however, that at the end of life, people may perceive themselves as a burden 
in their particular community.182 
The next Part will explain why decisions at the end of life may not be 
made relationally, and highlight the role of law’s individualistic conceptual-
ization of autonomy in undermining autonomy at the end of life.  Given that 
autonomy is the central principle of this body of law, the next Part will argue 
for the reform of end-of-life decision-making law and policy to accommodate 
and promote relational autonomy. 
III.  ALIGNING END-OF-LIFE DECISION-MAKING LAW AND POLICY WITH 
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
The law does not always track what people want with respect to end-of-
life decisionmaking given differing conceptualizations of autonomy.  The 
gap between end-of-life decision-making preferences and law and policies 
governing end-of-life decisionmaking may not be significant if a person is 
making decisions while competent and capacitated.  However, such end-of-
life decisions are often made when a person lacks capacity.  Many people do 
not plan for loss of capacity, which means that surrogate decisions are made 
based on law and policy defaults. 
In this Part, I address reasons why there may be a mismatch between 
what people say they want (consideration of familial interests and shared de-
cisionmaking with physicians) and the choices they actually make at the end 
of life.  I then draw on the law and behavioral economics literature to describe 
the concept of choice architecture, also known as “nudging.”  I next outline 
some changes to the background architecture of end-of-life decision-making 
law and policy that may aid individuals, families, clinicians, and courts in 
making end-of-life decisions in line with an individual’s values.  Specifically, 
I argue that relational nudges, focusing on the modification of existing de-
faults and the strategic use of priming, should be built into existing end-of-
life decision-making law and policy in an attempt to influence various actors’ 
                                                          
 181.  Id. at 117.  Also, the community can sustain a person’s “relationships, values, and spiritu-
ality” when a person’s capacity declines at the end of life.  Id. at 121.  Community is not only family 
and friends, but also the community of the hospital—other patients, their families, and hospital staff.  
Id. at 121; see also Dugdale, supra note 120, at 186–87 (noting how physicians and patients, espe-
cially in the context of long-standing relationships, constitute a community).  The IOM has argued 
that communities also have a responsibility to help their members prepare for death.  IOM, supra 
note 48, at 370–71. 
 182.  Ridenour & Cahill, supra note 175, at 114–15.  The Vatican has concluded that considering 
the financial burden on others, including family or the larger community, at the end of life is a valid 
concern.  Id. at 116. 
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behavior to accommodate and promote relational autonomy.  I conclude by 
addressing objections to my recommendations. 
A.  Explaining Gaps Between Preferences and Behavior in End-of-Life 
Decisionmaking 
This discussion of how people conceive of autonomy differently than 
does the body of end-of-life decision-making law and policy would not be 
necessary if end-of-life decisions were routinely made in accord with a per-
son’s values and preferences, and in particular, if such decisions were made 
in collaboration with or in consideration of others.  But, there are potentially 
significant gaps between what people report wanting at end of life with re-
spect to relational decisionmaking, and what happens to them at the end of 
life.183  One reason that people do not make the best decisions (i.e., decisions 
that align with their values, preferences, and interests) with respect to their 
health, generally, is because of the somewhat unique nature of healthcare de-
cisionmaking, including “the special importance of health . . . [and] the emo-
tional nature of the questions.”184 
When it comes to end-of-life healthcare decisionmaking, it is reasonable 
to assume that people are even worse at making decisions.185  For example, 
it is well known that while most people think it is smart to have an advance 
directive, they typically never complete the document.186  People often fail to 
                                                          
 183.  See Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1704 (arguing that the complexity of end-of-life decision-
making law “can result in decisions that do not adequately honor or protect a patient’s preferences 
and interests, especially when decisions are made about life-sustaining treatment for patients lacking 
capacity”). 
 184.  I. Glenn Cohen, Introduction to Part I, in NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134, at 58 (citation 
omitted) (citing NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH CARE NEEDS FAIRLY 
(2008)).  That people are prone to predictable cognitive biases is well known to health policymakers.  
As the IOM notes, based on their review of the research on decisionmaking, people do not tend to 
make “rational choices based on well-established views and preferences.”  IOM, supra note 48, at 
167.  Instead, decisions are biased or based on heuristics, which can “unintentionally thwart what 
patients themselves see as their best interest and goals.”  Id. at 168. 
 185.  See id. at 167 (explaining how various cognitive biases and irrationality in decisionmaking 
may manifest at the end of life).  
 186.  Id. at 125 (summarizing scholarly literature on the completion rates of advanced direc-
tives). 
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complete an advance directive due to fear of talking about death187 or physi-
cians’ failure to initiate discussions about end of life with their patients.188  
Thus, many people put off making any decisions at all, and failure to plan for 
future incapacity leaves them at the mercy of default laws, policies, and de-
cisions made on their behalf by surrogates who may not be well informed.  
When people do not plan for incapacity and there is no evidence of what they 
would want in a particular end-of-life scenario, the default is to try to sustain 
life.189   
Even when people are able to make their own end-of-life decisions be-
cause they are still competent or they have planned for their incapacity, they 
may not make decisions that actually effectuate their desires due to flawed 
                                                          
 187.  Id. at 128.  The IOM notes: 
Advance care planning is an example of an action that has fairly steep immediate costs 
(contemplation of one’s mortality and the possibility of being unable to make decisions) 
and benefits that may appear only theoretical.  The younger and healthier the person is, 
the more theoretical those benefits may seem. 
Id. at 168. 
 188.  Even if physicians are willing to have conversations with their patients about end-of-life 
planning, they may not be adequately reimbursed by healthcare payers for time spent on these con-
versations, disincentivizing physicians to conduct the conversations.  Id. at 320 (explaining how the 
Affordable Care Act has no reimbursement mechanism for end-of-life conversations physicians 
conduct with patients).  But see Aleccia, supra note 144 (describing recent changes in Medicare 
rules that reimburse physicians for end-of-life planning conversations); see also David Orentlicher, 
The Limits of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255, 1275–76 (1994) (arguing that inadequate physician 
compensation leads to less understanding of patient end-of-life wishes); Shepherd, supra note 21, 
at 1741 (arguing that all conversations between patients and providers about healthcare matters 
should be reimbursed). 
 189.  IOM, supra note 48, at 169, 330 (explaining that one default rule in medicine is “aggressive 
care unless stated otherwise”); see also Sarah Conly, Better Off Dead: Paternalism and Persistent 
Unconsciousness, in NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134, at 292 (explaining that continued care is 
the default option because of a physician’s oath to “do no harm”); NELSON & NELSON, supra note 
157, at 98 (explaining that continued care is used as a defense to tort claims because of a bias to-
wards using available technology to sustain life); Bernacki & Block, supra note 144, at 1997 (ex-
plaining that physicians default to aggressive care because of their preferences); Shepherd, supra 
note 21, at 1701 (explaining that continued care is assumed to be in the patient’s best interest). 
Aggressive care can be considered a penalty default if most people would not prefer it.  See 
Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2097 
(2012) (“The default is a penalty . . . if the legal effect of silence is disfavored by the contractors.”). 
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decisionmaking and routine cognitive biases.190  People have “bounded ra-
tionality” when making decisions,191 and thus, may not understand their pref-
erences in a particular situation or be able to predict their future prefer-
ences.192  This has led some scholars to argue, “[t]hus, unassisted, patients’ 
decisions might be neither truly informed nor autonomous, and patients may 
have limited insight into their own cognitive biases and limitations.”193  For 
example, research has demonstrated that when faced with decisions to par-
ticipate in research, where a requirement of such participation is voluntary 
informed consent (i.e., an autonomous decision), people report understanding 
the information upon which their decision is based, when in fact, they do 
not.194  This same lack of understanding occurs in healthcare decisionmak-
ing,195 particularly in the end-of-life context where other barriers to rational 
decisionmaking may include being ill at the time of the decision.196 
Beyond physical and psychological factors that limit understanding, 
there are “institutional and situational factors”197 that may result in deci-
sionmaking that is not truly autonomous and that will not promote a person’s 
                                                          
 190.  See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2013) (summarizing 
scholarly literature on cognitive biases); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009) (summarizing scholarly 
literature on cognitive biases, and arguing for how to improve decisionmaking in light of such bi-
ases).  People are particularly poor at decisionmaking when the decision is complex and good, com-
plete information is unavailable, which is the case with healthcare generally and end-of-life deci-
sionmaking specifically.  Id. at 9–10. 
 191.  Russell Korobkin, Three Choice Architecture Paradigms for Healthcare Policy, in 
NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134, at 15.  Behavioral law and economics scholars note: 
Traditional, neoclassical economists . . . assum[e] perfect rationality: that choices made 
maximize the subjective expected utility of the chooser given constraints.  Or, put in a 
slightly different way, that our “revealed preferences,” as determined by the choices we 
make, match our experienced utility or hedonic experience . . . .  But the burgeoning body 
of social science research in the field . . . has provided a bumper crop of insights into the 
variety of ways in which our bounded rationality causes people to make decisions using 
heuristics that frequently lead to suboptimal outcomes. 
Id. (citations omitted) (first citing Gul & Pesendorfer 2008); and then citing Gilovich, Griffin and 
Kahneman 2002). 
 192.  See Epstein & Street, supra note 158, at 456 (“[P]atients’ preferences may be vague, un-
stable, and uninformed.”); Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411, 421–
22 (2006) (describing how people are bad at predicting their future preferences). 
 193.  Epstein & Street, supra note 158, at 456 (“Clinicians’ preferences and decision-making 
processes are similarly affected.”). 
 194.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 131. 
 195.  See Schneider, supra note 192, at 418–20 (summarizing research on patients’ failure to 
understand information received from clinicians about treatments). 
 196.  See Conly, supra note 189, at 289–90.  Even if patients are not ill, studies show they still 
do not understand end-of-life options contained in advance directive forms (e.g., patients do not 
understand that ventilation does not keep the heart beating).  Schneider, supra note 192, at 419–20.  
Patients are also poor at planning for loss of capacity because they cannot anticipate how they will 
react to the experience of disability and illness.  Id. at 428. 
 197.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 131.  
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welfare.  For example, prior to admission to a hospital to undergo a medical 
procedure, patients may be presented with an advance directive as part of 
routine admission paperwork.  If they quickly complete the advance directive 
while waiting to be admitted, they may not be thinking carefully through their 
treatment preferences.  Additionally, they may not be feeling well, which 
could affect their ability to make decisions that align with their true values 
and preferences.  These contextual factors may result in different decisions 
than the patient would have made had they completed the advance directive 
at a time when they were less vulnerable, in a nonmedical setting such as at 
home or with their estate planning attorney, and where they had more time to 
consider what is truly important to them, including their social relation-
ships.198 
The default processes and standards built into end-of-life decision-mak-
ing law and policy matter a great deal when surrogates are called upon to 
make end-of-life decisions, when people use standardized advance directive 
forms, and when people opt into physician AID.  The discrepancy between 
how autonomy, the principle value and goal of this body of law, is conceptu-
alized by judges, lawyers, and legislators compared to ordinary people thus 
may become problematic.  Problems arise because standards and processes 
governing these situations may not actually effectuate autonomy, which is 
what the law is meant to do. 
Based on the empirical studies described previously, end-of-life law and 
policy fails to promote autonomy because it accords relational concerns a 
different weight and valence than most people would prefer.  The cases de-
scribed in Part I show the stark disconnect between how people want to make 
end-of-life decisions and how such decisions may be made in court upon in-
capacity.  With respect to surrogate decisionmaking, for example, in the 
Schiavo case, the court characterized the end-of-life decision as “about The-
resa Schiavo’s right to make her own decision, independent of her parents 
and independent of her husband.”199  In this instance, the weight the court 
gave family input in Schiavo’s end-of-life decision was equal to zero because 
the court assumed that Schiavo would not consider her family’s input while 
making the decision.200  However, given the above described studies, if com-
petent, Schiavo likely would not make decisions “independent” of her family 
members, and would either decide with them, or at least weigh their input at 
some value greater than zero.201 
                                                          
 198.  See Christopher T. Robertson et al., Introduction, in NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134, at 
5 (discussing how factors such as the initial framing of choices may intersect with cognitive biases).  
 199.  In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 200.  See id. at 187 (noting that a judicial determination is “a necessary function if all people are 
to be entitled to a personalized decision about life-prolonging procedures independent of the sub-
jective and conflicting assessments of their friends and relatives”). 
 201.  See id. at 186. 
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In the case of physician AID, when addressing the state interest in pro-
tecting vulnerable groups with compromised autonomy, the Glucksberg 
Court discussed the risk that persons may “resort to [physician AID] to spare 
their families the substantial financial burden of end-of-life health-care 
costs.”202  The Court assumed that anyone who makes such decisions in part 
for economic reasons has compromised autonomy.  The Court does not seem 
to recognize, however, that access to physician AID might actually be auton-
omy-promoting in this case, an option that persons—even those from disad-
vantaged social groups—may knowingly, willingly, and happily make out of 
consideration for their families, just as they have likely made many other 
decisions in consideration of the wellbeing of their families.  Indeed, the re-
view of empirical literature demonstrates that the majority of patients do not 
want to be a burden on their families and may, therefore, intentionally and 
autonomously make end-of-life decisions with economic considerations in 
mind.203  One participant in a research study stated: 
I hope to stop myself from becoming a burden to them [children].  
Looking after somebody either takes a lot of money, in which case 
you may get somebody to baby-sit for you, or you have to do it 
yourself, and I do not wish my children to be in the position of 
having to do that.  Therefore, I would rather die faster than later.204 
Courts may thus accord a different valence to relational considerations than 
dying persons might. 
In brief, decisions made on the basis of existing end-of-life decision-
making law and policy may not accord with most people’s values, prefer-
ences, and interests, many of which are relational in nature.  This means that 
current law and policy may actually impede rather than promote autonomy.  
                                                          
 202.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997); see also id. at 783 (Souter, J., con-
curring) (“[T]he terminally sick might be pressured into suicide decisions by close friends and fam-
ily members . . . not only because the costs of care might be more than family members could bear 
but simply because they might naturally wish to see an end of suffering for someone they love.”).  
 203.  Considering the generosity of the social safety net matters for this discussion, and I do not 
mean to suggest that the only choices are between hastening death and being a burden on family or 
society.  While the focus of this paper has been mostly on the micro-level of decisionmaking, fo-
cusing on dyadic or small group relationships, it is also important to consider the macro-level con-
ditions that influence autonomy.  See, e.g., Susan Sherwin, Relational Autonomy and Global 
Threats, in BEING RELATIONAL: REFLECTIONS ON RELATIONAL THEORY AND HEALTH LAW 13, 
19 (Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer J. Llewellyn eds., 2012) [hereinafter BEING RELATIONAL] (“Often, 
oppressed people fail to act with full autonomy because the options that are meaningfully available 
to them do not include a choice that is compatible with their deepest values and needs . . . .  In such 
cases, increasing autonomy requires making changes to the background conditions . . .”).  There 
could be structural changes to, for example, the provision and financing of long-term care that could 
decrease the burden on families, which may change how people make decisions at the end of life.  
The background conditions of social and economic inequality decrease true autonomy.   
 204.  Peter A. Singer et al., Quality End-of-Life Care: Patients’ Perspectives, 281 JAMA 163, 
166 (1999). 
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To make consistent the purpose of end-of-life decision-making law and pol-
icy—respect for, and promotion of, autonomy—and its effect, changes must 
be made to accommodate and advance people’s relational interests.  As lead-
ing health law scholars note, “the central purpose of health care law is to 
improve the lives of patients.”205  The following sections will outline some 
proposals to achieve this outcome.206 
B.  Choice Architecture (“Nudging”) 
Given that people do not always choose autonomously or in a way that 
increases their welfare, and given the complexity of healthcare decisionmak-
ing, insights from behavioral psychology have been applied to this decision-
making domain through intentional manipulation of the decision-making 
process.207  The growing influence of behavioral law and economics has, to 
date, only had limited application to the domain of end-of-life decision-mak-
ing policy, however.208  This Section will review the basic outlines of choice 
architecture, and the next Section will apply these insights to end-of-life de-
cision-making law and policy. 
Legal academics and economists have been interested in ways in which 
an individual’s cognitive biases can be countered and overall welfare in-
creased by altering the way decisions are made through intentional “choice 
architecture” or “nudging.”  Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler are 
among the most well-known scholars advancing these ideas.209  They empha-
size that decisions are not made a-contextually and that the way choices are 
                                                          
 205.  Mark A. Hall et al., Rethinking Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 342 (2006); 
see also Shepherd & Hall, supra note 112, at 1433 (“[L]aw that affects patients should better take 
into account what it means to be a patient.”). 
 206.  This normative move is also consistent with other scholars who argue that once we realize 
that autonomy is relational, given the importance of autonomy to much of law, which conceptualizes 
autonomy as individualistic, we must change laws.  See NEDESKY, supra note 176, at 5. 
 207.  See generally NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134.  
 208.  This application seems to be in the realm of experimental studies of the effect of changing 
default rules about comfort or aggressive care in advance directives.  See IOM, supra note 48, at 
167–170 (exploring the ways that clinicians can use insights from behavioral psychology about how 
decisions are made “to develop, test, and implement scalable interventions that improve the quality 
of the health decisions made by patients, family members, and providers” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Scott D. Halpern, in Young Leaders: Employing Behavioral Economics and Decision Science in 
Crucial Choices at End of Life, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2789 (2012))).  
 209.  While they have authored many articles advancing their ideas, a summary is found in their 
book.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 3, 6.  For a shorter, but comprehensive summary, 
see Richard H. Thaler et al., Choice Architecture, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 429 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
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presented impacts a person’s final choice.210  They refer to people and insti-
tutions who structure decisions as “choice architects.”211  They define “nudg-
ing” as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in 
a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives.”212  They assert that nudging is particularly appro-
priate when decisions are “difficult and rare . . . and when [people] have trou-
ble translating aspects of the situation into terms that they can easily under-
stand.”213 
Much of the literature about choice architecture discusses default 
rules.214  A default is what happens in a particular decision system if a person 
decides to do nothing.215  The selection of a default rule is one of the most 
powerful tools of choice architecture,216 and thus is potentially controver-
sial,217 especially because in many situations most people choose to do noth-
ing.218 
Beyond the use of default rules, Thaler, Sunstein, and colleagues de-
scribe other aspects of choice architecture.  Because choices can be complex, 
and because cognitive biases exist, people can be expected to make errors 
when making decisions.219  Good choice architecture attempts to reduce these 
decision-making errors and aids with selection of a choice that improves an 
individual’s welfare.220  Good choice architecture “takes into account the 
ways ‘choices are presented and the environment in which decisions are 
                                                          
 210.  See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190.  They also stress that choice design 
is never neutral.  Id. at 3. 
 211.  Id.   
 212.  Id. at 6. 
 213.  Id. at 72. 
 214.  See id.  
 215.  Thaler et al., supra note 209, at 430.   
 216.  As Thaler and colleagues observed: 
For reasons of laziness, fear, and distraction, many people will take whatever option re-
quires the least effort . . . .  All these forces imply that if, for a given choice, there is a 
default option . . . then we can expect a large number of people to end up with that option, 
whether or not it is good for them.  
Id. 
 217.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 85. 
 218.  Sticking with the selected default is due to status quo bias.  Id. at 7–8, 34, 83. 
 219.  Thaler et al., supra note 209, at 431–33; see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 
87; Korobkin, supra note 191, at 21 (“Medical care decisions are often complex . . . most are novel 
for the patient; and when such decisions require trading off money against health, which most of us 
are instinctively reluctant to have to do, they can undermine rational cost-benefit analysis.”). 
 220.  Thaler et al., supra note 209, at 433 (describing the use of checklists in medical practice to 
reduce medical errors in hectic environments where complex medical decisions must be made). 
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made,’ adjusting them so that better decisions result,”221 and may also try to 
simplify choices.222 
Another element of choice architecture is priming.  Priming makes “use 
of the principle that our acts are influenced by subconscious cues.  These cues 
can be strategically used as primers for [desired] behaviors.”223  Social sci-
ence on priming “shows that subtle influences can increase the ease with 
which certain information comes to mind.”224  For example, using visible 
primes, such as displaying healthier food earlier in a buffet line, has been 
shown to increase healthy eating behaviors.225 
There are many other tools of choice architecture, such as the use of 
incentives,226 although a complete discussion of such tools and their applica-
tion to this body of law is beyond the scope of this Article.  The next Section 
will discuss how the structure of choices can be altered in end-of-life deci-
sion-making law, policy, and practice to promote relational autonomy. 
C.  Relational Nudges in End-of-Life Decision-Making Law and Policy 
Most people want to maintain control over decisionmaking, and also 
have loved ones and physicians involved in decisionmaking, at the end of 
life.  This is because autonomous decisionmaking at the end of life is under-
stood relationally.  Individuals may not always be able to decide based on 
their relational values and preferences, however, due to failures of rationality 
in this specific context.  Laws and policies can be designed to better accord 
with most people’s decision-making preferences by nudging actors to con-
sider relationality in end-of-life decisionmaking.  What I call “relational 
nudges” are meant to account for failures of rationality and increase the like-
lihood that end-of-life decisions will be made in the manner most people pre-
fer—in consultation with and in consideration of others.  These nudges 
should increase autonomous decisionmaking in this domain and also promote 
                                                          
 221.  IOM, supra note 48, at 168 (quoting S.D. Halpern, Young Leaders: Employing Behavioral 
Economics and Decision Science in Crucial Choices at End of Life, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2789, 2789 
(2012)); see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 36–37 (describing how framing choices 
matters). 
 222.  Korobkin, supra note 191, at 21 (“Policymakers can enhance the ability of individuals to 
make decisions that maximize their own subjective expected utility by combining and presenting 
information in ways that simplify the relevant choice.”).   
 223.  J.S. Blumenthal-Barby & Hadley Burroughs, Seeking Better Health Care Outcomes: The 
Ethics of Using the “Nudge”, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 6 (2012). 
 224.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 69.   
 225.  Id. at 69–71 (describing studies of priming); Amy L. Wilson et al., Nudging Healthier Food 
and Beverage Choices Through Salience and Priming, Evidence from a Systematic Review, 51 
FOOD QUALITY & PREFERENCE 47, 51 (2016) (reviewing studies about the effects of priming on 
behavior); see also Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 223, at 6. 
 226.  See, e.g., Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 223, at 1–2 (reviewing studies about 
the use of incentives). 
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overall welfare.227  In this Section, I will describe an example of an existing 
relational nudge.  I will then illustrate other possible forms of relational 
nudges, first focusing on defaults and then moving onto priming.  It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to list all possible relational nudges or propose model 
laws, but I instead want to suggest places where low-cost interventions may 
have a potentially large impact. 
1.  Example of Relational Nudge in End-of-Life Decision-Making 
Law 
Before moving into a discussion of my proposed relational nudges, it is 
instructive to examine an existing relational nudge in end-of-life decision-
making law.  Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act228 contains examples of rela-
tional nudges that also preserve patient autonomy.  The law requires that a 
physician recommend that a patient requesting AID inform their family of 
their decision, but does not make this a condition of receiving physician 
AID.229  Additionally, should a physician not make this recommendation, the 
patient will be nudged in this direction again when they complete the written 
request for the lethal medication and must initial next to one of the following 
options: informed family “and taken their opinions into consideration,” cho-
sen not to inform family, or have no family to inform.230  Oregon’s law ex-
plicitly acknowledges the dying individual’s relationships with family mem-
bers, and requires persons pursuing this end-of-life option to take this 
relationality into account as well by at least prompting them to think about 
the fact that their decision to die in this manner likely matters to their family. 
The law thus accounts for people, particularly physicians, making mis-
takes and forgetting to discuss with their patients whether the family has been 
consulted, and contains nudges in multiple parts of the process to ensure that 
relationality is considered when making this end-of-life decision.  Never does 
the law require that an individual talk to their family, but it nudges them to 
do so when making the decision to hasten their death.  This law promotes a 
“relational autonomy,” preserving a person’s free choice to make their own 
medical decisions without consulting family members or strongly weighing 
                                                          
 227.  My arguments are a response to the challenge identified by leading end-of-life ethicist 
Bruce Jennings.  See Jennings, supra note 42, at 220 (asserting “that the challenge facing the rela-
tional orientation in end-of-life care is twofold: (1) to provide a more practical and feasible template 
for medical planning and decision-making that more effectively serves the needs and rights of dying 
persons; and (2) to avoid bluntly rejecting or abandoning ideals of personal autonomy and respect 
for persons”).   
 228.  OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800–.897 (2015). 
 229.  Id. § 127.815. 
 230.  Id. § 127.897.  Interestingly, there is no option to select reflecting that patients may choose 
to inform their families but not take their opinions into consideration.   
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their family’s interests, but also attempts to put the patient on the path to 
consider relevant others’ “voice[s]” or “stake[s].”231 
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act is an outlier in this area of law232 be-
cause it contains relational nudges and explicit references to a patient’s fam-
ily and their interests.  The following sections will suggest how relational 
nudges can be built into other types of end-of-life decision-making law and 
policy. 
2.  Relational Nudges: Modifying Existing Defaults 
This Section will describe how existing end-of-life decision-making law 
and policy defaults can be modified to promote and accommodate relational 
autonomy.233 
a.  Defaults in the Decision-Making Process for Competent 
Adults 
The current default in end-of-life decision-making law is to respect an 
individual’s decision, given that it is part of a liberty-based privacy interest 
to make healthcare decisions regardless of the effect the decision has on oth-
ers.234  An attempt to override this decision may come through attempts at 
persuasion or through a medical evaluation that finds someone lacks capacity 
to make the decision.  While I do not argue for a change in legal defaults 
around end-of-life decisionmaking for competent persons, defaults in 
healthcare organizational policy interpreting and facilitating this right can be 
improved to promote relational autonomy.  Changes to policy are both more 
feasible and perhaps more effective, given that policy may affect physician’s 
clinical practice (and thus end-of-life decisionmaking) more than law.235 
                                                          
 231.  Robert A. Burt, The End of Autonomy, 35 HASTINGS CTR. SPECIAL REP. S9, S12 (2005) 
(describing the interest others have in an individual’s end-of-life decision).   
 232.  It may be the case that specific healthcare organizational policies contain relational nudges 
around withholding or withdrawing care for competent patients or assisting surrogates in making 
decisions on behalf of an incompetent patient.  A survey of such policies would have to be conducted 
in order to know the extent to which they promote relational autonomy. 
 233.  Notably, the rules in end-of-life decision-making law and policy are almost all default rules 
rather than mandatory rules because people can always opt out of the defaults.  Mandatory rules are 
those that cannot be contracted around (i.e., opt out).  See Ayres, supra note 189, at 2035–39 (de-
fining terms).   
 234.  See Winick, supra note 14, at 1735 (“Unless incompetent, the patient’s medical decisions 
must be respected, no matter how foolish these decisions are thought to be.”).  Others have argued 
for changing this default.  See, e.g., NELSON & NELSON, supra note 157, at 114–15; Burt, supra 
note 231, at S10. 
 235.  See Orentlicher, supra note 188, at 1301–05 (describing how end-of-life decision-making 
legislation does not change physician practice, and arguing that professional and policy changes 
may result in more patient autonomy).  
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For example, when a competent adult patient decides to forgo life-sus-
taining treatment, institutional (e.g., hospital) policy or clinical practice 
guidelines should explicitly nudge patients to consider making this decision 
in consultation with others (or at least inform them of their decision).  This 
decision could trigger clinicians to inquire as to whether patients have dis-
cussed their decision with their family, friends, religious leaders, or extended 
social network.236  If the patients have not, the clinician could recommend 
they do so, although the patient should never be made to feel as though they 
are required to discuss their private medical decisions with anyone.237  I am 
not arguing for any changes to current default rules of maintaining patient 
confidentiality contained in the Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
bility Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”),238 nor am I suggesting weakening the fiduci-
ary relationship between physicians and their patients wherein physicians 
owe patients a duty of confidentiality.239  This means that clinicians would 
not legally or ethically be permitted to inform a patient’s family of their de-
cisions without the patient’s consent.240 
The clinician arguably will have also had the opportunity to weigh in on 
the decision as well.241  If clinicians are responsible for this nudge, they will 
need a reminder to make this inquiry and recommendation, because they too 
are affected by cognitive biases and distorted rationality.242  Checklists, or 
tying this to a referral to hospice may be useful clinical practice.243 
                                                          
 236.  To ensure that physicians do not forget to follow such a policy, reminders could be built 
into electronic health record systems, so when a physician makes notes in the patient’s medical 
record about the decision to withhold or withdraw care, they see the reminder to suggest the patient 
talk to their family. 
 237.  Truly respecting autonomy may actually require physicians to inform their patients that 
relationships are important to many people at the end of life.  As Beauchamp and Childress note, 
one of the positive obligations of respecting autonomy is “respectful treatment in disclosing infor-
mation and actions that foster autonomous decision making.”  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra 
note 1, at 107. 
 238.  Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
 239.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 319–20 (discussing physicians’ duty of con-
fidentiality and some exceptions to this duty); see also BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 45 
(discussing the duty of confidentiality in end-of-life context). 
 240.  This is true even in the palliative care and hospice contexts.  And, it is true even if families 
would prefer otherwise.  I also recognize that patient confidentiality may hinder communities from 
fulfilling their obligations to members at the end of life.  See, e.g., IOM, supra note 48, at 247 
(explaining how HIPAA prevents clergy who are not part of hospital staff from knowing if their 
congregants are hospitalized).   
 241.  Indeed, the withdrawal of many methods of life-sustaining treatment (e.g., artificial nutri-
tion or ventilation) by its nature will involve shared decisionmaking with physicians.  Decisions not 
to pursue care may not, however (e.g., decisions not to treat cancer that has recurred). 
 242.  Alexander M. Capron & Donna Spruijt-Metz, Behavioral Economics in the Physician-Pa-
tient Relationship: A Possible Role for Mobile Devices and Small Data, in NUDGING HEALTH, supra 
note 134, at 235 (noting that clinicians suffer from the same cognitive biases that patients do). 
 243.  Checklists and reminders are priming nudges. Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 
223, at 6.  For a brief description of the nudges, see supra notes 220 and 236 and accompanying 
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b.  Defaults in Surrogate Decision-Making Standards 
More significant is the issue of default rules and standards in surrogate 
decisionmaking.  If people do not plan for future incapacity by completing 
an advance directive, a series of default rules apply when they lose capacity 
and healthcare decisions must be made.  Given that most people do not com-
plete an advance directive,244 these defaults are especially consequential.245 
The current defaults in end-of-life surrogate decisionmaking, based on 
the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act discussed in Part I, are as follows.  
When a surrogate has not been chosen in advance, the law provides a famil-
ial-based hierarchy to select a surrogate.246  This default is particularly ap-
propriate because patients can always opt out of it prior to incapacity by se-
lecting a healthcare agent who is not a family member, for example.  If a 
patient does nothing to plan for incapacity, however, the default likely 
matches well enough with whom a patient would have selected to be their 
surrogate decisionmaker, given that most persons who choose a healthcare 
agent select an agent who is a family member or close friend.247  If they have 
                                                          
text.  It is also important to note that in certain institutional settings, like hospice, the default is that 
healthcare providers assume the family is actively involved in the end-of-life decision-making pro-
cess.  See, e.g., IOM, supra note 48, at 249 (describing the role of family in the palliative care 
setting). 
 244.  IOM, supra note 48, at 125.  Federal laws have tried to promote the use of advance direc-
tives, but have failed as a nudge because institutions were noncompliant in following the law.  
ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 36, at 336. 
 245.  I do not advocate for forcing people to complete an advance directive or mandating that 
they at least actively elect to choose the default rather than completing an advance directive.  Doing 
so is a form of what Sunstein refers to as “choice-requiring paternalism.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Fore-
word, in NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134, at xiii (emphasis omitted).  As Sunstein argues, there 
are many reasons that people may not want to make choices, particularly with respect to the end of 
life, and that the choice not to choose but instead to rely on the default, should be respected in order 
to respect autonomy.  Id. at xi–xiii; see also BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 25–26 (describing 
the range of decision-making preferences that people have at the end of life); THALER & SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 190, at 87 (arguing against mandated choice, especially when the decision is complex); 
Schneider, supra note 192, at 436–38 (summarizing research that shows that many people do not 
want to make or participate in healthcare decisions, especially when they are very sick, in which 
case they defer to others). 
Another reason I do not recommend requiring completion of an advance directive is because 
preferences can shift over time, and if someone completes an advance directive many years before 
death because doing so has been required as part of obtaining a driver’s license or enrolling in health 
insurance, for example, a person may be bound by prior preferences they no longer have.  See Re-
becca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1823, 1835 (2003).  This would thwart patient autonomy.  See id. at 1833–34. 
 246.  See supra Part I.B. 
 247.  Or as one court asserted, “A reasonable person presumably will designate for such purposes 
only a person in whom the former reposes the highest degree of confidence.”  Conservatorship of 
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 168 (Cal. 2001).   
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not done so, laws that list who is an appropriate surrogate decisionmaker im-
pute this preference,248 acknowledging that generally, the person who knows 
an individual best and who an individual would most trust to make the deci-
sion will be their spouse, followed by other close family members.249  The 
default instructions for surrogate decisionmaking are to follow written or oral 
instructions, and if this is not possible, to try to decide as the patient would.  
Should a substituted judgment not be possible, the law requires decisions to 
be made in the patient’s best interest.250  Currently, the statutory guidelines 
in the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act do not instruct surrogate deci-
sionmakers to consider the incapacitated person’s relationships or how the 
person would make decisions in light of their relationships.  And when sur-
rogate decisions or disputes go before a hospital ethics committee or to 
court,251 there may be a presumption against considering anything other than 
the patient and their individual interests,252 supposedly in the service of re-
specting autonomy. 
The default rules and standards for making a surrogate end-of-life deci-
sion should change to incorporate relational considerations.  Based on empir-
ical evidence of preferences and values at the end of life, and given that a 
failure of rationality may have led persons not to plan adequately for inca-
pacity, to truly respect autonomy and make decisions in accord with a per-
son’s interests, both substituted judgments and best interests analyses should 
account for relationality.253  There should not be a presumption against con-
sidering relational interests in surrogate decisionmaking.  Thus, the Uniform 
                                                          
 248.  This default does not always match an individual’s preferences, however.  The default may 
give decision-making authority to a family member who knows nothing about the patient or has 
conflict with the patient, and still chooses to make the decision on behalf of the patient.  See 
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 190 (describing problems with families as surrogate 
decisionmakers). 
 249.  Those most likely to be able to make an accurate substituted judgment are those who know 
the person’s values and beliefs the best, which will be those closest to the patient.  There has been 
research, however, that demonstrates that people are quite poor at making substituted judgments in 
the healthcare context.  See, e.g., NELSON & NELSON, supra note 157, at 87; Kohn, supra note 134, 
at 298–300 (describing studies). 
 250.  See supra Part I.B. 
 251.  See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434 (Mass. 
1977) (describing the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s view that decision-making issues should go 
before a court, and contrasting this with New Jersey’s judiciary’s view that these decisions should 
stay with physicians and ethics committees at hospitals). 
 252.  See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 186–87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).   
 253.  My argument is similar to that of the U.S. President’s Commission.  PRESIDENT’S 
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN 
TREATMENT DECISIONS 135 (1983) (“The impact of a decision on an incapacitated patient’s loved 
ones may be taken into account in determining someone’s best interests, for most people do have 
an important interest in the well-being of their families or close associates.”).  Some prominent 
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Health-Care Decisions Act and state-specific surrogate decision-making laws 
should be amended so that the autonomy and beneficence principles under-
lying this body of law appropriately intersect with the two dimensions of re-
lational autonomy: deciding with, and in consideration of, others.254 
Surrogate decisionmakers should be explicitly directed to consider 
whether the incapacitated person would have decided in consultation with or 
with concern toward any other persons, and if so, include these relational 
considerations as an element of the surrogate’s decisionmaking.  For exam-
ple, when agents or surrogates are directed to decide about treatment based 
on “the patient’s wishes, including the patient’s religious and moral beliefs,” 
as New York’s Family Health Care Decisions Act requires,255 this could be 
explicitly revised to include directions to consider how the patient made de-
cisions, especially in the context of their family relationships.256 
Modifying statutory defaults will impact parties beyond the surrogate.  
Presently, adjudicators, whether judges or ethics committees, at times seem 
fixated on questions of what an incapacitated person would choose with re-
spect to a particular medical intervention for a particular illness (e.g., would 
the person want artificial nutrition and hydration after a cardiac arrest that 
left them neurologically devastated?).257  The questions asked in the service 
of making a substituted judgment or deciding on the basis of someone’s best 
                                                          
bioethicists disagree with this position unless a person explicitly wants others’ interests considered 
in a best interests analysis.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 173.   
 254.  While the common law in many states may have developed to accommodate relational 
autonomy on the two dimensions discussed in this Article—deciding with and deciding in consid-
eration of others—this type of law is not easily accessible to non-lawyers, and many persons tasked 
with adjudicating end-of-life decisions, such as clinical ethicists, may not have access to this infor-
mation.  See Ayres, supra note 189, at 2088, 2093, 2094 (“[T]he law can make opt-out mechanisms 
more opaque by burying the description of altering rules in common-law decisions.”).  
 255.  N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d (McKinney 2015).  
 256.  This suggested additional language is not solely a relational nudge, but also a grant of 
explicit permission to surrogates to make decisions in a way that accounts for interests of others 
besides the patient or by consulting with others who are not legally designated surrogates, if this is 
how the incompetent patient would have decided.  While the existing instructions about making the 
decision on the basis of the “patient’s wishes” are broad enough to cover deciding in a relational 
manner (if that is how the patient would have wished to decide), non-legal actors present for the 
decisionmaking process, such as healthcare providers, may not understand the guidance to permit 
for relational decisionmaking.  In this way, the additional language promotes any relational deci-
sionmaking that may occur when ordinary people tasked with making a surrogate decision consider 
the effect of the decision on the patient’s loved ones, just as the incompetent patient would likely 
have considered others if they were competent.   
This explicit permission may lead to less suspicion on the part of healthcare providers that the 
patient’s autonomy is not being respected by their surrogates, and thus, prevent routine surrogate 
decisionmaking from being reviewed by an ethics committee or a court, a review that may cause 
distress for all parties and delay the decision.  Such a review is always an option, however, if there 
is serious concern that a decision is too heavily influenced by others’ interests at the expense of the 
patient’s welfare.  See supra Part III.D.3 (describing existing safeguards).   
 257.  See Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1735–36. 
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interests should instead focus on how the person would decide (e.g., what 
factors would weigh in their decision, and with whom, if anyone, would they 
consult?).  In the case of the conflict between Terri Schiavo’s husband and 
her family of origin about whether to discontinue Schiavo’s life support, to 
resolve the issue, the court could have asked with whom Schiavo would have 
consulted about making healthcare decisions and whose interests she may 
have weighed.  If Schiavo typically consulted with her parents, rather than 
her husband, about her healthcare and weighed their opinions more heavily, 
then the court should have followed that process. 
The suggested modification permits a focus on the process of the deci-
sionmaking as well as the substance of the decision, which is also a benefit 
from an evidentiary perspective.  It is likely that a court faced with resolving 
an end-of-life dispute could more confidently determine how a person would 
have decided than what they would have decided. 
c.  Defaults in Medical Futility Disputes 
Defaults in medical futility disputes are often embedded in organiza-
tional policy rather than statute.258  As discussed previously, the default is 
that healthcare decisions of competent patients are respected.259  This default 
may be reversed if it is the case that someone is requesting what healthcare 
providers have assessed is a futile medical intervention.260  In this case, while 
there is a legal or organizational process of appeal that a patient or their sur-
rogate can pursue, the healthcare provider’s decision not to treat is the de-
fault.  At times, however, neither policies nor statutes are available to offer 
guidance in futility disputes.  In this circumstance, the default is likely the 
continuance of what healthcare providers think is a futile medical interven-
tion. 
If a healthcare organization does not have medical futility policies, and 
the state in which it is located does not have futility statutes, the organization 
should adopt such policies to assist healthcare providers and patients or their 
surrogates when there are questions about, or disputes over, end-of-life deci-
sionmaking.  Medical futility policies should be designed to reduce conflict 
and accommodate various interests and perspectives, but the default policy 
should not be to provide what the treatment team and any appellate body 
                                                          
 258.  Texas is a notable exception given that its futility policy is in statute form.  TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.046, 166.052–.053 (West 2017).   
 259.  See supra Part III.C.2.a. 
 260.  This is the default in many healthcare organization policies and in the body of case law 
developing around medical futility, but some organizations may still opt for respecting patient/sur-
rogate choice over provider judgment. 
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views as futile care.261  While most of the earlier discussion about medical 
futility focused on the relationship between physicians and patients or their 
surrogates,262 it is also necessary to examine patients in relation to larger so-
ciety.  Healthcare resources are finite, and spending them on futile care may 
deprive others of necessary care.263  Indeed, futile care at the end of life is 
unnecessarily costly.264  Hospital policies can also empower institutional ac-
tors, such as ethics committees, to consider the cost of futile care.265 
However, built into the medical futility policy should be an option for 
the healthcare team to opt out of the no-treatment default when clinicians 
assess it is appropriate to engage in “compassion[ate]” futile procedures for 
the sake of relational interests.266  Hospital ethics committees with experience 
mediating futility disputes may be best situated to draft these policies, which 
should advise clinicians of the following with respect to interactions with 
surrogates: “Instead of refusing family participation and creating profes-
sional-family animosity, it may be more helpful for clinicians to listen to the 
family’s concerns and reasoning process, and then explore with them various 
options that can best respect the interests of all parties.  Such effort can clarify 
expectations and misconceptions.”267 
The empirical literature demonstrates that people do want shared deci-
sionmaking with their physicians at the end of life,268 and one way of avoid-
ing a futility dispute is for physicians to engage in shared decisionmaking as 
a matter of routine practice.  That is, shared decisionmaking should become 
                                                          
 261.  See Jecker, supra note 91, at 147–48 (arguing that there is a social contract that gives phy-
sicians professional and moral responsibility to refuse to provide futile care, and that this does not 
violate respect for patient autonomy).  But see Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1745–46 (critiquing the 
Texas Advance Directives Act for not permitting access to court review of a hospital futility deter-
mination). 
 262.  See supra Part I.C. 
 263.  See IOM, supra note 48, at 364–65 (discussing tradeoffs between costs of futile care and 
respecting patient autonomy); see also Jecker, supra note 91, at 142 (describing justice considera-
tions with respect to futility disputes in the context of scarce resources); Ridenour & Cahill, supra 
note 175, at 116 (describing the Vatican’s belief that it is permissible to consider the cost of end-of-
life care to society when making end-of-life decisions). 
 264.  See IOM, supra note 48, at 288 (describing studies about the cost of futile care). 
 265.  But see Conly, supra note 189, at 294–96 (arguing that physicians should not consider the 
cost of care because their loyalty should only be to their patient).  Considering costs would not 
violate fiduciary duties, however, because the ethics committees would not be composed of the 
patient’s treating physician.  See Jecker, supra note 91, at 148 (describing the conflict resolution 
role for hospital ethics committees in futility disputes). 
 266.  See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 170 (“[U]ndertaking a futile intervention, 
such as CPR, may be an act of compassion and care toward the grief-stricken family of a seriously 
ill child, and could be justified, within limits.”); BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 108 (“Delay-
ing the withdrawal of some or all supports for a clearly specified period of time is a reasonable 
accommodation to help bereaved loved ones begin to adjust to their loss.”). 
 267.  Ho, supra note 174, at 133.   
 268.  See supra Part II.A.4. 
 
1112 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:1062 
 
the default model of healthcare provision, rather than something physicians 
opt into (although patients should still be able to opt out of this model if they 
prefer to defer to their physician in decisionmaking, which, if done willingly 
and knowingly, is consistent with respect for their autonomous choice).269  
Perhaps if people feel like their physician is truly trying to understand their 
values and concerns in the decision-making process and is respecting their 
autonomy, then when a physician advises that a particular treatment is futile 
in light of the medical circumstances and the patient’s goals and values, pa-
tients and their surrogates will be more willing and able to respect this as-
sessment.270 
d.  Defaults in Physician Aid in Dying 
Finally, physician AID is not the default in states that allow patients to 
choose this form of death.  Instead, people have to select physician AID at 
two time points, at least fifteen days apart, using a written form.271  Autonomy 
is preserved with an opt-in system, even if the various steps one must take to 
avail themselves of this option may be burdensome.272  Given concerns about 
patient vulnerability at the end of life and the issue of externalities with this 
end-of-life decision, an opt-in rather than an opt-out system is likely the best 
                                                          
 269.  Opting for no physician involvement at all is not possible in the case of requesting an in-
tervention that only a medical provider can offer, however. 
 270.  See Jennings, supra note 42, at 228–29 (arguing that if physicians properly and respectfully 
communicate with patients and surrogates, then most of the time, they will not persist in requesting 
futile care).  Access to courts should still be available in cases of disagreement, however.  See Shep-
herd, supra note 21, at 1745. 
 271.  Ayres notes that “[a]ltering rule formalities can slow the . . . process and therefore reduce 
the likelihood of imprudent action.”  Ayres, supra note 189, at 2063.  And the fifteen-day wait is a 
cooling off period, which can also reduce the risk of error with respect to this end-of-life decision.  
Id. at 2083–84; see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 250–51 (asserting that cooling off 
periods are appropriate when “people make the relevant decisions infrequently and therefore lack a 
great deal of experience, and . . . emotions are likely to be running high”).   
 272.  The fifteen-day wait may prevent some people from using physician AID, however, if they 
lose competence during that time period, which makes them ineligible for this form of death.  See 
Alicia Ouellette, Barriers to Physician Aid in Dying for People with Disabilities, 6 LAWS 23, 28 
(2017).  But the potential loss of autonomy is negligible given how few people use AID.  See infra 
note 273.  Reducing the cooling off period to a shorter time period (e.g., one week) may satisfy 
those who are concerned that not everyone initially eligible for and desiring of AID will also sustain 
the benefits of cooling off periods. 
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default.273  Furthermore, this default process promotes shared decisionmak-
ing, at least with respect to the physician-patient dyad, because selecting this 
option requires multiple conversations with a healthcare provider.274 
3.  Relational Nudges: Priming 
Priming, another component of choice architecture that influences be-
havior through subconscious cues, is a potentially powerful way to promote 
relational autonomy in end-of-life decision-making law, policy, and practice.  
With respect to planning for incapacity, standardized advance directive forms 
and POLSTs can be revised to prime decisionmakers to consider an individ-
ual’s relational interests upon loss of capacity.  Similarly, the standard form 
to request physician AID can be designed to prime individuals to discuss their 
decision to pursue physician AID with family members.  This Section will 
suggest some revisions to standard legal forms.275 
                                                          
 273.  Very few people opt for physician AID.  For example, 218 people requested a lethal pre-
scription in Oregon in 2015, but only 132 used the prescription.  OR. HEALTH AUTH., OREGON 
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: 2015 DATA SUMMARY 2 (2016), http://public.health.oregon.gov/Pro-
viderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documents/year18.pdf. 
Through the use of formalities and waiting periods, dying in a manner other than through the 
use of physician AID may fall into the category of “‘sticky defaults’ that manage and restrain neg-
ative externalities and internalities while simultaneously permitting opt-[in] for a subset of [persons] 
who . . . pass a social cost-benefit test.”  Ayres, supra note 189, at 2045 (footnote omitted).  If the 
default were flipped, and upon receiving a terminal diagnosis, a physician wrote a prescription for 
a lethal drug unless the patient opted not to have it, this would be a massive departure from current 
medical practice in the United States.  This option would likely inspire significant political and 
cultural backlash, especially because “[i]n many contexts defaults have some extra nudging power 
because [people] may feel, rightly or wrongly, that default options come with an implicit endorse-
ment from the default setter”  and thus, some might interpret the reverse default as an endorsement 
of euthanasia.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 35; see also IOM, supra note 48, at 362–
63 (discussing the controversy over AID with respect to vulnerable patients). 
What may be an interesting middle ground, however, is that when patients receive a terminal 
diagnosis, they are also informed of the option of physician AID, and at that point they could choose 
to have the prescription or not.  This is known as mandated choice.  This, in theory, is what occurs 
in Vermont’s physician AID regime, wherein physicians are required by law to inform patients of 
this end-of-life option as part of informed consent conversations.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5282 
(2016).  However, one could argue that if presented the choice, people will feel like their physician 
is pressuring them to hasten their death. 
 274.  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.815, .820 (2015). 
 275.  With the exception of the AID form, these standard forms are defaults, which can be tai-
lored or replaced with alternative forms.  But given that many people will use the default forms, 
especially since the forms are provided by the state government or healthcare providers and imply 
they are the “preferred” forms, coupled with the fact that people are not likely, due to status quo 
bias, to change their forms once completed, it is necessary to make sure the forms are designed to 
ensure that most people’s preferences are accommodated.  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 
190, at 12, 34, 83–85.  For a discussion of some default rules contained in standardized advance 
directive forms, see Shepherd & Hall, supra note 112, at 1443. 
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a.  Advance Directives 
As discussed previously, relatively few people complete advance direc-
tives,276 which means that their relational autonomy may not be respected 
upon loss of capacity.  People should thus be nudged to complete an advance 
directive of some sort.277  But, given that laws meant to increase advance 
directives have not been particularly successful,278 in this instance it may be 
better to focus on adapting policy to fit individuals’ behavior rather than try-
ing to modify their behavior.279 
For the few who do complete an advance directive, standardized ad-
vance directive documents (e.g., living wills and durable power of attorneys) 
used by states, hospitals, medical practices, and lawyers should be revised to 
prime an individual to make end-of-life healthcare decisions in light of their 
connectedness to relevant significant others, which research demonstrates is 
the end-of-life decision-making mode many people prefer.280  Prior research 
has shown that the primary benefits of completing advance directives come 
from choosing healthcare agents rather than making specific healthcare 
choices.281  When selecting an agent, the form should advise an individual to 
                                                          
 276.  See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 277.  The timing of the nudge to complete the advance directive matters.  In my view, it would 
be best to have these nudges temporally close to expected death or to have a nudge to revise one’s 
advance directive regularly to ensure that documented preferences reflect current preferences.  See 
supra note 245 (discussing problems with binding oneself to former preferences). 
Another form of choice architecture—the use of incentives—could be particularly powerful 
here.  For example, if health insurance adequately covered the cost of physicians having extensive 
conversations with their patients about end-of-life planning, this may financially incentivize physi-
cians to have these conversations.  Now that Medicare reimburses for end-of-life planning discus-
sions, physicians may be more likely to have them with their patients.  Aleccia, supra note 144.  But 
see Megan S. Wright, Change without Change?  Assessing Medicare Reimbursement for Advance 
Care Planning, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 1 (May–June 2018) (discussing how Medicare reimburse-
ment for advance care planning conversations has had limited impact on provider billing practices 
to date). 
Incentives such as this, in combination with the other changes I argue for in this Article, may 
do the best job of ensuring a relational autonomy with respect to end-of-life decisionmaking.  But 
see Schneider, supra note 192, at 425–29 (arguing that all efforts to increase the rate of living will 
completion should cease because efforts are costly and have little impact, and because even when 
patients complete living wills, they do not make decisions that ensure they receive the type of care 
they desire); Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1713 (arguing against efforts to continue revising advance 
directive forms “to discover the Holy Grail for respecting patient autonomy”). 
 278.  ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 36, at 336 (discussing the failure of PSDA in this re-
spect). 
 279.  See Michael Hallsworth, Seven Ways of Applying Behavior Science to Health Policy, in 
NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134, at 44.  For a discussion of POLST and priming, see infra Part 
III.C.3.b. 
 280.  See supra text accompanying note 126. 
 281.  See Drought & Koenig, supra note 135, at 118.  Indeed, even scholars who are opposed to 
prioritizing patient autonomy and attempting to increase the completion of living wills support com-
pletion of durable power of attorneys.  See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 192, at 439–40 (arguing that 
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provide detail about how much freedom their agent has to deviate from their 
written instructions.  Surrogate decisionmakers are often stressed with the 
responsibility of making a decision on behalf of another and fear they are not 
deciding correctly, and the form may reduce this burden, which is something 
patients desire.282  Further, the form should advise people to inform their 
healthcare agent that they have been selected to fulfill this responsibility, so 
that agents are not caught unaware when the individual loses capacity,283 and 
so that the agent will have had an opportunity to discuss the person’s end-of-
life wishes with them and their family.284 
Some state governments provide online standardized forms that resi-
dents can complete to be accepted as a valid legal document governing their 
end-of-life decisions upon loss of capacity.  Many of these forms combine 
living wills (i.e., written instructions) and durable power of attorney forms.285  
For example, the Health Law Section of the Arkansas Bar Association pro-
vides a document that is distributed by the Arkansas Department of Human 
Services.286  The document begins with answers to common questions about 
living wills and power of attorneys, and then provides a “Declaration of Liv-
ing Will” form.  This living will form begins by asking about preferences for 
life-sustaining treatments that should be withheld or withdrawn in the case of 
an “incurable or irreversible condition with no hope of recovery that will 
cause . . . death within a relatively short [period of] time” or in case of per-
manent unconsciousness.  The form also provides a checklist of medical in-
terventions (e.g., surgery, dialysis, CPR, antibiotics, etc.) that a person can 
opt out of, as well as a few lines for people to write in additional directions.287  
The form then asks about preferences regarding artificial nutrition and hy-
dration.  The form concludes with a place for the individual’s signature and 
                                                          
this device can “resolve questions of authority to make decisions for incompetent patients, present[] 
patients a task within their competence, and cost[] little”).   
 282.  See Hines et al., supra note 134, at 487.  Research shows that patients do not want to be a 
burden at the end of life.  See, e.g., Broom & Kirby, supra note 129, at 504; Steinhauser et al., supra 
note 113, at 2479. 
 283.  See BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 51 (“Confusion and tension may arise when fam-
ily members do not know who the surrogate is, make an incorrect assumption about the surrogate’s 
identity, or are unaware of treatment decisions being made by a surrogate who is not present at the 
patient’s bedside.”). 
 284.  NELSON & NELSON, supra note 157, at 96 (“A real advantage to formally appointing a 
proxy is that it offers an opportunity to think through one’s wishes, aloud, in the presence of the 
people most concerned to hear them.”). 
 285.  Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1731.  Some argue that states should not provide standardized 
forms at all.  Id. at 1740. 
 286.  ARK. INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE PROGRAM, ADVANCED DIRECTIVES—AGING WITH 
DIGNITY (2007), https://wadleyhealthathope.org/sites/default/files/wadley-hope-advanced-direc-
tives.pdf. 
 287.  Id. 
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the signature of two witnesses.288  The next page consists of a form titled 
“Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care” for the individual to appoint an 
agent to make decisions on their behalf should they lose capacity.289 
While this form is meant to ascertain preferences about medical inter-
ventions and ensure that autonomy survives loss of decision-making capacity 
at the end of life, the document does not do the best job of reaching the rela-
tional dimensions of a person’s autonomy.290  When persons have capacity at 
the end of life, they often make decisions with and in consideration of others.  
The standardized form Arkansas provides to its residents does not promote 
this preferred style of decisionmaking.  Restructuring the document to prime 
people to consider relational interests and to discuss their decisions with oth-
ers by, for example, moving the durable power of attorney form before the 
living will form, and requiring that the person appointed as agent sign the 
form, may result in decisions that are more consistent with how the person 
would actually make their decisions at the end of life.  Patients do not make 
treatment decisions in a vacuum, and being reminded of other people rather 
than just presented with choices of whether, for example, to have a Do Not 
Resuscitate order, which may seem rather abstract, may prime people to 
make decisions differently.  These forms should also direct an individual to 
discuss the documents with family members.291  Both of these suggested re-
visions to the forms are low-cost and potentially high benefit.292 
                                                          
 288.  Id. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  As Shepherd notes, standard living will forms promote a “de-relationalized” autonomy.  
Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1700.  She writes, 
it would be unusual to see a living will that explicitly directed that life-sustaining treat-
ment be either discontinued or continued for the benefit of another (as in, “if I am ever 
in a persistent vegetative state, I would like my husband to choose what to do on the basis 
of what is best for our children”).  Such language is far removed from the typical language 
of living wills.  Even if that statement were written into a personalized living will, a court 
would likely be flummoxed to know what to do with it. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (first citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.303 (West 2010); and then citing OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. NT.63, § 3101.4 (West Supp. 2013)). 
 291.  These forms should also be readable and easy to follow.  See IOM, supra note 48, at 178 
(discussing problems with advance directives). 
 292.  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 3, 13 (describing small changes to choice 
architecture with little or no costs).  There is a low cost to revise standardized forms, but there may 
be increased transactional costs with respect to the time it takes to complete the forms.  Slowing 
down the process, however, may be beneficial in this significant decision in that it would prevent 
the possibility of unintended consequences.  See Ayres, supra note 189, at 2063–65 (describing 
transactional cost and error tradeoffs).  
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The advance directive form provided by the state of Oregon is more 
consistent with these suggestions.293  On the first page of the form, the indi-
vidual is prompted to appoint a health care representative.294  The next page 
asks about limits on the agent’s power.295  Next comes the “Health Care In-
structions” form, which highlights the shared decisionmaking between pa-
tient and physician by including options such as “I want to receive tube feed-
ing[;] I want tube feeding only as my physician recommends[;] I DO NOT 
WANT tube feeding.”296  Thus far, this document likely primes a person to 
consider end-of-life decisionmaking in the context of their social relation-
ships by placing the durable power of attorney form prior to the living will, 
and by letting an individual opt to have decisions made by their healthcare 
provider.   
Oregon also requires the appointed agent to sign, indicating they accept 
their appointment.297  The statement they sign reads, in part, 
I accept this appointment and agree to serve as health care repre-
sentative.  I understand I must act consistently with the desires of 
the person I represent, as expressed in this advance directive or 
otherwise made known to me.  If I do not know the desires of the 
person I represent, I have a duty to act in what I believe in good 
faith to be that person’s best interest.298 
However, this is the last page of the document.  It is therefore possible, and 
maybe even likely, that a person would first complete their written instruc-
tions and then separately request their intended agent to sign the form.  But 
it may be better for acceptance of the appointment to be prior to the written 
instructions, to increase the likelihood that the individual completing the 
form will discuss their preferences with the intended agent prior to complet-
ing the form.  Should this occur, these end-of-life decisions may be made 
with and in consideration of others, and relational autonomy will survive in-
capacity. 
b.  POLSTs 
As stated above, because laws meant to encourage completion of ad-
vance directives have had little impact, it may be better to adapt policies to 
                                                          
 293.  ORE. DEP’T OF CONSUMER & BUS. SERVS., ADVANCE DIRECTIVE FORM, 
http://healthcare.oregon.gov/shiba/Documents/advance_directive_form.pdf. 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  Id.  This form is an excellent example of choice architecture and altering rules.  It spells 
out what the default is, and asks whether people opt out, requiring initials for each opt-out. 
 296.  The document notes, “‘as my physician recommends’ means that you want your physician 
to try life support if your physician believes it could be helpful and then discontinue it if it is not 
helping your health condition or symptoms.”  Id. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  Id. 
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individual behavior.299  Institutional policies that promote the use of POLSTs, 
which are initiated by a physician and therefore not dependent upon patient 
planning, thus may be a more beneficial way to ensure that autonomy sur-
vives loss of capacity.  Many POLST forms—which are meant to ensure pa-
tients’ goals for care at the end of life are respected300—are modeled after the 
Oregon form.301  The front of Oregon’s one-page POLST form consists of 
medical orders about cardiopulmonary resuscitation, various medical inter-
ventions, and artificial nutrition, and the back of the form has instructions 
about completing the POLST.302  It is not until the last section of Oregon’s 
form that clinicians are asked to document whether the discussion upon 
which the POLST is based was with the patient or their surrogate.303 
A better way to structure this document to nudge clinicians to discuss 
treatment options with their patients in light of patients’ relationships with 
others is to 1) have the form require clinicians to ask patients if they have 
appointed a healthcare agent or who their surrogate is, and 2) have this be the 
first question on the form.  That way, all other questions are primed to be 
answered with respect to relational considerations, which is consistent with 
most patient’s values and preferences.304  And when physicians plan to dis-
cuss the POLST with their patient, they may want to go one step further and 
advise the patient to bring their surrogate decisionmaker with them to the 
meeting, so that the patient, physician, and potential surrogate decisionmaker 
                                                          
 299.  See supra notes 278–279. 
 300.  IOM, supra note 48, at 173.  Because the POLST forms are for seriously ill patients, doc-
umenting end-of-life wishes in these forms likely does not have the same precommitment issues 
discussed previously with respect to advance directives.  See supra note 245. 
 301.  The form is available at CTR. FOR ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE, PHYSICIAN ORDERS FOR LIFE 
SUSTAINING TREATMENT (POLST) (2014), 
http://www.jsicm.org/pdf/DNAR20161216_kangae_03.pdf.  See also Order OR POLST Forms, 
OREGON POLST, http://oregonpolst.org/order (last visited May 3, 2018). 
 302.  The signature of a patient (or their surrogate) is recommended, but not required.  Id.  In the 
instructions on the form, it recommends that patients have an advance directive and has an optional 
section for contact information for healthcare agents or surrogates.  Id.  Given that this form is a 
medical order and only requires a signature from the responsible clinician, it is unclear that patients 
ever see the form or its advance directive recommendation.  See id; see also IOM, supra note 48, at 
179 (expressing concern that some physicians may not actually have the necessary conversations 
with patients or their surrogates before completing a POLST); Terman, supra note 54, at 207–09 
(detailing the potential for abuse in completing POLSTs for incapacitated patients).  Thus, I would 
also recommend, to ensure that patients or their surrogates are truly knowledgeable and assenting, 
that a signature be required.  See Ayres, supra note 189, at 2074–76 (describing manifestations of 
assent as an error reduction strategy); Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1738 (“We need to develop guide-
lines and practices to allow physicians and hospitals to slow down and allow reconsideration of 
these quick judgments, without unduly impairing patient autonomy.”); Terman, supra note 54, at 
207–09 (arguing that any formalities required by POLST would slow the process down, but that the 
benefits of preventing premature death may outweigh those time related costs). 
 303.  OR. DEP’T OF CONSUMER & BUS. SERVS., supra note 293. 
 304.  See supra Part II.A. 
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are informed and involved in the decisionmaking.305  Hospitals may want to 
institute the latter recommendation as a matter of policy.  If both of these 
proposals are implemented, then both dimensions of relational autonomy are 
promoted: deciding in consideration of and in consultation with others. 
c.  Physician Aid in Dying 
As part of the mandatory process to opt into physician AID in Oregon, 
the written request form provided by law asks patients to initial whether they 
have informed their family of their decision to hasten death in this manner or 
whether they have no family to inform.306  This requirement likely primes 
individuals to think about their decision in the context of their family rela-
tionships, which promotes relational autonomy.  Given that Washington307 
and California308 modeled their physician AID laws after Oregon’s,309 they 
contain this same relational nudge.  The physician AID laws in Vermont310 
and Colorado311 do not, however.  Vermont and Colorado should amend their 
laws to include relational nudges, and as other jurisdictions legalize this prac-
tice, they too should include such nudges. 
If states choose not to model their statutes after Oregon’s, which con-
tains many relational nudges, then these relational nudges should be built into 
hospital policies.  As a matter of practice, physicians should ask patients who 
request AID whether they have informed or consulted with their loved ones, 
but not require that they do so in order to receive AID.  Based on the model 
of shared decisionmaking, physicians also should have an extensive conver-
sation with such patients to help them in determining whether this end-of-life 
choice is consistent with their values, preferences, and goals, especially in 
                                                          
 305.  See BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 38 (recommending that clinicians advise patients 
to bring surrogates with them to advance planning discussions with medical professionals).  Again, 
this slows the process down, but if it minimizes errors, a slower process can be justified.  See Ayres, 
supra note 189, at 2063–65. 
 306.  See supra note 230. 
 307.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.220 (West 2011). 
 308.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.11 (West 2016). 
 309.  Oregon Death with Dignity Act a Model for Other States: Washington Post Editorial, 
OREGONIAN (June 22, 2015), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/06/ore-
gons_death_with_dignity_act.html. 
 310.  See VT. DEP’T OF HEALTH, REQUEST FOR MEDICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF HASTENING 
MY DEATH (2013), 
http://www.healthvermont.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/11/End_of_Life_Choice_pa-
tient_medication_request_form.pdf. 
 311.  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-48-112 (West 2017). 
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the context of relationality.  To assist physicians in conducting such conver-
sations, professional organizations to which physicians belong may construct 
decision aids to distribute to physicians.312 
Any of the nudges that promote better communication between physi-
cians and their patients (or patient surrogates) or between patients and their 
families will likely reduce medical futility disputes.  There is no common 
standardized form related to medical futility disputes, so I cannot make sug-
gestions about priming for relational decisionmaking in this context, although 
specific healthcare organizations should ensure that their written policies 
have steps to promote shared decisionmaking. 
D.  Responses to Objections and Counterarguments 
When making any changes to law and policy, especially when the stakes 
are life and death, objections to the proposed changes should be carefully 
considered.  This Section will address various counterarguments to my pro-
posal to build relational nudges into existing law and policy. 
1.  Autonomy Should Remain Privileged in End-of-Life Decision-
Making Law, but Accounting for Others’ Interests Is Also 
Important 
Some may be skeptical that changing end-of-life decision-making law 
and policy to promote relational autonomy is desirable.  One strand of skep-
ticism concerns whether autonomy, in any conceptualization, is always val-
uable,313 or whether coercion to protect people from poor choices is preferred 
with respect to some actions.314  Similarly, law can legitimately take into ac-
count effects on others associated with autonomous decisions, and choose to 
                                                          
 312.  This would require that professional organizations such as the American Medical Associ-
ation were at least neutral on this end-of-life option, rather than in opposition to it.  AMA CODE OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS, OPINIONS ON CARING FOR PATIENTS AT THE END OF LIFE, PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED 
SUICIDE 5.7 (2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-
ethics-chapter-5.pdf (“Physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physi-
cian’s role as healer, would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal 
risks.”). 
 313.  There is a strand of literature that is skeptical or even hostile toward privileging autonomy 
in health care, noting that attempts to promote patient autonomy often fail or that other values, such 
as respect for patient dignity and relationships, are more important.  See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 
21, at 1720.  But see NEDELSKY, supra note 176, at 41–42, 45 (arguing that even in a legal and 
political system that centers relationships, autonomy is still valuable); Schneider, supra note 192, 
413, 439–44 (arguing that it is still important to determine what patients want and base an ethical 
agenda on patient preferences).   
 314.  Poor decisions can be thought of as “negative internalities.”  Ayres, supra note 189, at 2093 
(emphasis omitted).  See SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE 
PATERNALISM 1 (2013) (arguing that some courses of action, like consuming trans fats or smoking 
cigarettes, should be illegal because they are harmful, and that arguing that they should be legal 
because people should be able to make autonomous decisions overvalues autonomy).   
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impede certain courses of action to reduce negative externalities.315  With 
respect to end-of-life decision-making law and policy, either of these argu-
ments (paternalism and externalities) could be used to justify a mandatory 
rule that people must consult with others and consider others’ interests when 
making decisions about the end of their lives.  This mandatory rule could be 
seen as giving people what they want and as good for them even if they do 
not themselves choose according to their preferences, or reducing harm to 
third parties. 
In fact, Robert Burt, who argued that people should have a say in other’s 
end-of-life decisions, even when a patient is fully competent, has suggested 
this.  He wrote, for example, 
When the patient is competent and prepared to make a decisive 
choice, the autonomy principle does properly bestow hierarchi-
cally superior authority with the patient.  But even in this clear-cut 
case, there are other, importantly affected participants who should 
have some voice in the patient’s ultimate decision—not a veto but 
a voice, a chance to talk to the patient and address and amplify the 
ambivalence that the decision-making patient himself is likely to 
feel but also likely to deny.316 
Burt also suggests that consultation with others may be mandatory, or if 
there is an exception, a patient should have to justify why they refuse to con-
sult with others affected by their decision.317  He also suggests that if the 
patient is incompetent, all possible surrogate decisionmakers must achieve 
                                                          
 315.  See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 189, at 2084 (discussing effects on third parties in the context 
of sticky defaults). 
 316.  Burt, supra note 231, at S12.  Others have made more extreme arguments: 
Simple fairness, Hardwig believes, dictates that all those with an interest in the decision 
be taken into account as it is made.   
  This is an upsetting and radical claim for the profession.  It means, first of all, that fam-
ilies should be involved in the decisionmaking process not just as sounding-boards and 
not just as a source of patient-centered love and support, but in their own right.  Rather 
than being instructed by the health care team to focus on what is best for the patient, 
family members should be encouraged to get their own interests, fears, and preferences 
on the table.  They should be treated not just as means to the patient’s ends, but as ends 
in themselves.   
  But that is not all.  If we have the courage to follow the argument from fairness to 
wherever it leads us, we must acknowledge that when a fundamental disagreement arises 
between the patient and the rest of the family, and no amount of discussion or mediation 
can resolve it, the health care team might be obliged to try to do what the family wants 
even though the patient dissents. 
NELSON & NELSON, supra note 157, at 114–15 (footnote omitted) (citing John Hardwig, “What 
About the Family?”, 20 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5 (1990)). 
 317.  Burt, supra note 231, at S12.   
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consensus on what to do for the patient, although he acknowledges the prac-
tical difficulties of such a proposal.318 
In my view, mandatory consultation with affected parties interferes too 
much with the patient’s autonomy interest (in the face of physician paternal-
ism or family coercion or conflict) and burdens the fundamental value of 
bodily integrity.319  It is, after all, the patient’s body that bears physical suf-
fering (or indignity) associated with the decisions.320  Furthermore, not all 
persons prefer to consider other’s perspectives on their end-of-life decisions, 
and this variation in preferences is also another reason not to have mandatory 
rules in this body of law.  Finally, when persons are permitted to exercise 
choice, they experience psychological benefits,321 and this is an important 
social good that would be weakened by mandatory consultation. 
Law and policy can take relational preferences and values into account 
without imposing too much on the autonomy or bodily integrity principles by 
incorporating insights from behavioral law and economics and building in 
relational nudges like those proposed in Part III.C.2.  This nudging will steer 
actors such as patients, families, and healthcare providers, as well as institu-
                                                          
 318.  Id. at S13.  After all, how are “affected parties” defined?  How far out from the patient’s 
immediate family and primary clinician should the impact be measured?  And the further out one 
goes, the more difficult it is to achieve consensus, and at some point, a decision about medical 
treatment must be made. 
 319.  Indeed, Burt’s proposal is inconsistent with modern bioethics, as can be seen from Beau-
champ and Childress’s discussion about physicians disclosing healthcare information to patients’ 
relatives.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 305 (“Families provide important care and 
support for many patients, but an autonomous patient has the right to veto familial involvement 
altogether.”).  Jennings also notes that it is important to “[r]econstrue . . . patient-centered rights and 
values,” working with the reality of relationships, rather than “reject” rights.  Jennings, supra note 
42, at 228; see also Shepherd & Hall, supra note 112, at 1446 (arguing that respecting patient au-
tonomy remains important even as other values matter as well). 
 320.  As Justice Brennan wrote, “Dying is personal.  And it is profound.  For many, the thought 
of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent.  A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a 
matter of extreme consequence.”  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310–11 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 321.  See Winick, supra note 14, at 1755–68 (describing various psychological benefits of au-
tonomy).   
  Our political and legal conceptions of autonomy are aspirational.  They are based on 
a conception of the individual as a rational decisionmaker able to make free choices re-
flecting internal values and preferences.  In reality, however, this atomistic conception of 
the individual is artificial.  The individual is a component of . . . several social 
groups . . . .  The individual’s decisionmaking is heavily dependent upon the desires of 
these other groups and the anticipated impact the individual’s decisions will have on 
them.  We are by nature communal, more interdependent than independent. . . .   
  Our idealized model of individual autonomy is thus inconsistent with psychological 
realities and largely artificial.  Nevertheless, our political conception of the individual as 
an autonomous decisionmaker . . . is a useful foundation upon which to build a legal 
system. 
Id. at 1768–69 (emphasis added). 
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tions such as courts and hospitals, to consider relationality in end-of-life de-
cisionmaking.  But the nudges will never require individuals to make their 
end-of-life decisions in consultation with family members or on the basis of 
relational interests, thus preserving autonomy. 
It is important to consider the interests others may have in what happens 
to an individual at the end of their life.  End-of-life decisions may have pro-
foundly negative effects on third parties that outlast the autonomy interest of 
the individual in question (that is, their autonomy interest ends upon death 
while the effects of their decisions may linger for some time).  A person’s 
decisions may impact healthcare providers who may feel moral distress in 
some instances.322  They also likely have a strong impact on surviving family 
members.323 
Laws and policies often take into consideration externalities,324 and have 
done so with respect to end-of-life decisionmaking as well.  For example, the 
Saikewicz decision described the effect end-of-life decisions have on others, 
and argued it is a significant state interest to balance against the fundamental 
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.325  The Saikewicz court wrote: 
 A second interest of considerable magnitude, which the State 
may have some interest in asserting, is that of protecting third par-
ties, particularly minor children, from the emotional and financial 
damage which may occur as a result of the decision of a competent 
adult to refuse life-saving or life-prolonging treatment.  Thus . . . 
[when] the State’s interest in preserving an individual’s life [is] not 
                                                          
 322.  See, e.g., Curtis & Burt, supra note 83, at 22 (describing clinician distress at providing 
futile care); Betty R. Ferrell, Understanding the Moral Distress of Nurses Witnessing Medically 
Futile Care, 33 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 922 (2006). 
  This is also why there are conscience-based opt-outs in physician AID laws, for example.  
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.885 (West 2015).  This is also why providers are not required 
to provide “futile” treatment under the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (but if there is a refusal, 
care must be transferred to another facility or provider).  UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT 
§ 7(e)–(g) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993).  States that have not adopted the Uniform Health-Care De-
cisions Act have created similar processes for surrogate healthcare decisionmaking for adults who 
lack decisional capacity.  See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH Law § 2994-d(4)(b) (McKinney 2011). 
 323.  See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 311 (“A long, drawn-out death can have a debilitating effect 
on family members.”); Rachel Aviv, The Death Treatment, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/the-death-treatment (describing the trauma a 
woman’s decision to be euthanized had on her family). 
 324.  See Ayres, supra note 189, at 2084, 2086–87 (discussing externalities); see also Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (“Abortion is a unique act. It is an act 
fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the implications of her 
decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society 
which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing 
short of an act of violence against innocent human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs, for the life 
or potential life that is aborted.”). 
 325.  Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977). 
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sufficient, by itself, to outweigh the individual’s interest in the ex-
ercise of free choice, the possible impact on minor children would 
be a factor which might have a critical effect on the outcome of the 
balancing process.326 
Here the court explicitly raises the possibility that someone’s family re-
lationships, financial responsibilities toward family members, and family 
members’ emotional responses to their death can be raised as a countervailing 
state interest that may restrict a person’s autonomy in end-of-life deci-
sionmaking.327  This interest is often raised in cases involving Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses who need, but refuse, blood transfusions,328 but as the Supreme Court 
of Florida wrote, “[w]hile we agree that the nurturing and support by two 
parents is important in the development of any child, it is not sufficient to 
override fundamental constitutional rights.”329 
Also with respect to physician AID, arguments in favor of this end-of-
life option have often been framed in terms of externalities.  As Justice Souter 
summarized, “without a physician to assist in the suicide of the dying, the 
patient’s right will often be confined to crude methods of causing death, most 
shocking and painful to the decedent’s survivors.”330  And the actual Death 
with Dignity law in Oregon also requires active consideration of a person’s 
family when making the written request, which is another way that legislators 
have tried to reduce negative effects on third parties from this decision—by 
trying to increase the chance that people will inform their loved ones of their 
decision in advance. 
My suggestions for relational nudges are not only in the service of pro-
moting autonomy, but are also meant to reduce negative externalities by, for 
example, reducing surrogate decisionmakers’ emotional burdens by attempt-
ing to have persons while competent talk to people about their end-of-life 
preferences and values.  Thus, even if one does not agree with my argument 
that autonomy should continue to be privileged in this body of law, perhaps 
an argument that nudging decisionmakers to consider the effect end-of-life 
                                                          
 326.  Id. (citation omitted) (citing Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp. of Joliet, Ill., 340 F. Supp. 125 
(D. Ill. 1972)). 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  See, e.g., Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cty. v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989) (holding 
that a Jehovah’s Witness could refuse a blood transfusion despite having minor children to care for). 
 329.  See id. at 97.  Other cases also demonstrate that persons with minor children are legally 
permitted to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.  See, e.g., Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 
821, 832 (Conn. 1996) (holding for Jehovah’s Witnesses who are parents who refuse blood trans-
fusions); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 84 (N.Y. 1990).  Importantly, however, often lower 
courts order blood transfusions, and only on appeal does a court vindicate the parent’s right to refuse 
life-sustaining medical treatment, a vindication that is too late to matter in practice.  ORENTLICHER 
ET AL., supra note 36, at 389 n. 3. 
 330.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 778 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
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decisions—whether to hasten death or attempt to prolong life—have on third 
parties will be persuasive. 
2.  Nudging is Not Inconsistent with Autonomy 
Some scholars object to the concept of nudging on philosophical 
grounds, arguing that nudging is inconsistent with autonomy.  Others may 
object that in this particular case, the relational nudges I have proposed are 
inconsistent with autonomy in end-of-life decisionmaking.  This Section will 
address both objections. 
a.  Philosophical Objections 
There is currently a lively scholarly debate about whether nudging is 
consistent with autonomy.  Many scholars who think nudging is incompatible 
with autonomy often oppose nudging.331  It is necessary to address this debate 
because with respect to medical decisionmaking, the law prioritizes auton-
omy followed by beneficence, and I have not proposed deviating from this 
ordering of principles.  This Section will first briefly summarize this debate 
and then argue that nudging is not necessarily inconsistent with autonomy, 
and in this particular realm of law, as I have proposed nudging, it is actually 
autonomy-promoting. 
                                                          
 331.  See Thomas Ploug & Soren Holm, Doctors, Patients, and Nudging in the Clinical Con-
text—Four Views on Nudging and Informed Consent, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28, 37 (2015) (arguing 
that, because nudging may involve manipulation and bypass reason, it is incompatible with auton-
omous decisionmaking, and thus, incompatible with informed consent requirements, and that nudg-
ing is only justifiable when informed consent is not required); see also Blumenthal-Barby & Bur-
roughs, supra note 223, at 7 (noting that priming is manipulation, but can be ethically justified if 
the benefits outweigh harms and reasoning cannot be used).  But see J.S. Blumenthal-Barby & Aa-
nand D. Naik, In Defense of Nudge-Autonomy Compatibility, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 45, 45 (2015) 
(“Nudging may even enhance informed consent by producing levels of understanding more aligned 
with dual process models of reasoning . . . it is not the case that nudges necessarily (or even often) 
interfere with patients pursuing their own goals, and nudges may actually aid patients through their 
values clarification.”) (citation omitted) (citing Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feel-
ings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311 (2004)). 
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Nudging is often paternalistic.332  Some scholars thus pose the issue of 
nudging as a competition between autonomy and beneficence.333  Paternal-
istic beneficence is “attempting to protect patients against the potentially 
harmful consequences of their own stated preferences.”334  If there is true 
support for autonomy, some argue, then people will be permitted to make 
whatever choices they want, even if such choices are “bad” or mistakes.335 
Thaler and Sunstein advocate for a type of nudging called “libertarian 
paternalism.”336  By this they mean that policies should “maintain or increase 
freedom of choice,” but should be designed to “influence choices in a way 
that will make choosers better off, as judged by themselves.”337  They view 
libertarian paternalism as compatible with autonomy because it can be used 
to correct for cognitive biases that prevent people from making choices based 
on their true preferences.338  Beauchamp and Childress similarly describe the 
autonomy-promoting benefits of libertarian paternalism: “This paternalism 
                                                          
 332.  Again, as noted earlier in the Article, Beauchamp and Childress “define ‘paternalism’ as 
the intentional overriding of one person’s preferences or actions by another person, where the person 
who overrides justifies this action by appeal to the goal of benefiting or of preventing or mitigating 
harm to the person whose preferences or actions are overridden.”  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, su-
pra note 1, at 215 (emphasis omitted).   
According to this definition, nudging is not always paternalistic.  This is because it may be 
unintentional.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 12.  Or because it can be used in ways that 
are meant to influence another’s actions, but not for the individual’s benefit, but rather for the benefit 
of society (e.g., presumed consent for cadaveric organ transplantation).  See, e.g., David Orentlicher, 
Presumed Consent to Organ Donation, in NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134, at 340.  Nudging can 
also be used in a way that benefits corporations trying to profit from manipulating decisionmaking 
in a way that may be opposed to a person’s interests and societal interests.   
 333.  See Capron & Spruijt-Metz, supra note 242, at 233–34 (describing the tension between 
physician beneficence and physician respect for patient autonomy). 
 334.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 216. 
 335.  See Sunstein, supra note 245, at xviii (“[F]reedom of choice has intrinsic and not merely 
instrumental value.”); Brock, supra note 151, at 32.  Attempting to persuade people to make a dif-
ferent choice is consistent with respect for autonomy as long as a person’s final choice is respected 
even if it is not the recommended option.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 216.  For 
the purposes of this Article, respect for relational autonomy cuts both directions.  If a person auton-
omously decides to consider their relationships with others as part of their end-of-life decisionmak-
ing, this should be respected even if others think it is a mistake to do so.  
 336.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 5.  But see Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How 
Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1599 (2014) (arguing 
that nudges often function as “mandates” and only formally preserve choice). 
 337.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 5.  
 338.  Id. (“[I]ndividuals make pretty bad decisions—decisions they would not have made if they 
had paid full attention and possessed complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and com-
plete self-control.”).  Importantly, if law nudges rather than mandates or bans, people are still free 
to make decisions that the choice architect tries to steer them away from, preserving freedom.  Id. 
at 5; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 218–19 (“Libertarian paternalism is 
premised on the view that people have limited rationality or limited self-control that reduces their 
capacity to choose and act autonomously.”).  
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reflects many values that individuals would recognize or realize themselves 
if they did not encounter internal limits of rationality and control.”339 
I, too, argue that nudging is not necessarily inconsistent with autonomy.  
As described earlier, people often lack adequate information or understand-
ing, and have distorted rationality due to cognitive biases when making deci-
sions.340  Therefore, addressing these decision-making limitations through 
good choice architecture can actually promote autonomy rather than under-
mine it.  I recognize, however, that nudging can be used to counter autono-
mous decisionmaking.341  But my recommendations for changes in end-of-
life decision-making law and policy are meant to be autonomy-promoting, 
especially because rationality may be particularly distorted in healthcare de-
cisionmaking.342  Choice architecture can thus be “justified on autonomy 
grounds in arranging . . . choice situation in a way that likely will correct . . . 
cognitive biases and bounded rationality.”343 
Given the empirical research on people’s end-of-life decision-making 
preferences, I have argued that we should structure end-of-life law and policy 
to promote relational autonomy.  The way law and policy are currently struc-
tured may in some respects be biased against what people want.344  The 
                                                          
 339.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 219; see also id. at 104–05 (discussing how 
autonomy can be compromised by irrationality). 
 340.  See supra note 184 and text accompanying supra notes 190–193. 
 341.  Id. at 218 (“Hard paternalism requires that the benefactor’s conception of best interests 
prevail, and it may ban, prescribe, or regulate conduct in ways that manipulate individuals’ actions 
to secure the benefactor’s intended result.”). 
 342.  Some scholars have even argued that there is an ethical, although not legal, duty for phy-
sicians to assist their patients in overcoming their cognitive biases to make decisions that are in the 
patient’s best interest.  These scholars assert that healthcare decisions should be made collabora-
tively, however, and with the patient’s values guiding the decision, which is similar to the shared 
decision-making models described earlier.  Jennifer L. Zamzow, Affective Forecasting in Medical 
Decision-Making: What Do Physicians Owe Their Patients?, in NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134, 
at 227–28 (“Physicians should intervene proactively in at least two kinds of cases: (1) cases where 
the stakes are high (for example, where different treatment options will lead to very different out-
comes and where the outcomes will significantly affect one’s experiential quality of life); and (2) 
cases where patients typically have a poor understanding of what it is like to have a certain condition 
or undergo a certain treatment . . . .”).   
Other scholars are skeptical of nudging because they are anti-paternalism in the physician-
patient relationship.  These scholars think it is possible to nudge both beneficently and in a way that 
respects patient autonomy, however, as long as the procedure of nudging is fully transparent and 
the range of choices a patient has is not diminished.  Capron & Spruijt-Metz, supra note 242, at 234.  
 343.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 219; Capron & Spruijt-Metz, supra note 242, 
at 234. 
 344.  For example, living will forms that do not reference family in any way, but instead ask 
people what they would want should they have particular medical conditions at a future point, con-
tain a bias against relationality.  Abstracting the experience of medical conditions from the context 
of family relationships is absurd, and yet, the form does just that, which may ultimately frustrate the 
intent of the future incapacitated person who would want end-of-life decisions to be made with such 
relationships in mind. 
 
1128 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:1062 
 
choice architecture I have proposed would modify defaults and use priming 
to draw people’s attention to their relational context, rather than withhold 
information or ignore or obscure the reality of social relationships.  These 
relational nudges still prioritize an individual’s preferences and values rather 
than their family’s or physician’s preferences and values, and would never 
override people’s choices.  Rather, these nudges would help those who do 
prioritize relationality in end-of-life decisionmaking actualize their desires. 
In sum, these proposed nudges aim to promote both autonomy (aiding 
individuals in deciding rationally) and welfare (aiding individuals in deciding 
on the basis of their interests) by reminding decisionmakers of relationality, 
which often matters to individuals, but may be overlooked in end-of-life de-
cisionmaking.  Thus, my proposals are consistent with the principles under-
lying existing end-of-life decision-making law and policy, which prioritize 
an individual’s autonomy followed by their best interests (i.e., welfare). 
b. Relational Nudges Fit Most People’s End-of-Life Preferences 
Another common critique of nudging is that policymakers may not ac-
tually know what is in people’s best interests345 or what default rule people 
would democratically choose.346  However, in the case of end-of-life deci-
sionmaking, we do know what most people’s interests are and what default 
rule most people would choose.347  Empirical evidence has demonstrated, in 
study after study, what people think is important at the end of life, and what 
their values and preferences are with respect to decisionmaking.348  They 
want to retain decision-making autonomy, but they value input and guidance 
from their physicians,349 and they also consider their relationships with their 
loved ones while making such decisions.350  The default rules and other ele-
ments of choice architecture, such as priming, in end-of-life decision-making 
                                                          
 345.  Mark D. White, Bad Medicine: Does the Unique Nature of Healthcare Decisions Justify 
Nudges?, in NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134, at 73 (“[P]olicymakers use nudges to steer people’s 
decisions in interests that are not necessarily their own, but rather the policymakers’ idea of those 
interests.”); Korobkin, supra note 191, at 17 (describing how policymakers may not know what is 
best and how suboptimal nudges may succeed in changing behavior). 
 346.  Jonathan Gingerich, The Political Morality of Nudges in Healthcare, in NUDGING 
HEALTH, supra note 134, at 103.  Libertarian paternalists choose defaults that most people, free of 
distorted rationality, prefer.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 12. 
 347.  We also know that in the end-of-life context, people do not seem to be troubled by default 
rules.  See Sunstein, supra note 245, at xx (reporting on scholarly findings that, when informed 
about choice architecture in this context, people still follow the chosen default). 
 348.  See, e.g., Steinhauser et al., supra note 113, at 2478–79; Singer, supra note 204, at 165–
66. 
 349.  See Drought & Koenig, supra note 135, at 118 (“There is some evidence that patients are 
also willing to defer to physician judgment over their own previously expressed preferences in a 
similar manner. . .”) (citation omitted) (citing Ashwini Seghal et al., How Strictly Do Dialysis Pa-
tients Want Their Advance Directives Followed?, 267 JAMA 59 (1992)). 
 350.  See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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law and policy should therefore both preserve patient autonomy and accom-
modate relational considerations; that is, nudging should promote relational 
autonomy.  Given extensive knowledge of people’s preferences, the condi-
tions for justifiable nudging in this area of law are met.351 
It is true that not all people want to make end-of-life decisions in light 
of their social relationships.  For example, people may be estranged from 
their families.352  Others may not want their families involved in the decision-
making process so as to not burden or overwhelm them.  Or perhaps an indi-
vidual does not care to hear their physician’s opinion about what end-of-life 
choices they should make.  My proposals account for variation in prefer-
ences, however, by preserving opt-out (i.e., not having mandatory rules).  
Preserving opt-out protects the minority of people who prefer not to make 
decisions relationally.353 
In conclusion, with respect to objections about nudging, it is impossible 
to avoid influencing how decisions are made when creating law and policy, 
even if such influence is unintentional.354  Given this reality, I have argued 
for intentional changes to this body of law to accommodate the preferences 
of most people making an end-of-life decision, and to preserve the freedom 
to opt out or choose differently.  These relational nudges are, in the words of 
Thaler and Sunstein, meant “to help the least sophisticated people while im-
posing minimal harm on everyone else.”355 
3.  Existing Safeguards Can Adequately Protect Vulnerable Persons 
There are existing models of healthcare decisionmaking where the de-
fault is that decisions are made in consultation with families, such as in the 
pediatric setting where parents are legally entitled to make healthcare deci-
                                                          
 351.  See Korobkin, supra note 191, at 17–18 (arguing that libertarian paternalism is justified 
“(1) when policy-makers are highly confident about what choices and decisions will maximize the 
welfare of most actors; (2) when there is a high degree of homogeneity among the actors, so that 
nudging most people in the direction that is desirable for them will not have the side effect of nudg-
ing a large minority in a direction that is undesirable for them; and (3) when there are few negative 
externalities created by individual choices, such that behavior that is welfare maximizing for most 
individual decision-makers is also welfare maximizing for society”); see also Blumenthal-Barby & 
Burroughs, supra note 223, at 1 (analyzing the ethics of nudging). 
 352.  Or families may just not have close relationships, and should thus not be involved in one 
another’s healthcare decisions.  NELSON & NELSON, supra note 157, at 99. 
 353.  But see Bubb & Pildes, supra note 336, at 1599 (“[T]he opt-out option exists more in theory 
than in fact.”). 
 354.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 3, 10, 72, 237. 
 355.  Id. at 72, 248–49.  If someone has planned for death in an alternative manner, using cus-
tomized documents provided by an attorney, for example, these nudges should not impact their end-
of-life decisionmaking.   
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sions for their children but are often encouraged to make decisions in consul-
tation with their children, and also in the hospice and palliative care setting.356  
Many people may be concerned that considering other’s interests or consult-
ing others in end-of-life decisionmaking would allow families or others to 
assert undue pressure on an individual’s end-of-life decision,357 overriding a 
person’s autonomy and resulting in decisions that are not in their best inter-
est.358 
While in many instances, families may aid in maintaining or restoring 
patient autonomy,359 autonomy also can be compromised by family influ-
ence.360  Decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment, 
or to make use of physician AID, for example, raise concerns about whether 
the patient is being pressured to hasten their death, contrary to their desire to 
prolong their lives, at a time when they are particularly vulnerable and may 
not be able to withstand such pressure.361  Sometimes there are allegations of 
financial conflicts of interest between individuals and their family members, 
                                                          
 356.  There does not seem to be an accepted model of deciding on the basis of other’s interests, 
however. 
 357.  Liz Blackler, Compromised Autonomy: When Families Pressure Patients to Change Their 
Wishes, 18 J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE NURSING 284, 284 (2016). 
 358.  Ho, supra note 174, at 129 (“[F]amily members may have divergent values and priorities 
from those of the patients, such that their involvement could counter patients’ autonomy and best 
interests.”); see also NELSON & NELSON, supra note 157, at 85 (describing bioethicists’ suspicions 
and distrust of patients’ families). “An overly romantic view of the family might lead to the temp-
tation to compromise the patient’s interests, while an overly cynical view might declare irrelevant 
anything but the patient’s interests.”  Id. at 99. 
 359.  NELSON & NELSON, supra note 125, at 131.  This Section of the Article focuses on the 
concern that families will compromise a patient’s autonomy.  I would like to emphasize, however, 
that physicians may also compromise their patient’s autonomy through the paternalistic provision 
of care that does not take seriously informed consent or their patient’s values.  In this instance, 
family involvement in healthcare decisionmaking can provide welcome support for a patient to as-
sert their preferences in interactions with the healthcare provider, or if the patient is incapacitated, 
the family can assert the patient’s preferences on behalf of the patient.   
Any conflict between a physician and patient/surrogate will likely be referred to an ethics 
committee, which can also provide a review of the situation and take steps to ensure the patient’s 
autonomy is respected.  Ethics committees involved in mediating such conflicts will need to recog-
nize, however, that autonomy is relational, and not automatically assume family involvement in 
healthcare decisionmaking is problematic.  
 360.  Blackler describes compromised autonomy as follows: 
[T]he form of compromised autonomy that arises when patients with decisional capacity 
are unduly pressured or coerced by their families into making medical decisions that are 
not in line with previously held values, beliefs, or perspectives.  Family pressure or co-
ercion is defined as occurring when caregivers employ verbal threats, harassment, berat-
ing, intimidation, or other manipulative tactics designed to force vulnerable patients to 
change well-established beliefs or preferences.  Patients with a history of power inequi-
ties, shifts in familial roles and relationship status, and progressive disease are at higher 
risk to experience compromised autonomy. 
Blackler, supra note 357, at 284.  
 361.  Ho, supra note 174, at 129. 
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who may benefit financially if a patient were to die more quickly.362  This 
benefit may come in the form of a larger inheritance if the patient’s financial 
resources are not being used for medical treatment, which is expensive at the 
end of life.363  Or the financial benefit may come in the form of the patient 
costing the family member less if the family member is the party covering 
the patient’s medical expenses.364  People may also experience pressure to 
hasten their death from family members or other caregivers if their illness 
and treatment constitute an emotional or psychological burden on these other 
parties.365 
Others may be concerned that healthcare providers will be indifferent to 
patients who are vulnerable and that weighing the clinician’s views on end-
of-life treatment is thus inappropriate (even with respect to the shared deci-
sion-making model).  “Vulnerable” could mean that the patient is seriously 
ill and needs care.366  Or “vulnerable” may refer to a class of persons, such as 
persons with disabilities, who are marginalized in society and thus may be 
more susceptible to or harmed by assessments that their lives are less valuable 
than others.367 
                                                          
 362.  A financial conflict of interest would also exist if it would be in a person’s best interest to 
die, but in their family’s interest for the person’s life to be extended if the family relies on the 
person’s Social Security benefits or rent-controlled apartment, for example.   
 363.  See IOM, supra note 48, at 289–301 (describing the cost of care at end of life); see also In 
re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]here may be occa-
sions when an inheritance could be a reason to question a surrogate’s ability to make an objective 
decision.”). 
 364.  See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 171 (describing the difficulty of deciding 
in someone’s best interest when also responsible for their healthcare costs). 
 365.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 783 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).  
 366.  The IOM defines “vulnerable groups” in the following way:  
This report’s use of the term “vulnerable populations” goes beyond the conventional us-
age, which applies to people from ethnic, cultural, and racial minorities; people with low 
educational attainment or low health literacy; and those in prisons or having limited ac-
cess to care for geographic or financial reasons.  Here it includes people with serious 
illnesses, multiple chronic diseases, and disabilities (physical, mental, or cognitive); the 
frail elderly; and those without access to needed health services.  In this latter sense, 
almost all people nearing the end of life can rightly be considered a “vulnerable popula-
tion.” 
IOM, supra note 48, at 28; see also id. at 38–39 (providing specific examples of vulnerable persons). 
  It is important to note, however, that not all members of “vulnerable groups” are, in fact, 
vulnerable.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 267–68 (“[F]or many groups a label cov-
ering all members of the group serves to overprotect, stereotype, and even disqualify members ca-
pable of making their own decisions.”).   
 367.   See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732 (majority opinion) (“An insidious bias against the 
handicapped—again coupled with a cost-saving mentality—makes them especially in need of 
Washington’s statutory protection.” (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 
593 (9th Cir. 1995))); see also Elizabeth Pendo, What Patients with Disabilities Teach Us About the 
Everyday Ethics of Health Care, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 292–96 (2015) (describing physi-
cian bias against persons with disabilities, and the negative encounters persons with disabilities 
report having with healthcare providers, which may lead to poor health care); Searight & Gafford, 
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Given concerns about compromised patient autonomy when seriously 
ill due to relational conflicts of interest or disregard for the patient’s wellbe-
ing, and given that failing to adequately protect patients from coercion may 
cost them their life or inflict suffering, end-of-life decision-making law and 
policy appropriately privilege autonomy and beneficence.  Fortunately, my 
proposed modified defaults and use of priming will likely not increase patient 
vulnerability or reduce autonomy,368 and there are existing safeguards that 
can also assuage concerns about relational nudges in end-of-life decision-
making law and policy.369 
The primary existing safeguard for patient autonomy is the fiduciary 
duty owed by physicians to their patients.  The physician should be acting in 
the best interests of their patient, and if they are fulfilling this duty, they will 
not act with disregard to their patients370 and will monitor whether their com-
petent and capacitated patients are being unduly influenced by others to de-
cide in a way contrary to the patient’s preferences.371  Physicians who are 
concerned about undue familial influence can try to speak to their patients 
privately.372  Furthermore, physicians can “safeguard [their incapacitated] pa-
tient’s interests and preferences, where known, by monitoring the quality of 
surrogate decision making,”373 and pay special attention to the incompetent 
                                                          
supra note 167, at 519–21 (reviewing literature about how African Americans fear that physicians 
do not value their lives).  
 368.  See Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 223, at 4 (arguing that nudging should not 
make vulnerable persons worse off).  The nudges I discuss in this Article are just that: nudges.  There 
are no mandates to involve or consider anyone else when making end-of-life decisions.  With respect 
to priming, in particular, if someone does not want their family involved in their decision, the prim-
ing is unlikely to change their behavior in this context.  The nudge, in theory, should only change 
the behavior of those inclined to decide with or for their family, but who through failures of ration-
ality neglect to do so unless prompted to. 
 369.  See Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1744–45 (asserting that existing safeguards are sufficient 
to protect persons for whom end-of-life decisions are being made). 
 370.  See NELSON & NELSON, supra note 157, at 116.  Also, should physicians not act in the 
best interests of their patients, this is a breach of duty, and if it results in harm, the tort system can 
aid with supplying a remedy.   
 371.  BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 64–65.  Further, “[a]ttention to potential signs of 
neglect and abuse, such as the family’s explicit and adamant refusal to consider the patient’s well-
being or repeated attempts to override the patient’s expressed preferences can be helpful.”  Ho, 
supra note 174, at 132.  In the context of physician AID, see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 783 (Souter, 
J., concurring) (“But one of the points of restricting any right of assistance to physicians would be 
to condition the right on an exercise of judgment by someone qualified to assess the patient’s re-
sponsible capacity and detect the influence of those outside the medical relationship.”). 
When I speak of “monitoring,” I do not mean to suggest non-stop surveillance, which would 
be administratively burdensome for clinicians (and beyond their expertise), and would also violate 
the patient’s and family’s privacy.  I mean only that in the course of routine provision of medical 
care, physicians and nurses should observe the patient’s interactions with their family and be aware 
of anything that suggests undue influence or that the patient is being harmed. 
 372.  BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 64–65; Blackler, supra note 357, at 287; Ho, supra 
note 174, at 133.   
 373.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 191. 
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patient’s protests or dissent.374  Prior to their patient’s incapacity, however, 
physicians can aid patients in protecting their autonomy against undue famil-
ial influence by suggesting that their patients appoint a trusted healthcare 
agent or write a living will.375  I would still suggest, however, that in this 
appointment and written directions, patients are primed to consider relation-
ality, as I described above.376 
The next existing safeguard is hospitals and healthcare providers, who 
typically have institutional actors and policies that can aid in protecting pa-
tients and facilitating resolution of disagreements.377  Often, hospital ethics 
committees or consultants can aid in these roles.378  Should oversight by phy-
sicians or consultation with ethics committees not be sufficient to protect pa-
tients at the end of life, there is always the judicial system.  “When good 
reasons exist to appoint guardians or to disqualify familial decisionmakers or 
health care professionals to protect an incompetent patient’s interests, the 
courts may legitimately be involved.”379 
However, it should be noted that people often make decisions with fam-
ily interests in mind, including financial interests, and this does not neces-
sarily constitute undue pressure or necessitate oversight by physicians, ethics 
committees, or courts.380  As leading end-of-life clinical care guidelines re-
mind clinicians, “[t]eam members should be mindful that . . . any patient with 
decision-making capacity may choose to consult with loved ones or oth-
ers.”381  Scholars have likewise observed that “[m]ost families have a history 
of collaborating around critical personal and family decisions long before en-
tering a medical setting.  These intimate relationships shape the family’s core 
                                                          
 374.  Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1730, 1742–43.  Physicians can also rely on capacity determi-
nations rather than a legal designation of incompetence, and allow capacitated patients to make 
decisions to the extent they are able.  Id. at 1742.   
 375.  Blackler, supra note 357, at 287–88. 
 376.  See supra Part III.C.3. 
 377.  BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 14–15.  Some argue, however, that hospitals and 
physicians may not be vigilant in their role in protecting vulnerable patients because of financial 
disincentives to preserve life.  In the context of physicians not maintaining the line between assisted 
suicide and euthanasia, see, for example, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 784–85 (Souter, J., concurring) 
(“Physicians, and their hospitals, have their own financial incentives, too, in this new age of man-
aged care.”). 
 378.  BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 64–65.  As others have noted, ethics “committees 
have a robust role to play in circumstances in which physicians acquiesce too readily to parental, 
familial, or guardian choices that prove contrary to a patient’s best interests.”  BEAUCHAMP & 
CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 192. 
 379.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 192. 
 380.  There is evidence that individuals willingly make decisions to hasten their deaths to avoid 
being a financial burden on their families.  See, e.g., Singer et al., supra note 204, at 166; see also 
NELSON & NELSON, supra note 157, at 90 (“Someone, now incompetent, . . . might well have 
wanted to forgo treatment that maximally advances her interests if it is gotten at great emotional or 
financial cost to the rest of her family.”). 
 381.  BERLINGER ET AL., supra note 90, at 64–65. 
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values and beliefs and inform decision making.”382  This is because “familial 
care relationships are not generally based on temporary contracts but on em-
pathy and beneficence family members have towards one another.”383  Thus, 
law and policy should not “over protect” people from their families, and 
should not necessarily assume that an individual’s end-of-life decision-mak-
ing process with their family is different from other decisions they make with 
their families.  As Sunstein asserts, “[i]n daily life, people defer to others, 
including friends and family members, on countless matters, and they are of-
ten better off as a result.”384 
Furthermore, people may change their minds about their end-of-life de-
cisions after they consider relational interests, and this does not necessarily 
mean they have been unduly pressured.  As one scholar argued, 
many patients reconsider previously held values, wishes, and pref-
erences in the setting of broader effects on family. . . . Patients may 
decide to set aside personal wishes for the good of the family or as 
a means to maintain peace and harmony with loved ones.  Given 
the interconnectedness present in many families, it is reasonable 
for patients to altruistically consider others when making serious 
medical decisions, even decisions in conflict with strongly held be-
liefs.385 
The final existing safeguard is physiological in nature.  All of the end-
of-life decision-making law and policy discussed in this Article is triggered 
only when a person is dependent upon life-sustaining medical treatment or is 
terminally ill.  It is thus not obvious why there should be so much concern 
about relational abuses during this time period.386  There should of course be 
procedural safeguards in place, but fear should not drive policy to the point 
                                                          
 382.  Blackler, supra note 357, at 285.  As some scholars have observed,  
Reciprocal concern and sympathy that people feel for their loved ones can help to explain 
why intimates’ involvement and consideration of their well-being do not necessarily con-
stitute undue pressure.  For those whose family is at the centre of their existence, consid-
eration of their advice, needs and mutual interests is part of their autonomous agency.   
Ho, supra note 174, at 132. 
 383.  Ho, supra note 174, at 130; see also NELSON & NELSON, supra note 157, at 90, 94 (de-
scribing how family relations are often based on love and obligation and that if surrogates make 
decisions conscientiously on behalf of a patient, the moral authority given to the surrogates in this 
context excuses any error in the decision); Joseph J. Fins, From Contract to Covenant in Advance 
Care Planning, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 46, 48 (1999) (describing a covenantal approach to surro-
gate decisionmaking that can arise from trusting, reciprocal relationships between patient and proxy 
and contrasting to the contractual approach embodied in existing law). 
 384.  Sunstein, supra note 245, at xix. 
 385.  Blackler, supra note 357, at 288; see also Broom & Kirby, supra note 129, at 503–36. 
 386.  Additionally, “[m]ost families don’t use the health care delivery system as a means of mis-
treating the helpless.”  NELSON & NELSON, supra note 157, at 115. 
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that it deprives persons of what they prefer,387 given that the cost of not hav-
ing adequate protection is relatively low (e.g., deprivation of a few months 
of likely poor quality living), and the cost of having too much protection is 
relatively high (e.g., people do not have the death they prefer). 
4.  Implementing Recommended Relational Nudges Is Feasible 
Some may argue that my proposed nudges are not feasible to implement.  
After all, the process of legal change is sometimes difficult.  However, end-
of-life decision-making law and policy is rapidly changing as more states le-
galize physician AID and organizations are searching for better ways to man-
age care at the end of life due to the rapid aging of the population.388  Given 
that law and policies are in a state of flux, now is an opportune time to make 
additional changes that can help promote autonomy and welfare in end-of-
life decisionmaking. 
Furthermore, many of my proposals are directed at institutional policy 
and clinical practice, such as changing state-provided standardized advance 
directive forms or POLST forms to prime for relational decisionmaking, 
which bypass the need for formal legal change and all of the political battles 
that accompany formal legal changes.  Therefore, implementing many of 
these nudges should not be difficult, although if done without public notice 
and comment, the process of implementing these nudges may be subject to 
criticisms of non-transparency.389  So, for example, if the POLST form is 
changed, physicians should be told the reason for the change (i.e., to promote 
shared decisionmaking), given that they are a key stakeholder group.  It may 
be that in consulting with physicians about proposed changes, physicians will 
have the opportunity to provide other feedback about how to make the 
POLST form more useful in clinical practice (beyond relational nudging and 
promotion of relational autonomy), and additional changes can be made to 
                                                          
 387.  The relational nudges are meant to bring more balance to end-of-life decision-making law 
and policy, which is almost completely derelationalized.  If the proposed nudges are adopted, ad-
mittedly this may lead to some instances where other parties exert undue influence on a patient 
when under the current derelationalized system they would be unable to.  It is my hope, however, 
that these instances will be greatly outweighed by the increased numbers of people who are able to 
make decisions at the end of life in the way that studies show they prefer: in consultation with and 
in consideration of others. 
 388.  For example, as this Article is in the publication process, Hawaii has legalized physician 
AID.  Carla Herreria, Hawaii Becomes the 7th State to Legalize Medically Assisted Suicide, 
HUFFPOST (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hawaii-legalizes-assisted-sui-
cide_us_5ac6c6f5e4b0337ad1e621fb. 
 389.  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 240, 244–45 (arguing for increased transpar-
ency in the choice architecture process).  See generally Capron & Spruijt-Metz, supra note 242.   
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the form that promote overall welfare.390  For state-provided end-of-life plan-
ning documents, the websites on which they are hosted can explain to resi-
dents of the state that the forms have been revised to prompt people to discuss 
their end-of-life wishes with family.  Disclosing the reasons behind the policy 
may help create buy-in. 
Some may wonder why the focus is on legal and policy change rather 
than other types of change,391 such as attempts to influence the larger culture 
that fears death to the point of ignoring its reality until someone is actively 
dying.  I have argued, however, for changes beyond law and policy, such as 
changing clinical practice, especially with respect to shared decisionmaking 
models becoming the default mode of healthcare provision.  And with regard 
to changing the culture of avoidance around death and dying, it is likely more 
feasible to change the structure—laws and policies—than to try to enact 
widespread cultural and psychological change.392  In fact, it is through chang-
ing the structure that cultural changes in this realm may become possible; that 
is, changing law and policy may normalize conversations about end of life, 
which may decrease avoidance of discussions of death and dying. 
5.  More Research Needs to be Conducted 
Some may question whether end-of-life decisions are not routinely be-
ing made in consultation with and in consideration of others, even if the law 
does not promote relational autonomy.  There is not a lot of empirical evi-
dence about what happens when these decisions must be made,393 and more 
                                                          
 390.  There may be some physician resistance to altering the POLST form in a way that slows 
down the process of completing the form.  If physicians are informed that the changes are to promote 
patient autonomy, perhaps this explicit explanation of intention will lessen resistance.  (More ma-
terial changes, such as adequate compensation for the time spent discussing end of life with their 
patients may be more likely to assuage concerns of physicians rather than appeals to principles.)  
Physician preference for efficiency should not override patient autonomy, however. 
 391.  Clinicians are also beginning to advocate for taking into account patient and family pref-
erences and values in healthcare decisionmaking at the levels of clinical practice and guidelines.  
This is occurring not just with the proliferation of shared decision-making models, but also includes 
considering patient perspectives when drafting clinical practice guidelines.  See Murray Krahn & 
Gary Naglie, The Next Step in Guideline Development: Incorporating Patient Preferences, 300 
JAMA 436, 436–37 (2008).  While clinical practice undoubtedly affects end-of-life decisionmaking 
and experiences, the overall context for end-of-life decisionmaking derives in large part from law 
and policy. 
 392.  There has been cultural change around end-of-life planning in some places, but it is unclear 
whether the changes can be reflected in a bigger, more heterogenous population.  See Chana Joffe-
Walt, The Town Where Everyone Talks About Death, NPR MORNING EDITION (March 5, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2014/03/05/286126451/living-wills-are-the-talk-of-the-town-
in-la-crosse-wis? (discussing how almost everyone who dies in La Crosse, Wisconsin completes an 
advance directive because a local hospital clinician helped normalize discussing end of life in the 
community). 
 393.  An ideal research design would study these decisions as they unfold (i.e., using ethno-
graphic methods), which is difficult to do with respect to resources (these decisions occur over time, 
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research on end-of-life decisionmaking in action should be conducted.  The 
limited evidence available suggests, however, that some people do not per-
ceive that they are making autonomous choices at all,394 leading some schol-
ars to question whether in institutional settings patients can experience au-
tonomy at the end of life,395 especially given power imbalances between 
physicians and patients,396 which would make some of my proposals espe-
cially important. 
Even if decisions are routinely made in a relational manner, however, 
there is value to having relational autonomy explicitly reflected in the law, in 
part, because it defines the boundaries of permissible behavior,397 while sim-
ultaneously expressing the symbolic value398 of the importance of human 
connectedness.  Moreover, as the Saikewicz court asserted about the need for 
law to respond to established medical practice and ethics, 
“[t]he law always lags behind the most advanced thinking in every 
area.  It must wait until the theologians and the moral leaders and 
events have created some common ground, some consensus.”. . .  
We therefore think it advisable to consider the framework of med-
ical ethics which influences a doctor’s decision as to how to deal 
with the terminally ill patient.  While these considerations are not 
                                                          
and across multiple interactions, and the study thus would ideally be longitudinal), but also in terms 
of access (it is difficult for researchers to be present for healthcare encounters).  There are also not 
many court cases in which a record of decisionmaking is provided.  See Shepherd, supra note 21, 
at 1704 n.38 (“[T]he vast majority of these decisions are made outside of court review [in hospitals 
and nursing homes].”). 
 394.  See, e.g., Shepherd & Hall, supra note 112, at 1445 (“[P]atients are not actively making 
choices, that that notion is itself a bit of a fiction.”); Drought & Koenig, supra note 135, at 121 (“In 
fact, few patients, family members, or health care providers believed that many decisions were ac-
tually made. . . .  [I]n most cases, there was not an experience or a perception of choice on anyone’s 
part.  Some patients denied outright that they had made any medical decisions, even though multiple 
decisions to pursue or forgo treatment (such as surgery) had, in fact, been made, or at least had 
occurred.”).  
 395.  Ho, supra note 174, at 130 (describing how institutionalized patients at the end of life enter 
unfamiliar settings with unfamiliar people and are not able to exercise agency).   
 396.  Drought & Koenig, supra note 135, at 116.  
 397.  See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 659–60 (N.J. 1976) (“It is both possible and neces-
sary for society to have laws and ethical standards which provide freedom for decisions, in accord 
with the expressed or implied intentions of the patient, to terminate or withhold extraordinary treat-
ment in cases which are judged to be hopeless by competent medical authorities, without at the same 
time leaving an opening for euthanasia.  Indeed, to accomplish this, it may simply be required that 
courts and legislative bodies recognize the present standards and practices of many people engaged 
in medical care who have been doing what the parents of Karen Ann Quinlan are requesting author-
ization to have done for their beloved daughter.”). 
 398.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 
2021 (1996).  
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controlling, they ought to be considered for the insights they give 
us.399 
Others might object that my proposals are premature because there is no 
evidence that these nudges would work in practice,400 or that they would have 
effects that patients, their families, and physicians would desire.401  While it 
is true that we do not know the effect of these proposed nudges or whether 
any effects would be desirable, it is worth seeing if these proposals would be 
of help to those involved in end-of-life decisionmaking.  It may therefore be 
best to think of these proposals as hypotheses to be tested.  Because much of 
what governs end-of-life decisionmaking is at the level of state law or insti-
tutional policy, it may be advisable to test these nudges on a small scale—a 
particular state statutory schema or a specific hospital’s policy. 
For example, one of my proposed nudges can be assessed in the follow-
ing way.  A healthcare organization can alter their POLST form to put the 
question about healthcare agents at the top of the form.  The organization can 
then randomly give the former POLST form and the revised POLST form to 
a set of physicians.  The organization can then compare whether answers to 
questions about life-sustaining treatment differ significantly between the two 
groups to see if the nudge had any effect.  The organization can then follow 
up with these patients, their families, and their healthcare providers over time 
to determine whether and how the process of end-of-life decisionmaking is 
different between the two groups and whether the intervention—the nudge to 
consider relationality prior to making end-of-life decisions—improved the 
quality of dying.402 
As other scholars have noted, “behavioral policy insists on being empir-
ical and pragmatic about any proposed policy intervention.  After all, if we 
are interested in manipulating behavior, the ultimate question is whether the 
intervention works to achieve the desired behaviors.”403  We will never know 
                                                          
 399.  Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Mass. 1977) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (citing J. Russell Elkinton, The Dying Patient, the Doctor, 
and the Law, 13 VILL. L. REV. 740 (1968)). 
 400.  A common critique of biomedical ethics scholarship is that it is not easily translatable to 
or reflective of clinical practice.  See Larry R. Churchill et al., Five Threats to Patient-Centered 
Care: With Questions for Health Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 251, 256 (2015).   
 401.  See Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 223, at 6 (arguing that priming is only 
ethical if it is evidence-based). 
 402.  Because this is research on human subjects, it would need to be approved by an Institutional 
Review Board, unless it fell under the category of quality improvement for a particular healthcare 
organization.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Quality Improvement Activities FAQ, 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/faq/quality-improvement-activities/in-
dex.html (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 403.  Robertson et al., supra note 198, at 4; see also Hall et al., supra note 205, at 344 (arguing 
for a “patient-centered empiricism” that studies “what actually happens to patients and . . . how 
public policy initiatives actually affect patients” (emphasis omitted)); Shepherd & Hall, supra note 
112, at 1451 (arguing for empirical analysis rather than assuming proposals will work in practice). 
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unless we are willing to experiment, and so I advocate for rigorous testing of 
my proposals, all of which are in the service of promoting relational auton-
omy, and subsequently the best interests, of people at the end of life.404 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Autonomy is the central principle in end-of-life decision-making law 
and policy.  Much of this body of law conceives of autonomous decisionmak-
ing as an independent, individualistic endeavor and recognizes a person’s re-
lation to others only to a limited extent.  However, social science research 
has demonstrated that while people want to retain control over their 
healthcare decisions at the end of life, many people prefer to make end-of-
life decisions in consultation with and in consideration of others.  Patients 
want to share in end-of-life decisions with their healthcare providers, want to 
have strong relationships with loved ones when they are dying, and often 
make decisions based on a preference not to burden others—emotionally or 
financially.  Stated differently, for most people, the exercise of autonomy is 
relational in practice. 
The divergence between these conceptualizations of autonomy matter 
because most people do not adequately plan for decisions that must be made 
at the end of life, a time when many persons confronting death no longer have 
decisional capacity.  Legal defaults thus determine how decisions are made: 
by surrogates chosen under a default scheme, using default standards or in-
structions documented on default forms.  While these defaults are meant to 
effectuate autonomy, given the divergence in understandings of this concept, 
current law and policy may not do the best job at promoting autonomy, as 
defined and experienced by those governed by these laws.405 
The question then becomes, how can the law be more responsive to peo-
ple’s relational preferences, values, and concerns at the end of life and actu-
ally promote autonomy, the primary principle in this body of law?  This Ar-
ticle argues for building in relational nudges into end-of-life decision-making 
law and policy, to account for failures of rationality that may prevent people 
from making decisions according to their stated preferences (in this case, with 
respect to the background context of their relationships) and to reduce nega-
tive effects end-of-life decisions may have on third parties such as surviving 
                                                          
 404.  Aaron S. Kesselheim, Introduction to Part V, in NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 134, at 220 
(“How do we implement these principles in a way that supports positive outcomes and avoids the 
potential risks?  Not surprisingly, the leading answer is more research.”). 
 405.  As other scholars have noted, “social and family considerations are not well captured in 
the current approach to end-of-life decision making . . . which focuses on the patient’s rights indi-
vidually and not in his or her social and family context.  Traditional approaches . . . may underesti-
mate the importance of social and family ties.”  Singer et al., supra note 204, at 167. 
 
1140 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:1062 
 
family members and healthcare providers.  This Article offers some prelimi-
nary thoughts about the form these relational nudges should take.  Some of 
the suggested nudges modify existing defaults, and many also take advantage 
of priming effects to prompt people to make decisions in consultation with 
and in consideration of relevant others.  These nudges are directed at patients, 
surrogates, and physicians. 
This Article is in conversation with scholars who have recently begun 
to apply “relational theory” to health law406 and who have argued for the de-
velopment of a “relationship-centered” health law.407  To date, most of the 
existing scholarship focuses on the physician-patient relationship rather than 
other types of relationships,408 whereas this Article has tried to bring family 
relationships into the legal analysis.  Furthermore, while scholars have ap-
plied the concept of relational autonomy to other bodies of law,409 and in 
particular to family law where the connection may be clearer,410 exploring 
relational autonomy in health law is just beginning.411 
                                                          
 406.  Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Jocelyn Downie, Introduction, in BEING RELATIONAL supra note 
203, at 4.  This seems to be a move made by Canada-affiliated scholars.  See, e.g., id. (“Relational 
theory . . . is focused on relationality—the fact of relationship . . . .  Through this lens . . . we can 
see the ways in which being in relationship is integral to self-understanding and to interactions with 
others at individual, collective, and even institutional levels.”); Maneesha Deckha, Non-Human An-
imals and Human Health: A Relational Approach to the Use of Animals in Medical Research, in 
BEING RELATIONAL, supra note 203, at 287 (describing relational theory as the “quite simple ac-
knowledgment that human beings are relational and interdependent and that law’s stark reliance on 
individualism and independence fails to capture the centrality of relationships and the importance 
of our responsibilities to others”); NEDELSKY, supra note 176, at 41 (discussing how relational the-
ory can be applied to any value, but focusing on autonomy given its importance in the legal system 
in the West). 
 407.  This can be seen in the United States in recent health law symposia.  See Mark A. Hall, 
Foreword: Toward Relationship-Centered Health Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 233 (2015).  Hall 
describes where relationships are central to various parts of health law, and notes that such an anal-
ysis is just beginning.  Id.; see also Hall et al., supra note 205, at 341–43 (describing what a rela-
tional perspective in health law might look like); Lois Shepherd, Different Ways to Understand 
Patient-Centered Health Law, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1469, 1470 (2010) (arguing for “family-
centered” health law).  
 408.  Shepherd and Hall argue that “[t]here are just too many players involved in modern medical 
care . . . to think in terms of a physician-patient dyad anymore.”  Shepherd & Hall, supra note 112, 
at 1448.  But the only article that discussed a relationship other than a physician-patient relationship 
in a recent symposium on relationship-centered health law discussed the relationship between re-
searchers and subjects in the context of human subjects research regulation.  See generally Rebecca 
Dresser, What Subjects Teach: The Everyday Ethics of Human Research, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
301 (2015). 
 409.  See NEDELSKY, supra note 176, at 3–5 (arguing for changes in Anglo-American law to 
reflect the relational self). 
 410.  JONATHAN HERRING, RELATIONAL AUTONOMY AND FAMILY LAW 59–60 (2014); 
NEDELSKY, supra note 176, at 67. 
 411.  See, e.g., Sheila Wildeman, Insight Revisited: Relationality and Psychiatric Treatment De-
cision-Making Capacity, in BEING RELATIONAL, supra note 203, at 255, 267 (relying on the concept 
of relational autonomy to describe how institutions and societal conditions enable or disable deci-
sional capacity).   
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This Article thus hopes to advance scholarship on relational autonomy 
at the end of life and extend beyond the physician-patient relationship, and 
also set the stage for applications of this concept to the larger body of health 
law and disability law scholarship.  In particular, this Article will set a foun-
dation to consider how alternative, more realistic conceptualizations of au-
tonomy matter for law and policy around general healthcare decisionmaking 
for persons with cognitive disabilities, and for end-of-life decisionmaking in 
the context of dementia.  That is, when the law recognizes that autonomy is 
relational in practice, then persons with cognitive disabilities who need as-
sistance in decisionmaking may be able to retain decision-making authority 
rather than have such authority transferred to an agent, surrogate, or guardian.  
                                                          
  Several prominent health law scholars in the United States seem to think there is no further 
value in analyzing or promoting autonomy in health law, however.  See, e.g., Hall, supra note 407; 
Hall et al., supra note 205, at 341 (“The dominant paradigms—patient autonomy and market the-
ory—have largely done their work and run their course.”); Shepherd & Hall, supra note 112, at 
1431 (describing how patient-centered health law perspectives are too focused on autonomy and 
not focused enough on relationships); Lois Shepherd & Margaret Mohrmann, Welcome, Healing, 
and Ethics, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 259, 259 (2015) (same).  This may be because such scholars 
contrast autonomy with relationships, whereas I think promoting autonomy is compatible with a 
focus on relationships because autonomy is relational in practice.  
